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JPRS-TAC-88-026
13 JULY 1988




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Qian Qichen's Speech at UN Disarmament Session

OW2206013788 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
13-19 Jun 88 p 14-18

["Text" of speech by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, chairman of the PRC delegation at the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, made at the session on 2 June]

[Text] As we gather in the headquarters of the United Nations for the third time to devote ourselves specially to the issue of disarmament, we find ourselves in a world where the arms race is still going on, the international situation remains turbulent, peace is jeopardized and security not ensured. The danger of war is still there. But on the other hand, we see that over the years there have been increasingly strong calls from people everywhere for a halt to the arms race and for preservation of world peace. The developing countries want development and peace. The developed countries want no war. The United States and the Soviet Union, too, declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The Non-Aligned Movement and numerous world and regional organizations and conferences have been engaged in the search for proper solutions to the major issues confronting various regions and the world as whole. The people of the world and all peace-loving nations with their aspiration and actions to maintain peace are playing a role of growing importance in containing war. Therefore, we believe that while the danger of war still exists, the forces for peace outgrow the factors making for war and that peace can be maintained. Recently, there has been some new positive development in the international situation. The conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles last December has led to a certain degree of relaxation in East-West relations. The signing of the Geneva accords on the Afghan question last April has shown that progress has been made in the endeavour to seek political settlement to regional conflicts.

Ten years have elapsed since the convening of the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. We are pleased to note that this has been by no means a fruitless decade.

Firstly, the campaign to halt the arms race and promote disarmament constitutes an ever stronger force for maintaining peace and containing war. Numerous countries have joined in the struggle for disarmament. Various social forces working for peace have converged into a surging and irresistible historical trend.

Secondly, an effective approach has been adopted for disarmament. Since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the international community has realized more and more clearly that the armaments possessed by either of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, far

exceed those of any other country and that the nuclear weapons they possess account for more than 95 percent of the world's nuclear arsenal. In view of this fact, the two superpowers bear a special responsibility for disarmament and should take the lead in drastically reducing their armaments, especially their nuclear weapons. Now this view is shared by all countries in the world, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Disarmament has been turned from a good desire of the people of all countries into an action that has a clear starting point and practical goal.

Thirdly, some concrete progress has been made in disarmament. The U.S.-Soviet INF treaty is the first treaty ever signed between them for cutting down the existing nuclear weapons. It is our hope that this treaty will be observed and implemented in real earnest and that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to move forward on the way to reducing strategic nuclear weapons and the other types of nuclear weapons.

You will, I believe, agree that the achievements made in the disarmament field have been hard-won. These achievements, though initial, have been encouraging to the people striving for disarmament, bringing them some hope for further disarmament.

Now I would like to take up the other aspect of the question. That is, the current situation remains grave; the task for disarmament is still most arduous and we have a long way to go, so we should never slacken our efforts.

First, as we all know, the nuclear weapons covered by the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty constitute a very small portion, only 3 to 4 percent, of the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. If they can reach agreement on the 50 percent reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons and implement it, they would be taking another step forward. The results of the recent U.S.-Soviet summit show that it will take an arduous process of negotiations to reach such an agreement. The problem is that even if they do cut by half the number of their nuclear weapons, their nuclear arsenals will still account for approximately 90 percent of the world's total and moreover, will hold absolute superiority in quality, sufficient to destroy all life on earth many times over, thus keeping humanity under the shadow of nuclear threat.

In their negotiations on disarmament, the two superpowers have paid great attention to "balance" and "equal security" between themselves. The question, however, is whether with "balance" and "equal security" between them, there will be peace and tranquility in the world. Things are by no means that simple. The egregious imbalance in military forces between the two superpowers and the rest of the world makes the vast majority of countries feel extremely insecure. This state of affairs cannot be changed unless the two superpowers take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear weapons of all types. Second, chemical weapons pose a threat to and are

detested by mankind. So far there have occurred from time to time instances involving the use of chemical weapons between belligerents. Therefore, besides nuclear disarmament, the issue of complete prohibition of chemical weapons requires the efforts of countries around the world for an early solution.

Third, as nuclear disarmament is under progress, conventional arms reduction should not be neglected either. One should not forget that conventional weapons were invariably used in the frequent military invasions and armed occupations of sovereign states which have taken place since World War II. In Europe, where the countries are deeply concerned about disarmament, what the two major military blocs in sharp confrontation possess are mainly conventional arms. The bulk of the US\$1,000 billion worth of world military expenditure every year is spent on conventional weapons. At present, conventional armaments are developing rapidly. The number of naval vessels is growing; weapons are being upgraded at a faster pace; and advanced science and technology are being increasingly applied to conventional weapons, resulting in greater accuracy, kill and destructiveness. Particularly disturbing is the fact that there is no impassable chasm between conventional war and nuclear war. Once a large-scale conventional war breaks out, no one can guarantee against its escalating into a nuclear war. Therefore, it is our consistent view that drastic conventional arms reduction is also of great importance.

I should also like to stress that since all have expressed support for disarmament, it is self-evident that first and foremost the arms race should be halted. It will go against the wish of the people of the world for disarmament if, after some cuts in armaments have been achieved through years of painstaking and complicated negotiations, all-out efforts are made to push the arms race forward. It is regrettable that the arms race is still going on. The two major nuclear powers are stepping up their efforts to upgrade their nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Long-range cruise missiles have emerged as a new strategic nuclear force and are in the process of further development. Strategic nuclear weapons are being improved in respect of accuracy, mobility and stealth. So are tactical nuclear weapons. With the development of space weapons, a new type of strategic weapon which serves concurrently defensive and offensive purposes, outer space, which is a common heritage of humanity and ought to be developed and utilized for peaceful purposes, will become an area of arms race between the two superpowers.

At present, people should be on guard against an important change which is taking place in the superpower arms race, i.e., quantitative reduction but qualitative improvement. Their nuclear weapons have been piled up to such a magnitude that, as is aptly pointed out, it makes no real difference whether one can destroy one's opponent 60 times or 40 times. Therefore, application of the latest scientific and technological research findings to

the development and manufacture of new types of weapons is becoming a new trend in their arms race. This is very dangerous. Numerical reductions in armaments are of course a good thing. But will qualitative development of more and newer types of armaments make the world safer and peace more secure?

What should be done when we face so many complex problems in the field of disarmament?

In our view, successful experience in disarmament gained so far can serve as an important guide to the solution of these problems.

First, experience tells us that a realistic objective must be set and an effective approach followed if there is to be success in disarmament. The present situation of world armaments determines that the superpowers bear a special responsibility for disarmament and that they should take the lead in drastically reducing their respective armaments. Their signing of the INF treaty is a first step in line with this effective approach. Only by persisting in this approach can we achieve further concrete results in the cause of disarmament.

Second, experience tells us that disarmament is a major issue concerning world peace and the security of states. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, should have a say and the right to take part in discussions and to raise demands and put forward suggestions. In fact, progress made in the disarmament field so far is not separable from the joint efforts by all countries.

Third, experience tells us that the role of the people of the world should not be ignored: The World Disarmament Campaign initiated by the United Nations, the voice of nongovernmental organizations and the discussions by academic societies have produced tremendous impact morally and psychologically and in the aspect of public opinion, giving a strong impetus to the cause of disarmament.

Here I wish to briefly sum up the consistent position and propositions of the Chinese Government on disarmament as follows:

1. As the nuclear arms race poses a general, grave threat to world peace and security, nuclear disarmament should be given top priority in the reduction of all types of armaments.
2. The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.
3. The two superpowers, which bear a special responsibility, should take the lead in putting an end to the testing, manufacturing and deploying of all types of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing and eliminating all types of nuclear weapons each of them has deployed in any region at home or abroad. Then a

broadly represented international conference on nuclear disarmament can be convened with the participation of all nuclear states to discuss what steps and measures should be taken for a thorough destruction of nuclear armaments.

4. Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, we hope to see all nuclear states undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states or nuclear-free zones.

5. There is also an urgent need to drastically reduce conventional armaments. The conventional armaments of all states should be used only for defence and not for aggression against other states or threat to their security.

6. An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons should be concluded at an early date.

7. An international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons should be concluded at an early date.

8. All states have the right to take part in the discussions and solution of disarmament issues on an equal footing. The legitimate interests and just demands of the small and medium-sized countries should be respected.

Disarmament is no doubt important for the maintenance of world peace, but it is apparently not enough to pin our hopes only on disarmament for the maintenance of world peace. While we meet here, the world we live in is still far from tranquil. A series of prolonged regional conflicts continue to undermine the security of the countries concerned and threaten world peace. Year after year we have been discussing these issues here at the United Nations. The recently signed Geneva Accords on the Afghan question represent a victory for international justice. The United Nations organization has made praiseworthy contributions towards this end. Naturally, people may ask: Why doesn't Vietnam make up its mind to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea since the Soviet Union is already resolved to pull out its troops from Afghanistan? The Vietnamese people, having survived the scourge of war in Vietnam, urgently need a period of rehabilitation and economic development after the war. The Vietnamese authorities, however, motivated by their wild ambition for expansion, have dragged their country into the quagmire of a war of aggression against Kampuchea, indulging themselves in military expansion. This has brought enormous sufferings to both the Kampuchean and Vietnamese peoples. Any attempt on the part of the Vietnamese authorities to keep their troops in Kampuchea under whatever pretext would be doomed to failure. Now it is high time that they made up their mind to withdraw all their forces as soon as possible.

The Chinese Government regards peace and development as the two major issues of the present-day world. It is for the purpose of both peace and development that we strive for disarmament. The United Nations has held a special conference and conducted in-depth discussions on the relationship between disarmament and development. It is widely agreed that without a proper solution to the development issue, international peace and stability would be adversely affected. At present, the gap between North and South is still widening. As a result of falling prices of oil, raw materials and primary products and the irrational international economic order, the Third World is sustaining great losses. The accumulative total of US\$1,200 billion foreign debt, a crushing burden, has weighed heavily on some developing countries. The trade protectionism of some developed countries has added to the economic difficulties of debtor nations. Now the developing countries are already adopting measures to readjust their economies, including measures of cutting down expenses, painful as they are. It is clear, however, that such huge international economic problems cannot be solved only on the strength of the measures taken by the developing countries alone. We therefore call on the developed countries to pursue farsighted policies and provide necessary and reasonable conditions for the developing countries in terms of finance, trade and so on in order to facilitate the latter's development and enhance their debt service ability. As the world has developed to what it is today, economic interdependence of countries has reached a high degree, so it is very difficult for the developed countries to maintain their prosperity on the basis of prolonged poverty of developing countries. This problem is so serious that all the countries in the world have reason to feel worried. Some people have compared the debt crisis to an atom bomb dangling over the heads of mankind. I do not think it is alarmist talk.

Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China is the only developing country. China is whole-heartedly dedicated to its modernization programme. Only in an international environment of enduring peace will it be possible for China to accomplish this historic task. China is committed to the maintenance of world peace and interested in the attainment of disarmament. It is opposed to the arms race and never takes part in it. The small number of nuclear weapons in China's possession is entirely for self-defense. From the very day when we tested the first atom bomb, we have declared once and again that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has long stopped nuclear testing in the atmosphere. It has undertaken not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones as it understands the desire of non-nuclear weapon states concerned for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and respects such zones already established. Following its signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, China signed last year Protocol II and Protocol III attached to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.

In its dedication to the promotion of world peace and disarmament, China has not only actively put forward proposals, but put them into practice. As soon as the international situation permitted, China voluntarily decided to reduce its troops by 1 million, and the troop reduction was already completed last year. Many of our military airports and seaports have been converted to civilian or military-civilian use. A considerable number of our military industrial enterprises have been shifted to production of civilian goods. The proportion of China's national defense expenditure in the state budget has dropped from 17.5 percent in 1979 to 8 percent this year. Our current military expenditure totals approximately 5.5 million in US dollars, that is, about US\$5 per person. I think that this simple figure is a most telling argument.

Although what has been achieved in the field of disarmament over the past decade since the first special session devoted to disarmament is not satisfactory, one must say that there has been some progress if compared with the first three decades of the post-war period. These achievements have been gained through the unremitting efforts of the countries of the world and all peace-loving people. They have enhanced our confidence and strength. Experience is showing us the way to new achievements. We sincerely hope that following the fundamental principles contained in the final document adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament and taking into account the developments in recent years, all the delegations will make concerted efforts to set realistic objectives and adopt practical measures for future disarmament endeavours, thus ensuring full success to this special session. It is our belief that peace can be maintained and the goal of disarmament achieved. Science and technology, which are created by mankind, should be used to benefit mankind, not destroy it. Mankind will eventually be able to take its destiny into its own hands.

Toronto Economic Summit Supports INF Treaty
OW2206052088 Beijing XINHUA in English
2359 GMT 20 Jun 88

[Text] Toronto, June 20 (XINHUA)—Seven nations at the 14th economic summit support Reagan's arms control deal with the Soviet Union and "look for more cuts" by the two superpowers.

In a political declaration released here today, the leaders of the seven major industrial nations praised the U.S.-Soviet INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) accord as the first treaty that will set important precedents for future arms control agreements.

The declaration, which came out after two days' discussions by the leaders from the United States, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Federal Germany and Canada, however points to the massive presence of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe and Far East as major threats to the stability in the world.

"These threats must be reduced," it says.

Recalling changes over the past year in the east-west relations, the declaration notes that the greater freedom and openness in the Soviet Union offers "opportunities to reduce mistrust and build confidence".

The leaders at the summit also appreciate the growing interest shown by the East European countries in expanding economic ties with the Western industrialized powers. "We encourage them to open up their economics and societies," it says.

In other respects, the declaration also touches on the issues of terrorism and narcotics.

XINHUA: Roundup on 'New Trend' in Arms Race
OW2306015288 Beijing XINHUA in English
0829 GMT 22 Jun 88

["Roundup: A New Trend of Arms Race Between Two Superpowers (by Qian Wenrong)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, June 21 (XINHUA)—While welcoming the initial progress in the American-Soviet nuclear disarmament, delegates to the UN special session on disarmament has advised the world community to pay more attention to the dangerous new trend in the arms race between the two superpowers.

Delegates pointed out that the new trend is characterized by an extension into outer space and a shift to improving the quality of weapons.

The Indian delegation said that "the prospects for real disarmament will remain bleak so long as this technological arms race is allowed to continue unabated."

In the field of nuclear weapons, American and Soviet researchers have increased the emphasis on development of so-called "third generation" nuclear weapons such as the neutron bomb, x-ray laser, gamma ray laser and microwave weapons.

The third generation weapons are marked by the ability to achieve and enhance specific effects with nuclear weapons, while suppressing or eliminating unwanted effects.

In addition, the development of more accurate nuclear delivery systems is being explored. The manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) is one example of such technology that is likely to dramatically increase the ability to deliver nuclear weapons with pin-point accuracy.

Many of the new weapons systems have already been deployed by the two superpowers.

During 1986 alone, the United States fielded approximately 800 new strategic weapons and almost 200 new theatre and tactical weapons. These included 100 warheads for the first 10 MX missiles, 200 warheads for the seventh Trident submarine, 300 air-launched cruise missiles, 50 sea-launched cruise missiles and 80 ground-launched cruise missiles.

During the same period, the Soviet Union also continued to field new nuclear weapons. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, the first 10 Soviet rail-mobile 10-warhead SS-X-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles were deployed in late October of last year. The developmental or prototype production of newer sea-launched ballistic missiles is under way.

In the field of outer space, both the United States and the Soviet Union have accelerated funding to develop their respective anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.

A UN report revealed that about 15 Soviet ASAT weapons could be deployed between now and 1990, whereas it is estimated that the American ASAT weapons should reach full operational capacity some time in 1989.

Despite budget cuts, the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program is still going forward. The Soviet Union is also conducting a massive strategic defense research program and preparing a rapidly deployable nation-wide anti-ballistic missile defense system.

Kinetic energy weapons, directed energy weapons and electromagnetic guns are being developed to improve defenses against nuclear missiles, especially for use as anti-satellite weapons. Although these new weapons are being projected as "defensive", they also have offensive capabilities.

The growing role of military missions entrusted to space systems—reconnaissance, observation, communications, early warning, navigation—and the increase in the number of military satellites (about 100 each year for the Soviet Union and about 10 for the United States), is helping to define more and more acutely the problem of satellite security.

Some delegations to the UN pointed out that the words "conventional weapons" could already be a misnomer with the increasing accuracy, lethality and range of "conventional" weapons systems. New types of delivery systems are being developed and are capable of speeds ranging from five to 30 times the speed of sound and with larger payload capabilities. These vehicles can operate in both the atmosphere and space and negotiate intercontinental distances in 10 to 15 minutes.

The United States is developing fibre-optic guided missiles known as "Fog-M" which can fly at speeds of more than 700 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 200 meters and have automatic target-recognition capability.

It is worth noting that many new technologies, such as genetic engineering and biotechnology, have been used to produce chemical and biological weapons. One such technological innovation is the binary weapon that created a lethal nerve gas.

The ongoing revolution in electronics and computers is further transforming the nature of warfare. Weapons systems are moving from the "smart" to the "intelligent" phase. Artificial intelligence techniques are being considered for the development of autonomous vehicles and automated battle management systems.

If the new technologies are utilized for military purposes, there could be a new race to develop ever more hideous weapons, UN delegates warned.

Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation has expressed its strong opposition to any restrictions on the use of new technologies in military research and development.

As for the Soviet Union, there is no sign that it will give up the race to develop new arms systems programs in both nuclear and conventional weapons, or even in chemical and biological weapons.

Disputes Paralyze UN Disarmament Session
OW2306201688 Beijing XINHUA in English
0943 GMT 23 Jun 88

["UN Disarmament Session Comes to Crossroads (by Cheng Shengtao)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, June 22 (XINHUA)—The third special session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament has come to the crossroads as various groups of states remain differing on a few major issues while continuing their efforts to identify points of convergence.

The Committee of the Whole, which is mandated to examine substantive questions and formulate final proposals for the session, began its final week on June 20 processing the papers, all prepared by the chairmen of the three working groups on their own responsibilities in the absence of a consensus on the texts.

As the latest effort to narrow the gaps, committee chairman Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) spent a whole day yesterday consulting with the various delegation groups (East, West, Non-aligned, China) and followed up with a second draft text of the committee today.

The three working groups, charged respectively with examining the implementation of decisions made by the two previous special sessions, elaborating new measures

in the light of the current situation and studying the UN role in the disarmament field, had each held a dozen meetings over the past two weeks.

However, none of them had been able to reach consensus which is required of any decision. Amendment proposals submitted in working group two alone ran up to 65 pages.

Delegation sources said that while the new draft text contains more points where consensus is likely, it still takes time to work out a generally acceptable text as the final or concluding document of the special session. The delegations from now on have to burn the midnight oil in order to have the session end on Saturday as scheduled.

To begin with, these sources said, there is a big difference in the overall approaches.

Western countries want a concise report on the few key issues on which consensus exists, without dealing with contentious questions.

Non-aligned countries, however, are in favor of a comprehensive text that not only sets out areas of consensus but also gives substantive treatment to other issues on which there is no consensus but for which there is broad support.

Divergencies also exist on a wide range of specific issues, first and foremost nuclear disarmament.

The great majority of countries call for total elimination of nuclear arms, assumption of the prime responsibility by the two superpowers for their reduction, a halt to the race, a ban on their testing, and declaration by nuclear states not to be the first to use such weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear arms states.

But the West sticks to the theory of nuclear deterrence, envisaging no elimination, no comprehensive ban on testing, nor commitment to no-use.

France declared that prohibition of testing "can only be the consequence, not the cause, of a cut in arms," and that it cannot "feel itself bound by any limitations" to which the two superpowers may eventually agree.

In a bid to soften the edges of controversies on this issue, informed sources said, the new draft text distributed to the delegations today contains only general statements that measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war should be "further strengthened" and that the two superpowers, "who have the primary responsibility in this area, are strongly urged" to conclude a treaty to cut their strategic arms by half "at an early date."

Similar treatment is applied to questions of outer space, naval disarmament, conventional disarmament, and the relationship between disarmament and development, the sources said.

For example, in the new draft, there is only one sentence relating to naval disarmament—naval forces should not be excluded from the disarmament process.

Observers said while it remains to be seen whether the new draft will be accepted by all, it is quite certain that as things stand today, no approach can win without making due allowance for the opposite, if the session wants to succeed at all.

But they also point to such questions as prohibition of chemical weapons, verification, confidence-building and a greater role of the United Nations in the disarmament process—areas in which common grounds seem to be much larger.

The UN General Assembly as the largest disarmament deliberative body held a successful first special session ten years ago, but was unable to reach agreement on the main agenda items at its second special session in 1982.

The current session opened here late May. The general mood here is that it must not be let to fail again at this session, now that the international climate has considerably improved and people are expecting so much.

Foreign Ministry Denies Missiles Sales to Syria
HK2306123488 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in Chinese 0921 GMT 23 Jun 88

[Text] Beijing, 23 Jun (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Zhaoxing said today that the report on China considering sales of missiles to Syria is groundless.

In response to a reporter's question, Li Zhaoxing made this remark at a press briefing this afternoon.

UN Session on Disarmament Closes 26 June

Yu Mengjia Speaks at Closing
OW2806044088 Beijing XINHUA in English
1555 GMT 26 Jun 88

[Text] United Nations, June 26 (XINHUA)—The third special session on disarmament of the UN General Assembly ended here this morning without adopting a final document.

The session, which began on May 31, was scheduled to conclude yesterday afternoon. However, member countries failed to agree to the draft final document even after more than 20 hours of continuous negotiations.

The assembly decided just before midnight last night to use the diplomatic ploy of "stop-the-clock" to let delegates continue the consultations without formally requesting an extension of the special session.

However, owing to unreasonable demands of a certain Western country, the session was not able to reach agreement on the final document and had to conclude at 7:30 this morning.

Speaking at the close session, Ambassador Yu Mengjia, China's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, expressed China's "deep regret" over the failure of the assembly to adopt the final document.

"I cannot but point out frankly that one of the principal reasons for our failure to reach agreement is the insistence on some incomprehensible logic by a certain state which has primary responsibility in disarmament," Ambassador Yu said.

The special session has not been in vain, he stressed. "We have no choice but to continue to seek success."

The fact that the session ended without agreement on the final document shows how arduous and difficult the task of disarmament is, he pointed out. Member countries have to work untiringly for international peace and security, he added.

Delegates from many countries expressed disappointment at the failure of the session. However, they vowed to fight on in spite of daunting odds.

'U.S. Obstinacy' Cited

OW2706131488 Beijing XINHUA in English
0937 GMT 27 Jun 88

["News Analysis: No Wonder for Failure To Reach Final Paper at UN Disarmament Session" (by Chen Shengtao)—XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, June 26 (XINHUA)—Regrettable as it was, there should be no wonder, nor any despair for the failure of the third special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament to produce a final document.

Unlike a regular session, a special assembly session requires a consensus in making a decision. This certainly adds to the complexity of treating such complex problems like disarmament, on which positions of different nations proved too divided to be easily harmonized.

The road toward a final paper on disarmament seemed to be gravely rutted even at the very beginning of the special session when the preparatory committee was only able to submit a list of "elements for consideration" instead of a generally accepted paper as a basis for discussion by the session.

Later on, the three working groups charged with drafting papers on the substantive agenda items ended up with a failure to win consensus on their texts.

However, as efforts to narrow gaps and identify points of convergence piled up through long hours of consultations, consensus on a final document became increasingly within reach.

But, while all other parties showed a growing spirit of accommodation and gave up many of their strongly-held positions, the United States remained as irreconcilable [as received] on such issues as the prevention of the arms race in outer space, naval disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and development through disarmament.

Still worse, sources close to consultations said, when new concessions were offered in the 11th hour of the consultations, the United States will showed no interest in achieving consensus on the draft document on the ground that the deadline for the session was due.

Most observers here attributed the failure of consensus largely to the U.S. obstinacy. When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz addressed the general debate of the session, it was already evident that the United States prefers bilateralism on nuclear disarmament, while leaving some other issues to multilateral consideration—issues it believes other countries are primarily or solely responsible for.

Many delegates at the session have been surprised and upset by the incooperativeness [as received] of the United States as many other nations were ready to compromise to make the session a success.

But, disappointed as they were, many delegations pointed to the positive aspects of the session.

In the introductory part of the draft document, consensus was reached on the notion that "in a world of growing interdependence, it is essential for the international community to stimulate and deepen awareness of the common interests of our global society and of our common interest in strengthening international peace and security."

This is an obvious departure from the doctrine of power politics which had once been prevalent in handling international relations for a very long period of time.

The member states also agreed to recognize that nuclear disarmament is a "priority objective," the prevention of nuclear war "of utmost concern," and conventional disarmament of "vital" importance.

On many specific disarmament matters, consensus or near-consensus was reached eventually by virtue of an unprecedented spirit of mutual accommodation.

Chinese Ambassador Yu Mengjia said: "Our session was not futile. What happened now is that the gains we had been seeking have been put off a bit. Disarmament is too important to be ignored in advancing the interests of international peace and security and the well-being of the peoples. We must continue to work for its success and there is no alternative."

**Commentary Blames U.S. for UN Session
'Failure'**

HK2906012588 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
28 Jun 88 p 6

[Commentary by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Liu Kaichen (0491 7030 1368): "Disappointment in the United Nations Building"]

[Text] United Nations, 26 Jun (RENMIN RIBAO)—The third UN special assembly on disarmament, which lasted a month, closed at 0730 today at the United Nations building without resulting in the release of any document or manifesto. Participants in this assembly who had stayed up the whole night spoke one after another during the closing session, openly expressing their regret, sorrow, and disappointment at the failure of the assembly to achieve any results.

People are wondering: If the first UN special assembly on disarmament held in 1978 adopted a "Final Document" containing some substantive content, while the second UN special assembly on disarmament held in 1982 adopted a "Conclusive Document" which, though containing no substantive content, reiterated the validity of the "Final Document" adopted by the previous special assembly, now that the international situation is moving to detente and all countries have expressed a desire for disarmament more strongly than ever before, why did the third UN special assembly on disarmament fail to produce any specific results?

Observers here agree that this is mainly because there are tremendous differences of opinion between different countries on the disarmament issue. Even more, a few countries, such as the United States, which bear special responsibility for disarmament, have insisted too firmly on their own views and refused to make any compromise, resulting in the assembly failing to conclude any agreement on the content of a draft document.

Participants in the special assembly submitted a host of working documents and written proposals on disarmament during the assembly since late May. All the committee chairmen summed up the opinions of representatives from different countries, worked out a draft of the "final document," and started intensive and frequent consultations, in the hope that the special assembly would turn out a "final document" which would serve as an impetus to future disarmament efforts. Unfortunately, by the last day for consultations, the assembly had still failed to reach agreement on 20 of the 67 articles which formed the draft of the "final document." The

failure was mainly due to differences of opinion between the United States and other countries on a series of issues. For example, the United States has held that the "Final Document" adopted by the first UN special assembly on disarmament is out-of-date and therefore should not be taken up again at the current special assembly; the United States has objected to the prohibition of the arms race in outer space; it does not agree to the United Nations' role in disarmament inspection and the close relations between disarmament and development, and so on. The United States has also emphasized the necessity of urging Third World countries to join in disarmament.

To be sure, every country has its own view on disarmament, and this is not surprising. But the UN special assembly on disarmament operates through consultations, which demand that all countries seek common ground while reserving differences and try their best to reach agreement. In fact many countries have indeed made great efforts in the course of consultations. For example, developing countries agreed to add a note to the draft of the "final document" to declare that the document adopted by the conference on the relationship between disarmament and development last year concerns only those countries participating in that conference, thus the United States, which was not represented in that conference, would not have to commit itself to any document released therefrom. For another example, just because the United States objected to reduction of the navy, the Swedish delegation agreed that the passage it proposed asserting that "the navy must not be exempted from disarmament" will be deleted from the draft document. However, all these compromises called forth no response from the U.S. representative, who held to his stand and disapproved an extension of the assembly for further consultations. According to a report in the NEW YORK TIMES, a high-ranking U.S. government official had declared on the eve of the current special assembly: "If they (denoting other countries represented at the special assembly) attempt to commit us to any restriction, we are prepared to break away from consultations." This exposed the real reason why the United States always refused to budge from its original position during the special assembly.

Although the current special assembly has made no specific achievements, it has produced some positive effects. Except South Africa, 158 other members of the United Nations participated in the special assembly. Also represented at the assembly were 107 mass organizations relating to disarmament from the five continents. This was an unprecedentedly large-scale assembly. Representatives from all the countries gathered together during the special assembly to discuss the disarmament issue which is of vital importance to world peace and mankind's security. This special assembly, which has further revealed the complexity and arduousness of disarmament efforts, will inspire all countries to strive harder to check the arms race and to safeguard world peace.

NORTH KOREA

DPRK's Ho Tam Meets Honecker at Nuclear-Free Zones Meeting

SK2406053788 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0515 GMT 24 Jun 88

[Text] Pyongyang June 24 (KCNA)—Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, expressed support to the DPRK's proposals for national reunification, when he met on June 22 with the delegation of the DPRK headed by Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, which had participated in the international conference on the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany actively supports the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, to drastically cut the armed forces of the North and the South and to convene a North-South joint conference for national reunification.

He expressed deep gratitude to Comrade Kim Il-song for supporting the convocation of the international conference on the establishment of nuclear-free zones and sending a high-level delegation.

That Comrade Kim Il-song and Comrade Kim Chong-il attached great importance to the international conference on the establishment of nuclear-free zones initiated by the GDR was another demonstration of the excellent friendly relations between the two countries, he stated.

The Workers' Party of Korea led by Comrade Kim Il-song and Comrade Kim Chong-il, he stressed, is enforcing very wise policies.

For peace on the Korean peninsula, in Asia and the rest of the world, the United States and the South Korean side must actively respond to the constructive proposals advanced by the DPRK, he said.

Noting that the relations between the two countries are developing very favourably, he promised greater efforts to expand the wide-range cooperation and relations between the two countries.

Attends School-Naming Ceremony

SK2506230088 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1459 GMT 25 Jun 88

[Text] Pyongyang, June 25 (KCNA)—A ceremony was held in Berlin on June 23 to give the name of "GDR-DPRK Friendship School" to Marzan Higher Middle School No. 50 in the capital of the GDR, according to a report.

Attending the ceremony together with the teachers and pupils of the school were Guenter Schabowski, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and first secretary of the Berlin district party committee, and a vice-minister of general education and officials of Berlin and Marzan ward party and government organs.

Present on invitation were members of the DPRK delegation headed by Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, which had attended the international conference on the establishment of nuclear free-zones, DPRK ambassador to the GDR Pak Yongchan and embassy officials.

It was proclaimed at the ceremony in the name of the Marzan ward council of Berlin that the Marzan Higher Middle School No. 50 was named "GDR-DPRK Friendship School".

Ho Tam delivered a congratulatory speech at the ceremony.

He said the bonds of friendship between the Taedonggang Senior Middle School No. 1 in Pyongyang and the Marzan Higher Middle School No. 50 in Berlin would contribute to strengthening the brotherly ties of friendship between the parties and peoples of the two countries.

He stated that the friendship based on the particular intimacy between the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and esteemed comrade Erich Honecker will come into fuller bloom in the common struggle against the war provocation moves on the part of imperialists and for the preservation of a durable peace and the victory of the cause of socialism and communism at the eastern and western posts of socialism.

After the naming ceremony, the DPRK delegation attended a meeting with the teachers and pupils of the school.

Guenter Schabowski, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and first secretary of the Berlin district party committee, were at the meeting:

The DPRK delegation which attended the international conference on the establishment of nuclear-free zones, at the instructions of respected Comrade Kim Il-song, took this opportunity of attending the ceremony of giving the name of "GDR-DPRK Friendship School" to the Marzan Higher Middle School No. 50. This is a great joy not only of the teachers and pupils of the school but also of the entire Berlin citizens.

The teachers and pupils of the school should follow the spirit of the anti-Japanese armed struggle organised and waged under the leadership of respected Comrade Kim Il-song, he stressed.

He concluded his speech by declaring that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany fully supports the stand of the Workers' Party of Korea for the reunification of the country and for the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula.

After inspecting the school, the delegation presented souvenirs to it.

VIETNAM

Nguyen Speaks at Nuclear-Free Zones Meeting
BK2706095988 Hanoi VNA in English
0710 GMT 27 Jun 88

[State Council Vice President Nguyen Huu Tho Speaks at Berlin Meeting—VNA headline; date of speech not given]

[Text] Hanoi VNA June 27—Together with other peace-loving forces, the Vietnamese Government and people have striven for peace and security in the world as well as in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia, stated Nguyen Huu Tho, vice-president of the Vietnamese State Council and head of the Vietnamese delegation to the international meeting on the establishment of nuclear-free zones held in Berlin from June 20-22. The Vietnamese head delegate said: For many years now the situation in the Asia-Pacific region has raised burning questions concerning peace and security in the region and the rest of the world. We hold that the main orientations for the maintenance of peace and security in this region are:

—Reduce the level of military and political confrontation and the level of militarization, first of all the nuclear militarization.

—To solve all disputes and conflicts by peaceful negotiation, respect the nations' rights to self-determination, put an end to all outside interference and to the use of one country as a sanctuary to oppose other countries.

—To establish relations of peaceful co-existence among countries in the region and relations of equitable and mutually-beneficial cooperation in economy, trade, culture, science and technology, etc, and to oppose the policy of economic embargo and blockade, of exploitation and unequal treatment.

In this spirit, the people and government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam warmly support the Soviet Union's overall peace plan for Asia and the Pacific, warmly support the New Delhi statement on the principles of building a world free from nuclear weapons and violence, welcome and support Mongolia's initiative on the

signing of an international convention on non-use of force in relations among countries in the Asia-Pacific region; support the initiatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the peaceful reunification of Korea and on the turning of that peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, warmly support the ASEAN countries' initiatives on the building of a Southeast Asia of peace, freedom, and neutrality, as well as their draft legal document on a nuclear-free Southeast Asia. We warmly welcome the South Pacific countries' Rarotonga Treaty on banning the production, stockpiling, use and testing of nuclear weapons in the region. We hold that China's commitment not to use nuclear weapons first is a highly significant and applaudable gesture.

Regarding Europe, we strongly support the initiatives of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the establishment of a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons in central Europe, Poland's initiative on the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons by nine European countries and on the strengthening of mutual trust in the region, Czechoslovakia's initiative on the establishment of a zone of mutual trust cooperation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries and neighbourliness, Bulgaria's initiative on a nuclear-free Balkan Peninsula, and the initiative of Bulgaria and Romania on a Balkan region without chemical weapons....

Having shared a common fate as well as a history of prolonged and hard struggle to obtain and safeguard their independence and freedom, the peoples of the three Indochinese countries ardently want peace to restore their war-ravaged economies. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have put forth a joint initiative for building a Southeast Asia of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation, which has won sympathy and support from the world public.

We wish to have an early political solution to the Kampuchean issue on the basis of respect for the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination, terminate all outside interference and rule out for good all possibilities of a restoration of the genocidal Pol Pot regime. After helping the Kampuchean people to eliminate the danger of extermination, we had, by 1987, withdrawn half of our volunteer troops back to Vietnam. The People's Republic of Kampuchea and Vietnam have agreed to repatriate 50,000 volunteer troops in 1988, or half of the remaining Vietnamese force in Kampuchea. The command of the Vietnamese Volunteer Army will also be pulled out, and the rest of the Vietnamese Volunteer Army will be placed under the direction of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and will be repatriated by 1990: If a political solution to the Kampuchea issue is achieved, all the Vietnamese Army volunteers will withdraw from Kampuchea in keeping with an agreement to be signed.

Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea welcome representatives of all governments and international organizations and all interested people to come

and observe the withdrawal this year. Vietnam supports the PRK's proposal for the establishment of a corridor of peace along the Kampuchea-Thai border and for the repatriation of refugees.

He went on:

"We welcome all efforts for dialogue to achieve a political solution to the Kampuchea issue to build a peaceful, free and neutral Southeast Asia as proposed by the ASEAN countries. The talks between Chairman of the Kampuchean Council of Ministers Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk will positively contribute to this process. The main obstacle to such a solution is the Pol Pot genocidal clique, the legitimate demand of the people of Kampuchea and other countries is to stop the provision of weapons and sanctuary to the Pol Potists and to prevent all attempts at re-imposing the genocidal regime on Kampuchea."

The vice president said:

"We have always advocated the normalization of relations between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China, the restoration of the long-standing friendship between the two peoples, and the settlement of all differences between the two countries by peaceful negotiations, including the border dispute and the question of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa [Paracel and Spratly] archipelagoes. The peace and justice-loving people in the world recognize and support our good will. We believe that normal relations between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China will be restored on the basis of the long-standing friendship between the two peoples."

Concluding his speech, Vice-President Nguyen Huu Tho expressed the Vietnamese Government and people's profound gratitude to people and friends (on all continents) for their active support to Vietnam's past resistance wars for national salvation and its present national construction and defence.

INTRABLOC

Bulgarian, GDR Officials on Chemical-, Nuclear-Free Corridor

*AU2306201888 Sofia BTA in English
1938 GMT 23 Jun 88*

[“BZNS-DBD: Further Contacts”—BTA headline]

[Text] Berlin, June 23 (BTA)—Mr Petur Tanchev, secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Party (BZNS) and first vice president of Bulgaria's State Council, met today with Mr Guenter Maleuda, chairman of the Democratic Peasants Party of Germany (DBD) and deputy chairman of the GDR Council of State.

The sides expressed satisfaction over the successful promotion of the traditional fraternal ties between the BZNS and the DBD. They considered measures for a further activation of these contacts.

Mr Tanchev and Mr Maleuda emphasised that the BZNS and the DBD fully support the peace-loving policy of Bulgaria and of the GDR and their friendship with the Soviet Union and with the other fraternal countries. An emphasis was laid at the meeting on Bulgaria's contribution to good-neighbourliness and cooperation in the Balkans, to the efforts to ban nuclear and chemical weapons from the region. The major initiative of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe was praised as constructive. The two parties welcome the INF Treaty and the results of the Soviet-American summit in Moscow as a substantial contribution to the efforts towards a nuclear-free future of the planet.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NATO Unwilling To Accept 'Realistic Compromise'

*LD3006154388 Prague CTK in English
1438 GMT 30 Jun 88*

[Text] Vienna June 30 (CTK correspondent)—The 45th round of the discussions on the reduction of armed forces and armament in central Europe ended inconclusively today again because of the NATO states' unwillingness to accept a realistic compromise.

Head of the Czechoslovak delegation Ludek Handl stressed at today's plenary session that the Warsaw Treaty states explained their principled attitude to conventional disarmament in this round in the light of future all-European discussions. Their main aim is to reduce the two sides' military confrontation and military potential to a reasonable level necessary for defence, he stressed.

In connection with the effort to remove the threat of a sudden attack, the Czechoslovak ambassador underlined the Czechoslovak proposal submitted by General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Milos Jakes for the creation of a zone of confidence, security and good neighbourly relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states.

The socialist states searched in the previous round for a realistic and balanced solution both to the contents of the discussed agreement, and to its verification, Ludek Handl said, adding that the situation at the Vienna discussions can be changed only on the basis of the two sides' mutual steps.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Disarmament Talk Opens in Potsdam, Guests Arrive

Fischer Receives Whitehead

*LD1006140588 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1305 GMT 10 Jun 88*

[Text] Potsdam, 10 Jun (ADN)—GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer exchanged views in Potsdam today with John Whitehead, U.S. deputy secretary of state. The two politicians discussed the proceedings of the seventh Institute for East-West Security Studies annual conference and the state of bilateral relations between the two countries. John Whitehead praised the good organization and the constructive atmosphere of the Potsdam consultations, which encourage a frank exchange of views. In his speech to the plenum, he said he wanted to express the fact that in the development of the socialist states of Europe, he sees signs for an open and trusting dialogue, and for further progress in arms control.

In the bilateral sphere, the two sides concurred in their desire for relations between their countries to reach a higher level and to assume a steady character. Ways of attaining this goal were discussed.

Beil Receives Verity

*LD1106225088 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1146 GMT 11 Jun 88*

[Text] Potsdam, 11 Jun (ADN)—GDR Foreign Trade Minister Dr Gerhard Beil and U.S. Secretary of State for Commerce William Verity, who is in the GDR for the annual conference of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, on Saturday conducted an exchange of views on steps toward normalizing trade and economic relations between the GDR and the United States.

Dr Beil stressed the GDR's readiness to go on developing economic relations with the United States on the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage, thus bringing them in line with the increasing interests of the broadest

economic circles of the United States, as became clear at the ninth joint session of the GDR-U.S. and U.S.-GDR trade and economic councils in April 1988 in Washington.

Secretary Verity stressed the U.S. economy's great interest in trade with the GDR, which is expressed in the increasing participation of large U.S. concerns at the Leipzig fairs. The U.S. Government wishes to support this development.

The two sides expressed the view that the GDR and the United States, as highly developed industrial states, have the necessary economic and scientific-technological potential in order to bestow new impetus to bilateral trade and economic relations. The two sides agreed on a gradual solution to problems which still exist in trade between the GDR and the United States, thus at the same time making an appropriate contribution to the flourishing development of world trade.

Taking part in the discussions were: Francis John Meehan, U.S. ambassador in the GDR; and Christian Meyer, GDR deputy foreign trade minister.

Genscher Gives News Conference

LD1106172388 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1542 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] Potsdam, 11 Jun (ADN)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the international press in Potsdam on Saturday that the exchange of views with GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer on GDR territory was normal and useful. "It would have been difficult to understand if I, as part of my participation in the conference in Potsdam, had not met him," he said in reply to a question. The talks dealt with the negotiations of the CSCE states in Vienna. "We both agreed that the paper submitted by the neutral and nonaligned states represents a suitable basis for further negotiations," Genscher said. The consultations between disarmament representatives of the governments of the two German states, which started some years ago, have proved themselves, and should be continued.

Asked about the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones, Genscher affirmed that an FDP delegation led by Uwe Ronneburger, deputy chairman of the Bundestag group, would attend. Although his party rejects regional concepts, it nevertheless welcomes the opportunity of being able to explain its position at the meeting in Berlin.

178 Guests Attend

AU1306101588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Jun 88 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] Potsdam—The seventh annual conference of the New York Institute for East-West Security Studies (IEWSS) opened in Potsdam on Thursday afternoon [9

June] under the motto "New Ways to East-West Security." In his capacity as host of the meeting, which takes place in a socialist country for the first time, Oskar Fischer, GDR minister of foreign affairs, welcomed the participants from over 20 countries, on behalf of the GDR Government, in his opening speech.

The meeting at the "Hans Marchwitza" culture house is being attended by 178 high-ranking politicians, including several foreign ministers, scientists, businessmen, diplomats, and journalists from nearly all CSCE states. The 3-day exchange of experiences focuses on how further dynamics can be carried over to the disarmament process immediately after the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, and on how lasting security can be safeguarded in the world. The Potsdam East-West dialogue is characterized by the search for new approaches to the security policy of the nineties. In this connection, political, military, economic, and social aspects of the problem will be discussed.

Honecker Receives Guests

LD1106184988 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1725 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] Berlin, 11 Jun (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, this evening received participants in the seventh annual conference of the New York Institute for East-West Security Studies, in Berlin. In the Council of State building, the GDR head of state welcomed the institute's president, John Edwin Mroz, and high-ranking politicians, government representatives, parliamentarians, diplomats, businessmen, and publicists from more than 20 states, who have ended their 3-day annual meeting in Potsdam.

Erich Honecker shook hands with each of his guests, who were presented by institute president Mroz. The guests then filed into the festive hall, where other leading dignitaries of the GDR had gathered, namely SED Central Committee Politburo members Hermann Axen, chairman of the People's Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee; Kurt Hager, member of the Council of State; Joachim Herrmann; Werner Jarowinsky; Egon Krenz, deputy chairman of the Council of State; Guenter Mittag, deputy chairman of the Council of State; and Guenter Schabowski. Also present were Council of State Deputy Chairmen Gerald Goetting, chairman of the CDU; Prof Heinrich Homann, chairman of the NDP; and Dr Guenther Maleuda, chairman of the DBD [Democratic Peasants Party of Germany]; Hans-Dieter Raspe, deputy chairman of the LDPD [Liberal Democratic Party of Germany]; Oskar Fischer, minister of foreign affairs; Dr Gerhard Beil, minister of foreign trade; Heinz Eichler, secretary of the Council of State; Guenter Sieber, head of the International Relations Department of the SED Central Committee; and Deputy Foreign Ministers Ernst Krabatsch and Kurt Nier.

Numerous heads of diplomatic missions accredited to the GDR were present among the foreign guests.

Erich Honecker emphasized in a speech that he followed with great interest the intensive discussion on new ways toward East-West security. This subject has been a concern of people in all parts of the world for a long time. Today there was an increasing recognition that security can no longer be safeguarded at the expense of the other side, no longer in a fully armed conflict. The GDR, with its policy of dialogue, has been pursuing for years the principle of mutual talks and search for common standpoints and solutions. The GDR's invitation to the International Meeting on Nuclear-Free Zones was also guided by this. Erich Honecker expressed the hope that the institute's responsible work for peace and peaceful cooperation of states and peoples would have lasting success.

John Edwin Mroz, president of the New York institute, on behalf of the participants in the annual conference in Potsdam, thanked the GDR and its leadership for the generosity and hospitality shown. He recalled the intention of the institute at its founding 7 years ago to bring the peoples closer together through dialogue and to help bring about peaceful competition between East and West. A renewed attempt has been made in Potsdam to make a contribution toward this. Dr C. H. Berthold Beitz, honorary president of the institute, emphasized the open and frank discussion on all the urgent issues of the present day. He, too, thanked Erich Honecker personally for the warm hospitality. He is firmly and confidently convinced that it will be possible to live in the European home confidently in peace and friendship.

Erich Honecker and the other GDR dignitaries subsequently conducted lively discussions with the guests from all parts of the world.

Honecker Meets U.S., Other Guests

*LD1106231788 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 2026 GMT 11 Jun 88*

[Excerpts] Berlin, 11 Jun (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, today received participants in the seventh annual conference of the Institute for East-West Security Studies [IEWSS].

After the speeches, numerous groups formed in the ballroom of the State Council building. Hosts and guests discussed issues on the agenda of the Potsdam meeting and many other problems. Participants in the meeting used their meetings with the head of state and other leading GDR personalities to express their gratitude for the hospitality which had been shown during their stay. It was the general opinion that the GDR offered the best

conditions for carrying out the conference, which continued the dialogue on problems of disarmament, international security, and cooperation, shortly after the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow, and shortly before the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in Berlin.

Erich Honecker drank to the success of the Potsdam meeting and the participants' concern for creating more security between East and West, through better understanding and cooperation, to solve common problems of states and nations. He was joined by John Edwin Mroz, of the IEWSS, and Honorary President Dr. Berthold Beitz. [title as received]

Along with Herbert S. Okun, U.S. deputy ambassador to the UN and former ambassador to the GDR, and Donald M. Kendall (U.S.), chairman of the Pepsi-Cola Company, they held a three-way discussion on the results of the Potsdam dialogue. Both U.S. guests expressed their satisfaction and spoke of the good results. Erich Honecker congratulated them on this. Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg told Erich Honecker that he had had good talks with his GDR counterpart. These concerned the very issues of arms control and disarmament on which Oskar Fischer had taken a position at the UN special session, to which he was now travelling.

In a conversation with SPD Bundestag Deputy Karsten Voigt, the initiative by the SED, the CPCZ, and the SPD to create a nuclear weapons-free corridor and a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe was discussed. They agreed that the coming international meeting in Berlin is of the greatest significance for their common concern and the promotion of disarmament as a whole.

Senator William S. Cohen (U.S.) stressed that the Potsdam meeting has been extraordinarily useful, coming after the Moscow summit. Erich Honecker reasserted the GDR's viewpoint to the U.S. politician that no time should be wasted and the path embarked on in Moscow must be continued. They agreed that further deeds for securing peace must follow the words of peaceful dialogue.

Afterward he held a friendly meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov; the head of a department of the General Staff, Nikolay Chervov; and the director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Oleg Bogomolov, from the USSR. The Soviet politicians paid tribute to the good conditions in Potsdam for seeking possibilities for further agreement among experts after the Moscow summit. Erich Honecker underlined the great interest shown by the GDR in the IEWSS meeting. Everything had to be done to continue the dialogue to deepen the disarmament process, and to achieve further results to consolidate peace and international security.

Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, member of the LCY Presidium, expressed recognition and satisfaction that the GDR is developing great initiatives to improve the international atmosphere for disarmament and detente in central Europe. This is being followed in Yugoslavia with great attention and pleasure.

Georg Von Lilienfeld, consultant to the Alfred Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach Foundation, assessed the Potsdam meeting as a success for the cause of peace. Thanks to the hosts, the atmosphere at the meeting was good at the political, psychological, and human levels, which led to a positive result.

In a conversation between the GDR head of state and Jaromir Johanes, CSSR deputy foreign minister, they discussed the coming International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. The GDR and the CSSR, as socialist states on the dividing line between the two military blocs, they agreed, should continue with the initiative they started with their proposals to create a corridor free of nuclear weapons and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe.

Erich Honecker spoke with Polish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Olechowski about the obligation of responsible politicians to make peace secure for the present and coming generations. The coming meeting between the youth of both countries will serve this great end.

The creation of a nuclear weapons-free zones in central Europe and in the Balkans is the common goal of the GDR and Bulgaria, it was underlined in a conversation between Erich Honecker and Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ganev. The guest stressed that his country will take part in the coming world meeting in the GDR capital with pleasure, and will work actively in the spirit of their joint concern.

At the end of the reception, the GDR head of state met with Jack F. Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR. They stressed the necessity to continue the dialogue between the superpowers, and between all states. Each country can and must make its contribution to securing peace, to reducing political and military confrontation, and to deepening cooperation, which is necessary and useful for all states.

Honecker Addresses Participants

*LD1106192188 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1743 GMT 11 Jun 88*

["Speech by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, at a reception for participants in the 1988 international annual conference of the Institute for East-West Security Studies"—ADN heading]

[Text] Berlin, 11 June (ADN)—The text of Erich Honecker's speech is as follows:

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you warmly at the end of your deliberations. I have followed your intensive discussion on new paths toward East-West security. This topic has long moved people throughout the world. The GDR too participates with a sense of responsibility, constructively, and—in my opinion—not without success, in the search for these new paths and how to fashion them. With its allies, and in accord with all those who also want this, it is working for a world free of violence and nuclear weapons.

Man's longing for peace is as old as the existence of human life. However, attempts to create "eternal peace" foundered on those who were led by the old Latin saying: "si vis pacem, para bellum."

In our century, too, staunch fighters against fascism and war, for peace and humanity, were not heeded. The call made by Carl von Ossietzky 60 years ago to remove the diabolical nests where the instruments of war are produced in peacetime echoed empty, like so many other appeals and warnings. In the end there were millions of dead, and misery and destruction.

Nowadays there is a recognition that security can no longer be guaranteed at the expense of one another, no longer by building up arms against each other, but only by working together. The talks held a few days ago between Mikhail Gorbachev, general Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in Moscow, were characterized by this. The agreements reached there are grounds for further hope among people in both East and West. The GDR welcomes what was agreed, as you can read in my statement on the Moscow summit. It, for its part, is making efforts to do everything to promote fulfillment of the agreements.

We take the world as it is. This means that we also see the differences, the mistrust accumulated over decades, and different views on essential issues. However, this does not prevent us from talking to one another and to search for common standpoints and solutions. With its policy of dialogue the GDR has been pursuing this principle for years.

Our country was also guided by this policy when it sent out invitations for the International Meeting on Nuclear-Free Zones in Berlin, which will begin in a few days time. We expect that this meeting of representatives of all continents will give strong new impetus for the continuation of efforts to reduce the nuclear danger worldwide and to eventually ban it altogether. There must be no let-up in the struggle for disarmament. The common European home in which socialist and capitalist states live and are able to get along well would thus be made more robust.

Honored guests, your visit to the GDR was short and filled with work. Even so, I hope that you will be able to take home with you an impression of the life of its

citizens. Like all peoples, we want above all peace, understanding, and living conditions under which everybody can satisfy their material and intellectual needs. The policy of the government, parties, and of all social forces of my country, serves these deeply humane objectives. Despite difficult international conditions, we continue our economic and social policy. Our citizens understand this. They respond with increased performances to achieve our exacting projects, and with committed work for peace, security, and understanding.

May your responsible work to relegate war to the past, and to ensure that peace and peaceful cooperation characterize the future relations among states and nations, have great and lasting success. Let us place whatever unites us in the foreground, in the interests of a peaceful world, and let us jointly overcome whatever obstacles stand in the way.

Ladies and gentlemen, I wish you health and prosperity. Thank you for your attention.

Fischer Meets USSR's Aboymov

LD1106001888 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1259 GMT 10 Jun 88

[Text] Potsdam, 10 Jun (ADN)—GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboymov met for a friendly talk in Potsdam today. During the talk, the level of bilateral cooperation between the GDR and the USSR was praised, and the harmonious implementation of socialism's peace offensive was stressed. The partners in the talk agreed that the IEWSS [Institute for East-West Security Studies] annual conference in Potsdam offered a good opportunity to sound out possibilities for further strengthening of the promising trends in international relations reflected in the Washington missile agreement and the Moscow summit.

'Arafat Sends Message to Honecker

AU1306112988 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 10 Jun 88 p 2

[ND report: "PLO Assesses the Berlin Meeting as an Important Initiative by the GDR"]

[Text] East Berlin (ND)—Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and general commander of the Palestinian Revolution Forces, has sent a letter to Erich Honecker, SED general secretary and chairman of the GDR State Council, which reads as follows:

Dear Comrade Erich Honecker: It is with great appreciation that I received your invitation to participate in the International Meeting on Nuclear-Free Zones to be held in East Berlin 20-23 June 1988. On behalf of our Arab-Palestinian people, on behalf of my brothers, the members of the PLO Executive Committee, and on my own behalf, I would like to express warm thanks to you,

your militant party, your esteemed government, and to the friendly GDR people for the invitation conveyed to us to participate in this important conference.

I take this opportunity, dear Comrade, to let you know that the PLO will participate in this important forum with a high-ranking delegation headed by myself, this being the expression of our high esteem for the valuable contributions you and your esteemed government have made to creating nuclear-free zones and to limiting these weapons. We are of the opinion that your praiseworthy contributions represent the principles promoted by the GDR, under your wise and bold leadership, with a view to furthering international detente and reducing tension between states throughout the world.

Our Palestinian people under their sole legitimate representative, the PLO, have an extremely great interest in limiting those weapons, achieving a just peace, and in participating in all constructive international efforts aimed at reducing the nuclear arms race and eradicating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, especially since Israel—with the support, financing, and scientific and technical assistance of the U.S. Administration—possesses nuclear weapons, thus threatening security, peace, and stability in both the Middle East and throughout the world.

I would like to express warm thanks to the GDR, under your wise and bold leadership, for the constant and principled help and support for the just struggle waged by our people to reestablish their inalienable national rights, their right to return home, to self-determination, and to the creation of their independent state; and I also want to express our high esteem.

I wish you much good health, happiness, and success in leading the friendly GDR people and in implementing your national goals aimed at progress and well-being.

Revolution up to the final victory!

Yasir 'Arafat

Fischer Speaks on INF Missile Inspection

LD3006174288 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1412 GMT 30 Jun 88

[Text] Berlin, 30 Jun (ADN)—In his speech to the sixth session of the People's Chamber, GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer referred to the statement by the parliamentary groups on the agreement between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR on inspections in connection with the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The minister recalled Erich Honecker's statement directly after the exchange of the ratification documents in Moscow that the historical treaty has come into force and nuclear disarmament is beginning as a result. The prospects for European and worldwide development are

further proof that a world with fewer weapons, a world without nuclear weapons, is possible. A fundamental part of this first disarmament agreement is the trilateral agreement between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR on inspections and the agreement between the GDR and the United States on inspections of the former Soviet missile bases on GDR territory. Both of these documents form the basis in international law for carrying out verification measures on GDR territory. At the same time, they govern the advance notice and carrying out of inspections by the United States, in order to help guarantee the multilateral realization of the Washington treaty. The minister said that naturally the agreements safeguard the sovereign rights and interests of our state.

Fischer continued that we, on the dividing line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, have a vital interest in the speedy elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We commit ourselves to supporting the United States in carrying out its inspections of the former Soviet Army missile bases on our territory. For their part, the U.S. inspectors and members of their air crews must strictly obey GDR laws and regulations and not interfere in internal affairs. Our state is ready to receive these inspectors and to guarantee them the agreed support; this will be legally possible starting tomorrow. The good experiences gained from implementation of military observation and inspection in fulfillment of the Stockholm document on confidence-building measures and disarmament will be useful in reliably mastering these new tasks.

Many of the solutions found could undoubtedly be used as models for future disarmament treaties. It is an example of the principle that control and inspection measures are necessary because they are trust-building.

Intentions, or even efforts, to replace nuclear systems, which are subject to reduction and destruction, by "modernization" or rearming in other fields, will not only devalue the Washington treaty, they will be a direct blow to disarmament. For that reason the GDR calls for decisive steps to be taken to prevent this.

It is well known that the GDR and the USSR decided, in the interest of ratifying the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles—even before the treaty came into force—to withdraw the missiles stationed in response to the arming of West European states with the most modern U.S. nuclear missiles.

This, as well as similar steps by the CSSR, found the greatest respect internationally, the foreign minister said. The transformation of the former military site at Waren into a holiday center for the FDGB became a comprehensive symbol of the advantages which disarmament can bring for mankind. This corresponds, of course, to the essence of socialist politics and it is cheaper not to have to build holiday homes via the circuitous route of missile positions. Even when countermeasures to the stationing of U.S. intermediate-range

missiles in Western Europe had to be taken on our territory, we declared our support for the aim of drastic reduction in missiles by both sides.

The minister recalled the slogan coined by Erich Honnecker in November 1983, which rapidly grew in popularity: "The devilry must go—now more than ever." This slogan has lost nothing in the meantime, absolutely nothing of its topicality. Many people were surprised at the naming of Leipzig airport as the arrival airport for the U.S. inspectors who are due to supervise the enforcement of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the dismantling of missiles.

Even at the hour of the signing of this so-important document, someone in Washington had something to object to concerning Schoenefeld Airport. Why? It has remained inexplicable ever since. But the decision we immediately made, that it must be Leipzig, shows that the GDR follows a predictable, consistent policy, and this is oriented toward the comprehensive questions for mankind.

The GDR intensified the policy of dialogue and balance. That was one of the main themes during the talks and negotiations of our highest representative in many West European states, among them the countries where U.S. intermediate-range missiles are stationed. This is the attitude to be expected from a German state which takes seriously its duty to see that war will never again emanate from German soil. Looking back we can say: This policy was and remains correct, the efforts have been worthwhile, and they will continue to be so.

So it became impossible for the opponents of any disarmament, whether in the area of missiles of intermediate and shorter range or those of strategic importance, whether nuclear or conventional, to prevent its ratification. On 1 August the Soviet Union will begin the destruction of the missiles which have been withdrawn. All of this proves that the weight of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of December 1987 and of the other advances achieved in recent times in the struggle for disarmament and arms control far exceeds the respective subject of the negotiations.

The lively movement, which has entered all efforts toward disarmament and arms control, may be assessed as the first consequence of the insight that in the nuclear age more weapons do not mean more security.

According to Fischer, the worldwide cooperation of the forces of realism and reason is being extended on the basis of this knowledge. This was shown in a highly impressive way only a few days ago at the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, held in Berlin.

This, the most comprehensive world forum on peace issues in history, is unprecedented, Fischer continued. It is of outstanding importance in the struggle for nuclear disarmament, particularly for Europe, where the most modern weapons of mass destruction of all kinds are concentrated.

Our representatives who spoke at the meeting left no doubt that disarmament in the field of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles should be followed by the next zero solution—the removal of so-called nuclear tactical systems. A nuclear-free world in the year 2000 is not a Utopia—it can be achieved.

Thus, we stick to the view that there are the beginnings of a change for the better in international relations. For the first time the most up-to-date weapons systems are not only being limited, but destroyed.

To the west of our state border, there is still an advocacy of the retention of "nuclear deterrence" in Europe. This is aimed directly against the process of disarmament and improvement in international relations that has just begun. And it is mere supposition, speculation, that nuclear deterrence has prevented a third world war for 40 years. No one can guarantee this is the case.

Who would or should prove the contrary if worse comes to worse? Do we not see daily in our highly technological world accidents and disasters, because, for example, an insignificant component or a human being failed? I am thinking of Chernobyl, of the poisoning of the Rhine, of the catastrophes in Bhopal in India, in Seveso in Italy, at the launch of the "Challenger" spacecraft, of the cloud of poison gas in Springfield in the United States, and many other things, Fischer went on.

Can we in Europe or elsewhere risk a nuclear war "by chance"? That a war "by chance" has become conceivable is shown by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have taken measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict. This concern was also the stimulus for Erich Honecker's proposal at the international meeting for the creation of mechanisms for peaceful crisis management and the prevention of military incidents in central Europe, which immediately received a worldwide response.

We are in favor of a balance without nuclear weapons and with a minimum of weapons on either side—just enough for defense. We are against "nuclear deterrence" also for the reason that it logically entails these weapons being renewed and modernized from time to time. That means that "nuclear deterrence" is continuing the nuclear arms race. And more: "Nuclear deterrence" is in the end hindering and thwarting any sort of disarmament. If NATO adheres to its doctrine of nuclear deterrence, then all over the world the temptation to base

one's own security on nuclear deterrence would surely grow. Hence, what we must do is to find solutions which make nuclear weapons dispensable for all, without harming anyone's security.

The GDR judged the speedy realization of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of December last year as further proof of the realistic character of the Warsaw Pact's joint program on the creation of a comprehensive system of security and the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world. More and more people are becoming aware, were and are prepared to commit themselves to a life in peace. Perceptible influences on further developments in the world will emanate from the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, for which all the political and legal prerequisites now exist. The expectations tied to this can only be fulfilled if no break in the policy of disarmament is allowed.

Even if differences of opinion exist on the scope and objective of disarmament, we can still note that a growing consensus for further disarmament is forming. This consensus applies to the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic-offensive weapons, to nuclear weapons tests, to conclusion of a convention banning all chemical weapons, and to the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

As a state on this dividing line, we continue our persistent efforts to create nuclear-free zones and corridors in Europe. These proposals of the SED, the CPCZ, and the SPD demand a constructive answer.

In our view and in that of our allies, it should not prove difficult to rid Europe of chemical weapons and thus at the same time promote a worldwide ban on them. Our negotiating offer on a possible chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe is in line with this.

As for the reduction of forces and conventional arms in Europe, the GDR feels that the high concentration of weapons and civilian targets, the destruction of which would have unforeseeable consequences for our entire continent, means that a war can no longer be waged in Europe, either by conventional means or by nuclear means. Hence, at the Vienna CSCE meeting, we are trying to ensure that talks between the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional disarmament can take place before the end of this year. An early mandate for these negotiations would at the same time be an outstanding contribution to guaranteeing human rights, as only living people can exercise such rights.

The Warsaw Pact states are in favor of acting as soon as possible to get a clear picture of the existing asymmetries in forces and arms on both sides. In order to prevent this problem from continuing to be the subject of unproductive speculation or accusations which make negotiations more difficult, we are in favor of reliably verifying the

exchanged data, if necessary on the spot. Then there would be nothing in the way of removing—with due regard for mutual concerns—the imbalances between the forces and arms of the two military alliances that have built up over the years.

The Warsaw Pact states also feel that drastic reductions in forces and arms must directly follow the process of overcoming existing imbalances. The final aim is, first of all, the removal of the capacity of the forces of both blocs to launch a surprise attack, and ultimately the elimination of their capacity to launch any attack at all.

On all these issues our state and the members of the Warsaw Pact will continue to work to reach joint solutions by means of negotiation, solutions which lead us forward on the path of disarmament, detente, and cooperation and which of course are of benefit for bilateral relations, the GDR foreign minister said.

People's Chamber Statement on INF Inspection
AU0507100988 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 1 Jul 88 p 1

["Statement by the Parliamentary Groups of the GDR People's Chamber on the Agreement Between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR on Inspections in Connection With the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles"]

[Text] One month ago, with the exchange of the ratification documents, the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles entered into force.

At the same time the 11 December 1987 agreement between the GDR, the USSR, and the CSSR, and the 23 December 1987 agreement between the GDR and U.S. Governments on inspections, became effective.

Thus, a historic treaty has come into force in international law, eliminating for the first time a whole class of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons and setting new norms for the limitation and reduction of arms. At the same time, it is proof of the realistic character of the joint peace program of the Warsaw Pact states for a world without nuclear weapons and force.

The parliamentary groups of the People's Chamber unanimously state that the nuclear disarmament that has been initiated in practice has met with unrestricted approval and support among the GDR's citizens. The GDR has made its contribution to this positive development. It will now conscientiously fulfill all of the obligations resulting from this.

The parliamentary groups of the People's Chamber stated with satisfaction that one of the sites for these nuclear weapons is already being used as a vacation center for the FDGB. That shows how disarmament brings the people direct and tangible benefits.

The parliamentary groups of the People's Chamber are in favor of continuing the process of disarmament without any pause and extending it immediately to further areas. This is particularly the case with the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons belonging to the USSR and the United States, while adhering to the ABM Treaty; the ending of all nuclear weapon tests; and a ban on all chemical weapons.

The parliamentary groups in the GDR People's Chamber call for tactical nuclear weapons to be included in the process of disarmament. They express the hope that negotiations will start this year on radical conventional disarmament in Europe.

The striving for nuclear-free zones has proven to be an important contribution to encouraging the process of disarmament. The course and results of the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones held in Berlin, the most comprehensive world forum on peace questions so far in history, testify to this. The creation of nuclear-free zones and areas would strengthen the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and liberate ever greater areas from the diabolical nuclear stuff, as GDR state and party leader Erich Honecker stressed at this meeting.

The parliamentary groups of the People's Chamber stressed the great confidence-building significance of Erich Honecker's proposal to set up mechanisms for the peaceful regulation of crises and the prevention of military incidents in central Europe.

The parliamentary groups of the People's Chamber affirm their desire for future talks with all parliaments and parliamentarians and with all forces willing to negotiate, on the fundamental questions of our time, for a joint and peaceful future.

Tisch, Kessler Visit Former Missile Site
LD0307101788 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0855 GMT 3 Jul 88

[Text] Waren, 3 Jul (ADN)—The latest vacation home of the GDR trade union federation FDGB was officially opened Sunday on the outskirts of Waren, a city in Mecklenburg Kreis. Harry Tisch, FDGB national executive chairman, and Army General Heinz Kessler, minister of national defense and SED Central Committee Politburo member, visited the new "Warenschhof" vacation home, where during the summer months 300 workers at a time can spend their vacations in pleasant and comfortable surroundings.

At Erich Honecker's proposal, the facility was handed over 3 months ago—immediately before the withdrawal of the Soviet SS-22 shorter-range missiles—to the FDGB vacation service. During a walkabout, the first workers to spend their holidays in Warenschhof expressed pleasure at how disarmament could lead to social progress. Including Warenschhof, the trade unions are offering 5.1

million vacation trips this year. An FDGB member contributes only about one-fourth of the cost of his vacation; children usually pay only 30 marks.

POLAND

Orzechowski Interviewed on UN Session
AUI306172288 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
11-12 Jun 88 p 9

[Interview with Marian Orzechowski, minister of foreign affairs and PZPR Politburo member, by PAP correspondent Ludwik Arendt in New York: "The Results May Exceed Expectations"—date not given]

[Text]

Arendt Mr Minister, before the beginning of the third UN special session, which was devoted to disarmament, I heard doubts expressed about the need to convoke a forum of this kind, because so far the most important disarmament agreements have been concluded outside the United Nations. However, many participants in the session itself stressed the United Nations' historic responsibility for progress in arms reduction. So, what is the truth in your opinion?

Orzechowski Leaving aside extreme opinions, there is no one today who questions the role of the United Nations in the disarmament process. The only problem is how its role can be strengthened and made more active.

Disarmament is a collection of measures leading to lasting, universal, and equal security for everyone. This feeling of security is a necessary condition for a world of peace, cooperation, partnership, and the joint resolution of the problems that the world faces. The role of the United Nations—the most universal international organization in existence today—should be viewed against this broad background. Attention is focused within the organization on problems troubling the whole world and its individual member states, from small states with populations of several thousand in the South Pacific, to large powers.

The international community associates many different hopes and expectations with the United Nations. This is fully justified. But, at the same time, we must remember that we are living in a very real world, in which the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons are in the hands of two military superpowers. Small, medium-sized, and even large countries that do not have nuclear weapons fear the outbreak of an uncontrolled armed conflict and nuclear catastrophe. Their real influence on nuclear weapons stockpiles is slight, and this is what gives rise to doubts about the role of the United Nations in disarmament.

However, there is much that does depend on the will of all UN member states and the voice of the broad international community. We often forget that great

powers also reach agreement because this is what is generally desired by the peoples of the world. I do not know what the outcome of these talks would be if public opinion and active campaigning by peace movements were ignored. Neither Washington nor Moscow can fail to take account of the importance of the actual state of opinion in Europe and the world. I think that this is also part of the essence of the new political thinking.

Arendt In some of the speeches made at the general debate, it was stressed that the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles will initiate a real disarmament process. The United Nations has an important role in giving this conception of disarmament stability and continuity. What kind of role can and should the United Nations play?

Orzechowski Essentially, the role is included in the UN Charter. Although the document was drawn up more than 40 years ago and today's world is entirely different, the Charter is still completely relevant to today's world. What the document says can be translated into the language of today's political undertakings.

The United Nations exists, above all, for the creation and dissemination of the concept of a world of lasting peace, security, and cooperation. Halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament are some of the ways in which it can do this. It is within this framework that the United Nations can and should act out its role more and more fully. What I have in mind is the creation of an entire system of forms of arms control. The United Nations can—and we already have concrete examples of this—participate directly in the resolution of regional conflicts, which are such an important element in the world situation. Without the resolution of these conflicts, it is difficult to talk about great progress in disarmament. The United Nations can also play an important role as disarmament becomes more and more of a fact, because what will arise is the question of the use that is made of the resources that are released through arms reduction for the socioeconomic development objectives of individual states. The United Nations can participate in the realization of programs for development in various areas of life, including ecology, demography, and relations between North and South, that is to say, those global challenges that we face but cannot solve because of a lack of resources.

This issue must be viewed realistically, as an expression and evidence of the hopes and problems that matter to the world. What matters most of all is that today there is no state that questions the role of the United Nations in disarmament, regardless of the different ways in which the role can be interpreted. This is confirmed by the course of the third session and the speeches made there. A speech that was particularly important and interesting was the one made by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze.

One is tempted to say that the session will produce better results than expected. We expect a substantive final document to be adopted that will stress the growing role of the United Nations in the disarmament process, including its role at the Geneva disarmament conference.

Arendt Mr Minister, the first few days of the New York session coincided with the Soviet-American summit. How are the events in Moscow assessed when set against this background?

Orzechowski This is the third time that I have attended a UN session or debate. I truly believe that what is happening in the hall of the General Assembly and, to a greater extent, behind the scenes, is a very sensitive gauge of everything that is happening along the Moscow-Washington axis. You can clearly see how relations between the two countries are reflected in the views of delegates, in their attitudes and their statements—this ranges from a kind of political depression and doubt, to euphoria. This is fully confirmed by what is happening now, after the Moscow summit. The general feeling is that it signals a clear improvement in international relations. The age of nuclear disarmament has begun. Dialogue between the superpowers is being stepped up, regardless of all the problems that remain.

And one more thing: Here, at the United Nations, this forum of the universal organization for states, you can palpably, physically sense that the status of relations between the USSR and the United States has a direct impact on the role of small and medium-sized states all over the world. This is very important. It is no coincidence that the third session has shown a real explosion of all kinds of regional initiatives concerning disarmament. It provides confirmation once again of the validity of the rule that we have talked about on several occasions: When there is detente, growing confidence, and more political dialogue and diplomatic negotiations, there is a greater need for real initiatives on the part of small and medium-sized states than at any other time. These initiatives cease to be no more than an expression of good intentions and goodwill. The possibility of realizing these initiatives and of being involved in the great cause of strengthening peace and disarmament is clearly greater.

Arendt Mr Minister, the message sent by the chairman of the State Council, Wojciech Jaruzelski, which has been deemed an official third session document, contains, among other things, the basic elements of the expanded version of the Polish plan for reducing arms and increasing confidence in central Europe. How is our proposal being received?

Orzechowski The Jaruzelski Plan has aroused great interest in many parts of the world and among various states, and not just in Europe. This has happened for two reasons above all.

The plan suits its "historical time" very well. Everyone has realized for quite a long time now that Europe is the largest arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons. Currently, with the withdrawal of intermediate- and shorter-ranger missiles, the question being asked is: What next? How should disarmament develop further? The expanded version of the Polish initiative provides an answer to this.

The plan is comprehensive, very concrete, and open to suggestions from partners. That is precisely why it has been decided that it can constitute a subject for discussion and negotiation.

Incidentally, while mentioning these ideas, I would like to stress that many of our partners and friends have been pleased to see that Poland has once again become active on a permanent basis, that it has returned to its traditional role in the international arena. This is being assisted by the new climate in world relations generally.

Arendt During your stay in New York, you have met several foreign ministers. Press communiques do not, by their very nature, reflect the full substance and atmosphere of such meetings. Could you provide some more detailed information?

Orzechowski My stay in New York this time has not been the same as usual. It has been shorter than before. Prior to our departure for New York, we decided that basically we would not arrange bilateral meetings. The meetings that took place were at the instigation of our partners.

Chronologically, the first meeting was with Cardinal Agostino Casaroli. There is no need to explain his role at the Vatican. I would just point out that he is the chief architect of relations between the Vatican and Eastern and central Europe, and thus with socialist Europe. To put it figuratively, he has his "finger on the pulse" of everything that is happening in relations between the PPR and the Apostolic See, and this also applies to church-state relations in Poland. What we did talk about was the state of relations between the Vatican and the PPR. The Holy See has traditionally been interested in what is happening in Poland, in the development of the domestic situation. I think the most important aspect of the meeting was the reaffirmation of the desire to complete work on documents that would provide a basis for the establishment of diplomatic ties. I am thinking of the desire to adopt sound, long-term documents that base relations between the PPR and the Vatican on lasting foundations.

There was also an important meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG vice chancellor and foreign minister. What we discuss at our meetings, which have by now become a tradition—there have been six so far—is the whole range of bilateral relations. On this occasion we also made a quite thorough examination of the work of three working parties established in January of this year.

We noted the areas in which progress has been achieved and those in which it's lacking. We confirmed that I would visit Bonn. Our wish to have Chancellor Kohl visit our country this year was also confirmed. I would like to stress this point in particular, because in the mass media in various parts of Europe and not just in the FRG, false reports have recently appeared stating that the chancellor has supposedly called off his visit to our country. The New York meeting confirmed the common wish to see the visit take place.

I met Leo Tindemans, the Belgian foreign minister. We reviewed mutual relations, which are developing very well. During my meeting with Qian Qichen, the PRC minister of foreign affairs, we affirmed our desire to expand mutually advantageous cooperation. The current visit to the PRC by Premier Zbigniew Messner reflects this. We also exchanged views on international matters, including disarmament and regional conflicts.

I also met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir. The talks we held affirmed our desire for, and the nature of, our relations with the states in the Middle East and the Jewish community throughout the world.

I also had other meetings with, for example, the Nepalese foreign minister. In addition, I spoke to senior representatives of what is an exotic state for us, Vanuatu, with which we established diplomatic relations last year. The state, which is located in the South Pacific region in an area of great strategic importance, is currently undergoing important internal changes, and it decided that it should inform us about them and expressed its desire for mutual contacts.

Arendt Mr Minister, what about relations with the United States? As we are in New York, I think we should say at least a few words about them.

Orzechowski You are right. Being in New York, it is difficult not to consider Polish-American relations. They are still at a very delicate and difficult stage. Real, tangible progress would be in the interest of both sides.

Our position remains unchanged. There are plans for an official visit to the United States by the PPR foreign minister. It would mark an important step on the road to finding new possibilities for developing mutual relations.

Arendt Mr Minister, thank you.

PPR's Ciosek Addresses Berlin Conference
AU2906165388 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
22 Jun 88 p 8

[Speech by Stanislaw Ciosek, Politburo candidate member, at the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones—date not given]

[Text] The present international situation may cause a certain amount of optimism. Thanks to the Soviet-American dialogue that has been established in recent

years, the tide of confrontation that overran detente has been halted. The great humanitarian idea of ridding mankind of mass-destruction weapons by the end of this century is receiving opportunities for realization and gaining increasing support among world opinion.

The problem of world peace occupies a central position in the foreign policy of People's Poland. Hence Poland's commitment to disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. I wish to emphasize that our country's first proposal since World War II, presented at the UN General Assembly in January 1946, was on the subject of nuclear weapons.

From this major stream of Polish foreign policy emerged the concept of denuclearizing central Europe, known as the Rapacki Plan. Put forth in October 1957, this plan was incorporated in a Polish Government memorandum the following February.

Since then, 30 years have passed. The idea of ridding central Europe of nuclear weapons has still not become reality, though the idea of a nuclear-free zone has not disappeared from disarmament talks. In fact, it has become a permanent part of it. The Rapacki Plan became an inspiration for similar undertakings in other parts of Europe and the world, such as the Tlatelolco and Rarotanga treaties, or the ideas for nuclear-free zones in Scandinavia, the Balkans, Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia. One can also seek the origin of other disarmament accords in the Rapacki Plan.

So one can say with complete conviction that this plan has found a permanent place in the peace efforts of international society.

Of enormous significance to the modern world and the current disarmament dialogue was Mikhail Gorbachev's January 1986 program to slowly but surely bring about a world free of nuclear weapons on the basis of the concept of "new thinking" in international relations, which is meeting an increasing echo in the world.

Several weeks ago, the world monitored with the greatest attention another meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. The Moscow summit met the expectations of an enhancement and expansion of Soviet-American dialogue, especially concerning the roads taken by both great powers toward disarmament, permanent international security, and cooperation. East-West relations, of key importance for security and solving world problems, are entering a major new phase.

The first important steps have already been made in this direction in the form of the Washington treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the continuing Soviet-American dialogue on a 50 percent reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides. These advances permit one to suppose with optimism that, although the disarmament tasks are not easy, they can be achieved if there is goodwill from the countries of the world.

My country is expressing such a will by taking an active part in perpetuating security and building international confidence. With this in mind, Wojciech Jaruzelski presented in May 1987 a plan to reduce armaments and increase confidence in central Europe. It involves transforming military potentials into strictly defensive mechanisms of building the foundations of a system of joint European security. This plan, known as the Jaruzelski Plan, suggests that suitable measures should also be applied to other spheres apart from conventional disarmament, military doctrines, and confidence-building, and speaks out in favor of a gradual reduction and then elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as a particularly dangerous part of military potentials which might be used to make a surprise attack. The openness of the plan, the readiness to cooperate with all relevant states, and the fact that the interests of each state are taken into account, permits one to be optimistic that the plan will be a specific contribution toward increasing confidence and cooperation between peoples and consolidating peace and security all over the world.

Poland is firmly in favor of a universal system of international security. Partial solutions, to be carried out in stages, are very important in achieving this objective. One of them, very important, is the formation of nuclear-free zones. Hence our complete support for regional disarmament initiatives aimed at creating nuclear-free zones, especially in the most sensitive parts of the world, especially Europe.

The successfully developing Soviet-American dialogue and the disarmament trends in East-West relations are presenting favorable chances for Europe. They must not be wasted by forcing through ways of "compensating for" or "modernizing" the armed forces. We should do everything we can to make disarmament a constant and irreversible process, guaranteeing the world's development without war or force. This is in the interest of society and our civilization.

YUGOSLAVIA

Soviet General Chervov Interviewed on Disarmament

*LD0107185388 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1422 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Zagreb, Yugoslavia, July 1 (TANJUG)—I am an optimist and I am convinced that it would be difficult, regardless of who is to become the new U.S. President, to stop the process of disarmament no matter how much a quick one, Col. Gen. Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov, head of the Department of Disarmament Affairs to the Soviet Union's Defence Ministry, has said in an exclusive interview with START, a local fortnightly. He is one of the two main Soviet negotiators in the disarmament talks with the U.S.

The interview came as a result of a long talk on two occasions, before and after the Moscow meeting between Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. A lack of mutual confidence is a big brake on relations, and even negotiations, between the two superpowers, Gen. Chervov emphasised. If a true control of disarmament is desired, both sides must let experts see for themselves on the spot what should be done. There is no readiness with the U.S. for such a way of supervision over carrying disarmament out, the Soviet general said.

The Soviet Union does not agree with the U.S. scheme to have instruments deployed in outer space to send data back to the earth, Gen. Chervov stated precisely. "We do not believe that to deploy such instruments in outer space would solve the problem of strategic missiles," he said.

Explaining that such instruments could be used for guiding missiles as well, the Soviet general stressed that the Soviets had told U.S. Defence Minister Frank Carlucci that they have nothing against seeing information come from outer space but do not allow that instruments capable of guiding missiles be launched.

In reply to the question of talks between the Soviet and U.S. defence ministers in Moscow, Chervov confirmed that Dmitry Yazov and Frank Carlucci also discussed the Iraq-Iran war and were agreed that it should be ended as soon as possible.

In explaining a new Soviet initiative on disarmament Chervov pointed out that it is being passed over in silence of set purpose in the West, elaborating that it implies a proposal for exchanges of figures from numbers of troops to numbers of weapons between the two military alliances. "They should be figures behind which to be found standing are the leading bodies of states," the Soviet general added. "If the NATO countries think that we really have an advantage, let them accept our proposal and come out with official figures and, then, let us conduct inspection together," Gen. Chervov said.

Gen. Chervov also denied that the Soviet Union wishes now to modernize its missiles.

In answering the question of possibilities for a fifth Gorbachev-Reagan meeting and for their signing an agreement on eliminating 50 percent of their strategic missiles, Gen. Chervov voiced his belief that, technically, an agreement could be prepared in three months at the latest, adding that there must be more of political good will.

"If politicians came to terms, experts would quickly do their job," he added.

"If the U.S. side shows more political will, a new agreement can be signed by this year's end," Col. Gen. Nikolay Fedorovich Chervov said.

INDIA

Commentary Views Outcome of UN Disarmament Session

BK2906120788 Delhi General Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 29 Jun 88

[Commentary by UNITED NEWS OF INDIA Bureau Chief Virendra Mohan]

[Text] The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament ended without a consensus after 4 weeks of intense debate on ways to eliminate nuclear weapons and banish the danger of a holocaust.

Barring the United States, which obstructed a declaration outlining a new program for global disarmament, the majority of the countries which took part in the session expressed their sorrow and dismay at the failure of the session.

When the session began on 31 May in New York, great hopes were roused since it was being held in the aftermath of two significant events—the signing of Intermediate Nuclear Forces, INF Treaty, and the Moscow summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Third World and nonaligned countries in particular had great expectations that the UN session would help to further expedite the process of disarmament. But their hopes were dashed with one of the superpowers showing a lack of political will to embark on the path of disarmament excepting on its own terms.

The highlight of the session was the presentation of an action plan for nuclear and general disarmament by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Mr Gandhi specially flew to New York on 8 June and addressed the General Assembly on 9 June.

Several participating countries shared India's concern about the dangers of the arms race. Although the session ended without producing a consensus declaration, India's move to rid the world of nuclear and other weapons in a time-bound 22-year program was put on record when the session ended.

For 2 weeks efforts were made by delegates on the floor, as well as behind the scenes, to negotiate a concluding document.

India made a vain bid to salvage the session by seeking its adjournment to a more opportune time next year. India was joined by other Third World countries in voicing frustration and disappointment at the sudden collapse of the session.

The delegates apportioned the blame for the failure of the session to the American refusal to accommodate Third World and Soviet concerns over naval and outer space arms race.

The U.S. ambassador, General Vernon Walters, stated after the session that his country had certain items of national policy which it could not give up just to get a piece of paper.

Gen Walters listed the dimension of nuclear capabilities of Israel and South Africa as extremely contentious issues. The U.S. also disapproved the 1-sentence reference in the draft declaration to naval disarmament.

Indian Ambassador to the UN Mr C. R. Gharekhan said it was a great pity that the session should have ended without adopting a declaration. India had objected to the emphasis on regional nuclear disarmament in the draft declaration since it has consistently maintained that nuclear proliferation is a global and not a regional issue.

Ultimately, India had its way in bringing round other delegates to its viewpoint. India also submitted an amendment to the draft declaration to have the world body oppose clandestine acquisition of nuclear technology, something Pakistan had been accused of many times.

The assembly president, (Peter Floren), in his concluding address to the assembly regretted the failure to reach agreement and urged the delegates to show greater readiness to compromise.

As the U.S. persisted in its stand which some delegates said wrecked the session, the assembly president extended the session by several hours to help bridge differences.

Mr Gharekhan, voicing India's disappointment, said it was hoped that given the international atmosphere it would be possible to adopt a document of consensus. Mr Gharekhan said if the U.S. had shown more understanding, perhaps a consensus could have been possible.

This was for the first time in 15 years that a special session on disarmament wound up with nothing substantive to show. If the UN session has failed to bring about a consensus declaration, it did succeed in at least focusing world attention on the deep concerns of the Third World and nonaligned countries about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the arms race.

The Indian action plan presented by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the most comprehensive document tabled at the UN which the nuclear weapon powers have at least taken note of.

A positive outcome of the session was that greater pressure would now be put on the United States to adopt a more flexible stand to pave the way for disarmament.

IRAN

Mir Salim Meets Honecker at East Berlin Meeting

*LD2306151888 Tehran IRNA in English
1502 GMT 23 Jun 88*

[Text] Tehran, June 23, IRNA—President Ali Khamene'i's top advisor Mustafa Mir Salim met with President [as received] of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Erich Honecker in East Berlin Wednesday [22 June] and conveyed a verbal message from the Iranian president.

Mir Salim stressing on the dangers of chemical weapons as "a potential and tangible threat" said the Islamic Republic of Iran expects the ongoing international conference on nuclear-free zones in East Berlin, to take concrete measures against the use of toxic arms.

In reply President Honecker expressed hope that in the light of efforts of participants like Iran, the conference would take effective steps against such threats and strive for maintaining peace and tranquility in the world.

Meanwhile, in a separate meeting in the GDR capital yesterday, Mir Salim pointed the dangers of chemical weapons, no less dangerous than nuclear ones, to Nicaragua's Vice-President Sergio Ramirez Mercado, and said a correct stance should be taken against this more tangible threat (chemical weapons).

"U.S. expansionist policy is rather equal to the threat of these destructive weapons," Mir Salim added.

In response, Ramirez called for frequent contacts between high-ranking Iranian and Nicaraguan officials, and expressed hope that Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto could soon pay a visit to Iran.

Nuclear-Free Corridor Would Affect Conventional Balance

LD2206171988 Moscow TASS in English
1630 GMT 22 Jun 88

[Text] Berlin June 22 TASS—By TASS correspondent Yuriy Borisov:

A lively debate has been held at the current international meeting for nuclear-free zones in Berlin on the question of the joint initiatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on establishing in central Europe a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free from chemical weapons.

After the ratification of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the initiative to set up a corridor has assumed even greater significance for the disarmament process in Europe, said Hermann Axen, member of the Political Bureau, secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. If a nuclear-free corridor were established, almost all the tactical nuclear weapons, battlefield nuclear weapons and chemical weapons would be withdrawn for a distance of 150 kilometres on each side from the boundary between the two military-political alliances. Thus the reduction would also concern the potentials of conventional weapons.

Josef Kempny, member of the presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee, noted that in the era when nuclear weapons threaten humanity's existence, it is necessary, despite all the ideological divisions, to pool efforts for the resolution of the existing problems. He expressed regret that the FRG Government to which the joint proposal of Czechoslovakia and the GDR on the setting up of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe was addressed, has not drawn a positive response so far.

As Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, noted in his speech, he is confident that if a nuclear-free corridor is created, many individuals and nations will wish to continue advancing on the path of disarmament. Herein lies the cause of the negative attitude to that idea of those who fear it.

In the course of the debate the question was asked about the obstacles on the way towards a ban on the chemical weapons. GDR representative professor Karl-Heinz Lohs noted that the international ban on the chemical weapons is blocked above all by the destructive stand of the United States. This stand finds its expression in the manufacture of binary chemical weapons and is proof of the lack of political will on the part of the United States to ensure a ban on that type of mass destruction weapons.

Maj Gen Tenin Urges Realism in Arms Policy

PM2806090988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian,
23 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Major General V. Tenin, candidate of military sciences: "Egotism or Realism?"]

[Text] The new political thinking has enabled the Soviet Union to put forward a number of major international ideas aimed at producing a decisive shift away from confrontation, tension, militarism, and strong-arm methods in state relations and toward cooperation, trust, disarmament, and political dialogue.

These include ideas relating to security and the prevention of war: a program for phased elimination of nuclear weapons in the world, an all-embracing security system, defense sufficiency, a nonoffensive doctrine, a balance of interests, and the strengthening of national and regional security by lowering the level of armaments. These have all made the world sit up, setting sociopolitical forces in motion at the tricky crossroads where the world stands today.

The world community has approached this crossroads under a global threat to mankind's very existence. Never before has a civilization developed such rapid rates of development while simultaneously accumulating weapons for its own destruction at the very same rate.

Some 55,000 nuclear munitions, equivalent to more than 15,000 megatonnes of TNT altogether, almost 4 tonnes of nuclear explosive for every inhabitant of the earth, is the appalling balance of world stocks of nuclear weapons, according to UN figures. Were it to be used, not only would everything that lives and breathes perish, but the earth would be torn asunder. The conventional arms arsenals are an equally heavy burden. Their use brings an hourly death toll in regional conflicts and local wars. These weapons are being improved, acquiring the lethal characteristics of nuclear ones. The arithmetic of slaughter is turning into the algebra of universal self-destruction.

On entering the nuclear, missile, space, and electronics age, the human race not only hauled the trappings of war with it but also a host of archaic dogmas to justify it. However, mankind does not stand at the crossroads with negative baggage alone. An enormous potential for coexistence, cooperation, and the political solution of acute problems has been built up.

Only now have we really taken our bearings and asked the question: What path will we choose in the future—the path of egotistically setting off national interests against one another or realistic collaboration based on a balance of such interests?

In the first event, we will understandably see no light on the horizon, as the strong will crush the weak and military methods of solving the world's problems will

remain paramount. The arms race will assume ever more sophisticated forms and could become irreversible. Striving for parity and parity itself in the military sphere will no longer be capable of playing the role of a stabilizing factor. The situation could get out of hand at any time. As a whole, this will be a move toward catastrophe—nuclear, economic, and environmental.

In the second event, the picture of the world' development looks quite different. The main thing is that striving for a balance of interests must not only be accompanied but also be ensured by a continuous process of disarmament and growth in mutual trust. The task of preventing war and violence thus comes to the forefront of international politics. The balance of forces is supplanted by a balance of interests, which results from account being taken of one's own national interests and the legitimate interests of one's international community partners when resolving questions of world politics, however complex they may be.

The positive nature of this result resides in its being achieved by purely peaceful means. For some people, this may also have a minus sign, since the concept of a balance of interests does not mean stopping rivalry or competition stemming from the ideological and socioeconomic differences of states.

It is important that military strength give way to political reason in the balance of interests, the kind of reason which makes it possible for all countries—large or small, armed or neutral, united in blocs or nonaligned—to hold dialogue.

Pluralism of political choice must be guaranteed by freedom of choice and its respect by other countries. That means that no matter how countries view one another, relations between them in the outside world can be based only on civilized principles of peaceful coexistence. This means more than getting used to another system of views or ideology. They can be diametrically opposed, but that is no reason for ideological disputes to be transferred into the sphere of interstate relations. They must be pure if contacts are to be expanded, confidence built, and spheres of parallel and joint interests developed.

This is perhaps a less than exhaustive outline of the new foreign policy philosophy, which predetermines a future unmarred by nuclear madness.

Three years ago, the policy of realism geared toward a balance of interests was only grasping after this outcome. However, in 1986, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries had already proposed two major programs for strengthening world security on this basis: a phased plan for the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 and the Budapest program of considerable cuts in armed forces

and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Today, after the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow, held against the backdrop of the ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, the implementation of the Geneva agreements on a political settlement surrounding Afghanistan, and positive features in the drafting in Vienna of a mandate for major talks on European disarmament, it is possible to talk about the first practical results of world politics based on a balance of interests. The agreements in the sphere of disarmament will make it possible to reduce and in a number of cases completely eliminate a particular kind of weapon which forms the material base of war, that is to say, the instruments of pressure and threats which form the nub of the outmoded policy of a balance of forces.

But not everything is so simple in this dialectically complex and contradictory world. The arms race as a manifestation of human activity has its own catechism. Aggressive militarism does not come about in a vacuum. History shows that it is an accurate reflection of the inner disposition of the ruling circles of a particular state to achieve the monopoly right if not to direct the processes in the world at least to influence them, based on its own ideas about the role and place of other countries in it. Force—military, political, and economic—supplies the argument for such "influence." The method: diktat and intimidation; the means: an arms race designed to exhaust the rival and to attain a position of military-strategic superiority.

The fact that all this is present in the policy of the major NATO countries, despite certain positive aspects (could there otherwise have been, for example, the "double zero" on nuclear missiles in Europe, the achievement of East-West dialogue on conventional arms, or the breakthrough in Soviet-American relations), forces the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to tackle a dual task in the foreign policy sphere.

First, actively promoting the process of talks in the sphere of disarmament and security. It is indicative that at the UN General Assembly third special session on disarmament, our plans in this sphere were supplemented by a broad range of measures to decrease the naval threat. As of today, the Warsaw Pact countries have in conjunction offered the world community an integrated concept of demilitarization on land, at sea, and in the air and outer space.

Second, not slackening the attention paid to the building of defense, the efficiency of which, as the CPSU Central Committee Theses stress, must henceforth be ensured predominantly by qualitative parameters in regard to both equipment and personnel.

From the historic crossroads from which mankind is about to stride into the future, the following picture is discernible: The countries and the peoples, irrespective of their social choice, are building their relations on the

basis of disarmament, a balance of interests, and all-around cooperation. When this picture will become reality rather than just an image depends on how dynamically world politics restructures itself on the basis of the new thinking.

General Staff Officer on Conventional Asymmetries

AU2706151888 Vienna KURIER in German
25 Jun 88 p 23

[Reader's letter from "Colonel Dmitriy Belskiy—General Staff—Moscow"]

[Text] The other day, the daily KURIER found "fault" with the fact that the USSR had proposed to extend the reduction zone of conventional arms and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, but not merely to central Europe. However, this proposal results from the situation which had been created in Europe. It is a well-known fact that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO have substantial arsenals outside of central Europe. In terms of military potentials and technical equipment, Western military experts place England and France next to the United States. In terms of numbers, the Turkish Armed Forces come second to the United States in NATO. Thus, it would be insufficient if we were to confine ourselves to the central European area.

The Warsaw Pact has no "dramatic preponderance" of conventional arms. This has been repeatedly recognized even in the West. But there are certain imbalances and asymmetries. The Warsaw Pact, for instance, has a disproportion of some 20,000 tanks, and NATO has one of 1,400 aircraft of the air strike force [Angriffsluftwaffe]. Brought into action three times a day, 440 such aircraft can replace up to three tank divisions in terms of efficiency, mobility, and firepower. We suggest that one begin reducing conventional arms by eliminating the existing imbalances and asymmetries.

Akhromeyev: Military Withdrawals Should Begin in Mediterranean

LD2506105088 Moscow TASS in English 1030 GMT
25 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 25 TASS—Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, proposed that the elimination of foreign military presence and bases in foreign territories be started from the Mediterranean.

Addressing a press conference here today, he noted that albeit the Soviet proposal on putting an end to the stay of foreign troops and military bases in the territory of other countries, which was put forward by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, at the third special U.N. General Assembly session, has not yet been elaborated in detail, "it is possible, as the first step, to withdraw the fleets of foreign countries from the Mediterranean."

In the course of the upcoming talks on reduction of the armed forces and arms in Europe, Marshal Akhromeyev continued, it will also be possible to start the return of Soviet troops into their territory from the territories of a number of East European countries, and the troops of the USA and Britain—to their territory from the FRG.

Touching upon the situation at the talks on strategic offensive weapons after the Moscow summit meeting, the chief of the General Staff said that the Soviet side had attentively analysed the agreements reached at it by the leaders of the two countries. The activities have also been analysed on the working groups which have made considerable progress. At present the Soviet side is completing preparations for that so as to resume with fresh vigour the talks in Geneva on July 12.

"The preparations for the implementation of the INF Treaty, which has come into force, have added very many things we have to attend to," Marshal Akhromeyev continued. Preparedness has now been checked on all the facilities in the territory of the USSR for inspection by the U.S. side. All the equipment and facilities have been prepared for the travel and work at them by American inspectors. As the U.S. side has informed us, work in this line has been completed in the USA, too.

The Special Control Commission in Geneva, which was set up by the USSR and the USA, is examining the technical aspects of the upcoming inspections and eliminations. On July 1 the sides will start inspecting each other. The elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is due to be started in August.

Petrovskiy Speech to UN Session Outlined

LD2606210388 Moscow TASS in English
1930 GMT 26 Jun 88

[Text] New York, June 26 TASS—This special session will occupy a very conspicuous place in the history of the United Nations Organization, Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, said today in a speech to the closing plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly's third special session on disarmament.

The session [words indistinct] the crucial [words indistinct] the start of a real process of nuclear disarmament and became a truly people's assembly of representatives of various public and non-governmental organizations and the generator of new [word indistinct] and proposals the implementation of which will make it possible to fill [word indistinct] with a tangible content and to set into motion mechanisms of disarmament. The (?debate) has shown that the idea of the new political thinking which presupposes renunciation of confrontation and countervailing use force, and parallel constructivism of bilateral and multilateral efforts of countries are beginning to be widely introduced to the practice of world politics."

"Really, the logic of security in the military sphere has become [word indistinct] with new content at the session. The culture of the dialogue has changed too. It ceases to be a verbal fencing and a [word indistinct] for victory over an opponent but becomes the source of the quest for ideas and the source of the truth".

"Of course, revitalisation of UN activities, just as everything new, encounters opposition on the part of the braking forces of conservative reaction", the representative of the USSR pointed out. "We witnessed that at this special session as well. It is regrettable that a final document has not been coordinated precisely owing to counteraction by those forces. The more so as consensus was within reach, so to speak, and the Soviet delegation was ready to act so that consensus could be reached on all points of the document".

"Nevertheless what has happened does not discourage us", Vladimir Petrovskiy went on to say. "The session, having become a sort of laboratory of the new thinking, now creates greater opportunities for its rich potential to be used in practical acts and at other forums and to serve further headway in all direction of disarmament. The Soviet Union has received at the session a powerful store of energy for acting in all directions of disarmament. We are gratified to point out that our priorities are shared by the international community".

"The priorities are to conclude an agreement on a 50-per cent reduction in the strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States with the observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, to ban the tests of nuclear weapons, to cut down conventional arms and the armed forces and, as a starter, to hold talks on these issues in application to the European Continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, and finally to introduce the mechanisms of verification, openness and trust to the process of disarmament. Our routes of disarmament are a mutli-lane highway where there is room for both bilateral and multilateral efforts".

"We hold that in present day conditions it is exceptionally important that bilateral processes be substantiated by multilateral efforts and that there should be mutual enrichment from the experience gained as a result of acting in these two directions. We intend to continue to rely on the experience and wisdom of the international community and the knowledge which we have gained at this special session", the deputy minister of the foreign affairs of the USSR emphasized in conclusion.

Gerasimov on INF Treaty Inspection Procedures
LD2606174488 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1400 GMT 26 Jun 88

[From the "International Panorama" program, presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] Reciprocal inspection in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles begins on 1 July. The Americans will go to Votkinsk in Udmurtiya and will settle in

there for 13 years to observe the works there, which are bashfully called engineering works. Our inspectors [kontroler] will be based at the Hercules No 1 works in the town of Magna in the state of Utah. Given the normal secretiveness of both sides, the exchange of inspectors is a breakthrough.

There will also be spot checks—the inspectors can appear in places where there is a sign saying: Forbidden Zone, which has probably faded over many years. They can appear, let's say, in a village which disappeared from the maps some time ago, Novaya Sysoyevka. It snuggles in the hills of the Sikhote-Alin ridge in Maritime Kray. Forty-seven intermediate-range missiles are hidden there. Or the Americans will go to Polotsk, Mozyr, Slutsk, Lutsk, Chervonograd, (Vysokaya pech), Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Kansk, or Pinsk.

As we can see, glasnost is also possible in the delicate military sphere—though by mutual agreement, to be sure. Here, too, we must move further forward.

U.S. Reciprocation on Inspections Urged
LD3006023888 Moscow in English to North America
2200 GMT 29 Jun 88

[Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] Soviet and American delegations in Geneva have reportedly exchanged information about underground nuclear testing in their countries. Here is comment by Vladislav Kozyakov:

The two sides, he writes, have supplied detailed information about five tests and agreed on mutual inspections by experts of the nuclear test sites in Nevada and Semipalatinsk. Experimental explosions to be held at the two sites in August are intended to help Soviet and American experts clarify verification. This report is a reminder that where there is a mutual wish, agreement can be reached on largescale verification of disarmament moves. An even more striking indication of this truth is the INF Treaty. This treaty provides for a total of 640 on-site inspections. What all future arms control agreements need is openness and a readiness for any kind of inspection.

The Soviet Union has made it a practice to invite the other side's experts to gain first-hand information to remove any doubts where security is concerned. When the United States had doubts about the INF Treaty, its representatives were invited to visit facilities near Moscow and Gomel. Americans were also invited to the radar station at Krasnoyarsk to see for themselves that the Soviet Union has been abiding by all the treaty commitments. It would be fair if the American side did the same; but it has not yet invited Soviet experts to any of the radars that cause concern here. And now, too,

when an agreement is being hammered out to slash strategic offensive arms, there is no sign of reciprocity. The United States does not wish its warships or submarines to be inspected.

The Soviet Union has also suggested exchanging information about conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and monitoring them with on-site inspections, but there has been no reply. And yet, to show no readiness for disarmament control of any kind means jeopardizing any arms reduction.

'Anxiety' Over Soviet Inspectors Decried
PM2906104188 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 88 Single Edition p 8

[Colonel V. Pogrebnykov "Rejoinder": "Missiles and Secrets"]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has been "working" for nearly a month now. Over this time the sides, as was envisaged, have exchanged updated data on their status as of 1 June—the date the treaty enters into force—and are ready to begin on-site inspections.

It is not out of the question that during inspections, various problems may arise for each side. No great matter can do without these problems, especially a matter like the elimination of a whole class of weapons: over 2,500 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. But some people are deliberately and artificially creating problems.

Thus, even before the start of on-site inspections, the U.S. journal U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT began to regale readers with views of a highly dubious nature. Calling our inspectors, whose arrival is expected 1 July, "a group of qualified Soviet agents," the journal demands: "The United States must secure itself against the Soviet verifiers learning more than envisaged by the treaty."

What grounds are there for this anxiety? The following: In the past 4 months, the Pentagon has carried out three dozen special exercises. Taking part were 200 inspectors who are to travel to the Soviet Union and 400 staffers called on to escort the Soviet inspectors on U.S. territory. The journal writes that during an exercise the "Soviet" representatives—their parts were played by Russian-speaking U.S. inspectors—were able to elude their escorts' control for an hour. During another exercise, a "Soviet" inspector was able to gain access to secret information. During yet another exercise on the way to a verification site, a "Soviet" group was led through top secret military zones, access to which is not authorized for the Soviets.

Nor is that all, the journal continues. We must not allow "even physical contact between the inspectors and secret materials, especially materials like cover for modern weapons systems." Unless the inspectors have gloves on, the Soviets will be able to collect intelligence with the aid of... their fingernails.

Vigilance is useful and necessary. But the "supervigilance" which U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT urges is based on a kind of "presumption of guilt" of the Soviet inspectors. Spy mania, the attempt to place a mine of distrust under the verification of the fulfillment of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, does this journal no credit.

British Experts Visit CW Training Center
LD3006230988 Moscow TASS in English 2043 GMT 30 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—Correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov writes:

The entire arsenal of means of protection against chemical weapons—special machines for decontamination, various instruments and equipment—could be seen in operation today at a training centre of chemical troops near Moscow by British experts headed by Ambassador Tessa Solesby and by Soviet and foreign journalists. The British representatives came here to return a visit by a group of Soviet experts to the British bacteriological research centre in Porton Down. The purpose of the visit is to study in detail scientific, technical and military aspects concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons and possible verification methods.

"Today's demonstration in the training centre was organised in order to give the British delegation a possibility to see the entire process of measures to ensure protection from chemical weapons at this training ground", said Colonel General Vladimir Pikalov, commander of chemical forces of the USSR Ministry of Defence. He noted the defensive nature of the Soviet military doctrine and the Soviet side's readiness to take all the necessary steps to reach agreement on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Early last year the USSR ceased the production of chemical weapons and announced the size of their stocks—not more than 50,000 tons. Construction has been started of a plant in Chapayevsk to destroy chemical weapons. Representatives of 45 countries last autumn visited a facility in Shikhany where they were shown samples of Soviet chemical weapons and the technology of destroying them.

Colonel General Pikalov stressed that the prohibition of chemical weapons is obstructed by the production of binary munitions that was started in the United States and opens a new channel of the race in the production of chemical weapons.

Madam Solesby, the head of the British delegation at the disarmament talks in Geneva and head of the British group of experts, noted the importance of the present visit for strengthening trust and expanding the exchange of information. This, in her opinion, will facilitate success of the talks in Geneva.

Tonight the group of British experts left for Shikhany (Saratov region) to visit a chemical facility of the Soviet Armed Forces that studies means of protection from chemical weapons.

U.S. Plan for Experimental SDI Testing Noted
LD3007213888 Moscow TASS in English
1821 GMT 30 Jun 88

[Text] New York, June 30, TASS—The Strategic Defence Command of the U.S. Army will soon conduct tests within the framework of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI). As the journal "AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY", which is close to the Pentagon, has learnt, the tests will include an "experimental system of infrared sensors" designed by the "Hughes Aircraft Company", one of the leading contractors of the U.S. war department. According to the journal, it is to be installed on board the modified bomber "B-767". The aim of the test is to detect an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from the U.S. Air Force Vandenberg Base in California before it enters the dense layers of the earth's atmosphere.

According to the Pentagon's designs, the data obtained in the course of the experiment, may lead to creating the most important components of the SDI that would ready the defences in the eventuality the other defence systems prove to be unable to beat back the ICBM attack.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Deputy Chief Interviewed
PM3006130988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 88 Single Edition p 4

[M. Ponomarev report on interview with Colonel N. Shabalin, deputy chief of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center: "Verification—The Basis of Trust"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Colonel N. Shabalin, deputy chief of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, describes how the monitoring of the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is organized.

The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles came into force at 1220 hours on 1 June 1988, the moment the ratification documents were exchanged. This treaty provides for the destruction of all Soviet and U.S. missiles with a range

between 500 and 5,500 km, their launchers, and their support structures and equipment. The production of such missiles is terminated, and its nonresumption is guaranteed.

It is 1 month since the moment when the treaty came into force. What has been done in this time?

Quite a lot, Col N. Shabalin said. To be more precise, everything that the treaty envisaged. Lists of inspectors and flight crews have been exchanged through the nuclear risk reduction centers. Updated data under the Memorandum of Understanding on the determination of prime data were exchanged on 20 June. A special verification commission, whose job it is to resolve disputed questions concerning the discharge of obligations assumed by the sides, started work in Geneva at the beginning of June.

Once 30 days have passed since the treaty has come into force—in other words, as from 1 July—each side becomes entitled to carry out inspections [inspektsiya] at sites indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding. Measures to verify the treaty's observance thus come into effect. These measures are designed to give each side confidence that the pledges enshrined therein are strictly discharged, that missile systems are being eliminated, and that prohibitions are in no way evaded.

The goal of the inspections due to begin 1 July is primarily to verify the quantity of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment, and other data as at the date when the Soviet-U.S. treaty came into force. We have learned that the U.S. inspectors who will carry out monitoring in the eastern part of the USSR gathered in Japan a few days ago now. U.S. inspectors who will work in the western part of the USSR and in GDR and CSSR territory have arrived in Frankfurt-am-Main (FRG). The U.S. side has already notified us of the inspection site and the composition of the inspection group for continuous monitoring at the portal of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt ASSR.

The Soviet side also gave prior notification to the U.S. side of the number of inspectors, their surnames, names, and patronymics, and the inspection site for continuous monitoring: the "Hercules" Plant in Magna, Utah. Information regarding inspection sites at other facilities should be provided no earlier than 16 hours before the aircraft's arrival at the entry point, being Moscow and Ulan-Ude here in the Soviet Union.

A lot of work has been done, the center's deputy chief went on with his narrative, to prepare for the reception of U.S. inspectors. Questions of housing, catering, and medical services have been resolved. Communications with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow have been ensured for the inspectors. Task groups have been set up to deal with questions of stationing and accompanying the U.S.

inspection groups. The U.S. side can send up to 10 such groups at the same time. Some 117 Soviet facilities could be subject to inspection during July and August.

In their turn, more than 30 Soviet inspection groups could visit U.S. facilities in July and August, these being missile operating bases, missile support facilities, and missile destruction sites, including more than 20 facilities located on U.S. territory and more than 10 facilities on the territory of West European countries where U.S. intermediate-range missiles are deployed.

Answering a question about the members of Soviet inspection groups, Col N. Shabalin said:

These are very well trained and highly skilled people. I can mention, for example, Colonel Anatoliy Yevgenyevich Samarin, chief of the inspection group going to the "Hercules" Plant in Magna. He is himself a Rocket Forces man, thoroughly versed in missile technology. At the same time, he is very familiar with the production processes and the technology for missile equipment manufacture. Col Samarin has come with excellent recommendations from his former service station and, in our view, is fully prepared to perform the task assigned to him.

This task is far from simple. The inspection group leader is a representative of the USSR National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Being an official representative of the Soviet side, he is vested with great powers for decision-making, dealings with the U.S. side, and so on.

The Soviet comrades appointed as inspectors have undergone the necessary training. They have studied in depth the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and related documents, and they have been given detailed and specific guidelines. This is, of course, something new. But we have every reason to believe that they will cope with their task.

What will happen if an inspection reveals any violations? This is how Col N. Shabalin answered this question:

To start with, we will, of course, try to resolve any problems, should they arise, right there on the spot. Inspectors are entitled to request explanations in connection with any ambiguities arising in the course of inspections. Both we and the Americans have firm intentions on this account. But life is life. If there is no success in eliminating any ambiguity in the course of an inspection, this question with the relevant explanations by the U.S. side must be recorded in the inspection report and, if necessary, it can be subsequently examined at one of the special verification commission's sessions. As a matter of fact, this commission's task includes solving all questions concerning the fulfillment of treaty obligations. This commission, comprising representatives of both sides, is already functioning.

All activities concerning the verification of the fulfillment of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in the United States are the province of the Department of Defense On-site Inspections Agency. We have already met staffers of this agency and have discussed problems that concern us. The relations we are developing are businesslike, and I would perhaps take the liberty of saying, friendly. After all, we are doing one and the same job, a job that nobody else in the world has done yet: to verify the elimination of two types of nuclear weapons at once. Being the first is always hard, but it is also an honorable job. We are prepared to do everything to justify the trust vested in us.

NATO Accused of Stalling Preparations for Conventional Arms Talks

*LD0107230588 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Another meeting within the framework of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO over the preparation of the mandate for future talks on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains region, has taken place in Vienna, Austria. Yuriy Solton has this comment:

I think that already at the current stage the negotiations could have lead to impressive results. Regretfully, this has not happened. In fact, no progress has been achieved. [Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland at 2200 GMT on 1 Jul broadcasts a version of this commentary in which Solton says "In fact, little progress has been achieved."] NATO officials lack the courage and, to my mind, even the desire to adopt a political decision on the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and other countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. And these proposals give clear-cut answers to questions that NATO officials themselves put. They tried to intimidate the public on many occasions in the past and still try to do so today with the Warsaw Treaty Organization's military superiority in Europe. But to say something is one thing and to give facts confirming this is another. There are not such facts, however.

Quite a few figures have been released in the West stating the number of Soviet tanks, planes and servicemen, but these figures are often taken out of thin air. The USSR has proposed, therefore, that in order to establish the truth official information should be exchanged about the armed forces and armaments of the two military and political alliances. On-site inspections could check this information. All they would establish will be the asymmetry, of course. Then an agreement could be reached on removing the disbalance, lowering the level of military confrontation at the same time. And then the sides could get down to a general reduction of the armed forces.

The Soviet Union proposes that the army of each side should be cut down by 500,000 men already at the first stage, and then further reductions can be carried out so that the structure of the armed forces in Europe could assume the purely defensive nature.

And what is the response of NATO representatives? They say neither yes nor no. They propose no variants of their own. The relaxation of military tension in Europe where two 3-million-men strong armies oppose one another, the armies equipped with most modern weapons including nuclear, would tell favorably on the entire world situation. What prevents us from achieving this? I'm sure it is NATO's stake on military force. I'm also convinced that NATO will have to give up this policy sooner or later. The practice of balancing on the brink of a military conflict becomes too dangerous today.

Government To Allow Soviet Inspections

*LD0207081788 Moscow TASS in English
0630 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Brussels July 1 TASS—The Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of Belgium's Parliament, declared on June 30 by an overwhelming majority of votes in favour of ratification of the agreements between Belgium and the United States, and between Belgium and the Soviet Union on inspections on the Belgian territory of American cruise missile units through the effort of Soviet inspectors. This comes under provisions of the Soviet-American Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles.

For the ratification process to be completed, the above agreements are yet to be approved by the Senate, the Parliament's upper chamber.

A representative of the Belgian Government has announced that the Soviet inspectors can arrive in Belgium for exercising control at any time chosen by them. The lack of complete ratification of the agreements between Belgium and the United States and Belgium and the USSR on inspections, he said, shall not prevent them from exercising their functions, since the Belgian Government has already undertaken official obligations to observe the provisions of the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet inspectors will be able to subject to control the U.S. missile base in Florennes and the European cruise missile technical maintenance centre in Gosselies.

Geneva Nuclear Test Talks With U.S. Described

*LD0107184888 Moscow TASS in English
1635 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Geneva July 1 TASS—The second round of Soviet-American full-scale stage-by-stage talks on questions connected with the problem of nuclear tests has ended here today.

In accordance with the understanding reached at the summit in Washington, during the second round the delegations were set the task of promptly conducting the preparation in practice and ensuring the legal formulation of a joint verification experiment at the testing ranges of the sides with the aim of working out improved

measures to verify the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. It was held that these verification measures would be used to the extent to which they are applicable in the agreements on the further limitation of nuclear tests that could be worked out subsequently.

The main complexity of the task tackled at the talks was in its uniqueness—to permit representatives of the other side to work directly at nuclear testing ranges. It is natural that these circumstances and the need to ensure the possibly most successful conduct of the experiment required the solution of a whole set of technical, legal, organisational and other problems.

The agreement between the USSR and the United States on holding the joint verification experiment, worked out during the round and signed at the Moscow summit, became a code of agreed-upon provisions regulating the activity of the sides in connection with the joint verification experiment. Under the agreement the sides will conduct two nuclear explosions in pursuance of the joint verification experiment—one at the Nevada range in August of this year and the other at the Semipalatinsk range in September. The planned yield of each of these explosions is not less than 100 kilotons approaching 150 kilotons. Each side on the basis of reciprocity has the possibility of measure the yield of these blasts by using teleseismic and hydrodynamic methods of measuring yield. As to teleseismic methods, it was necessary to reach agreement on mutual procedures of obtaining trustworthy information and to exchange calibration data on earlier conducted explosions at Soviet and American ranges.

Such an exchange took place on June 28. As a result of the exchange the USSR and the United States fulfilled all their mutual obligations within the framework of the joint verification experiment related to the teleseismic method of verification at the stage of preparations for recording the blasts at the Semipalatinsk and Nevada testing ranges.

For the hydrodynamic method it was necessary to drill with high precision a measurement hole at each side, to reach agreement on the range of equipment and exchange geological data on the blast area. The measurement of the yield of the blast in the main hole at the testing sites of both sides obtained by means of hydrodynamic methods will be taken as the standard in the experiment.

The check in the course of an experiment of the two methods of verification that differ fundamentally in terms of complexity of implementation and cost will make it possible to draw objective conclusions about their applicability in the future verification mechanism.

The discussion and reaching of agreement on mutually acceptable solutions on the given questions passed on the whole in a constructive atmosphere and enabled the

sides to start the practical implementation of the joint verification experiment already before the signing of the agreement itself. Thanks to this, preparatory work for hydrodynamic measurements at the sites are entering the concluding stage. The preparatory work for testing the teleseismic method has been completed.

Parallel to preparations for the joint verification experiment the talks centred on the elaboration of concrete accords on the content of the future measures to verify compliance with the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. With due account for the fact that as different from the 1974 treaty the coordination of improved verification measures for the 1976 treaty does not require waiting for the results of the joint verification experiment, the working out of a new protocol to this treaty became yet another priority of the second round. The sides succeeded in achieving considerable progress along this direction as well and on the whole they have reached agreement on the main provisions of this document. A real base has been created opening the road to the speediest conclusion of work on it already during the next round of negotiations.

In the course of the concluded round of talks the delegations had also commenced, as far as this was possible prior to the joint verification experiment, to study questions connected with the improved verification measures for the 1974 treaty.

The final reaching of agreement on the protocols to both treaties should be completed within the shortest period of time so that the sides could move on after this to the study at the talks of further more radical measures to limit the yield and number of nuclear tests, up to and including their total termination.

On the whole the second round passed in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere that ensured effective conditions for the search for and working out of mutually acceptable decisions.

Soviet, U.S. INF Inspectors Travel to Sites

*LD0107210988 Moscow TASS in English
2010 GMT 1 Jul 88*

[Text] Washington July 1 TASS—A group of Soviet inspectors arrives at the U.S. air force base near San Francisco today. Under the INF Treaty the inspectors are empowered to verify compliance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

This was announced by Kendell Pease, a spokesman for the On-Site Inspection Agency of the U.S. Department of Defence.

In a special press release the Pentagon also announced that a group of U.S. inspectors led by Brig. Gen. Roland Lajoie, chief of the On-Site Inspection Agency, arrives in Moscow from the U.S. Airforce base at Rhine-on-Main (FRG) on July 1.

Maj Gen Razuvanov Addresses British Guests

*LD0207113888 Moscow TASS in English
1123 GMT 2 Jul 88*

[Text] Shikhany (Saratov region), July 2, TASS—A visit of a group of British experts to the Soviet military facility in Shikhany became another demonstration of trust and openness. They will see the laboratory and technical basis of the military facility, familiarize themselves with the technology of the elimination of chemical weapons, with special processing facilities and the equipment the Army unit has at its disposal for eliminating consequences of accidents. A practical demonstration of it will be conducted. They will fly by helicopter over the military facility and will be able to examine any spot of the test site.

Addressing the guests, Major General Robert Razuva-nov, head of the Shikhany military facility, pointed out that bilateral contacts between countries participating in the talks were very important for resolving as soon as possible problems connected with the banning of chemical weapons and concluding an international convention to this effect.

"Mutual consultations, the exchange of views between specialists and the exchange of delegations sent to military-chemical facilities promote the consolidation of trust. Last May a Soviet delegation visited a British centre of military-chemical studies in Porton Down. During a reply visit of a British delegation we shall try to do as much as possible for promoting the solution of problems directly connected with a convention on the banning of chemical weapons which is being worked out today. Special attention will be devoted to scientific, technical and military aspects dealing with a chemical weapons ban, possible methods of control over its implementation and means of protection against chemical weapons", he said.

The Shikhany military facility has been assigned the task of resolving a number of problems connected with chemical weapons, technical equipment of chemical troops and chemical protection units. Apart from it it was assigned a special task: to work out methods of technical control over non-development and non-production of chemical weapons. This part of scientific and technical research has a priority today over other spheres of studies.

British experts highly appreciate the sincere striving of the Soviet side for the consolidation of trust, the desire to conclude a convention on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons as soon as possible. Ambassador Tessa Solesby, head of the British delegation at the

disarmament conference in Geneva, said that their visit was the continuation of the exchange started by the visit to Porton Down by a Soviet delegation. Its purpose is to consolidate confidence in each other and mutual understanding on a wide range of questions connected with chemical weapons which are discussed at the Geneva talks.

Colonel General Vladimir Pikalov, head of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, said: "The more good, constructive exchanges on questions of principled importance—the sooner the problem will be resolved which is facing our nations. Of course we would like to have similar exchanges of delegations with the United States, if it displays goodwill in this respect".

Chervov Cited on NATO Modernization Plans
LD0207131188 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Text] Lately, high-ranking NATO officials have been talking increasingly often about their plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, American General John Galvin, for one called for implementing these plans several days ago in Zurich. What is behind these calls for modernization, and why have the top NATO officials concerned themselves with it? Our reporter addressed this question to Colonel General Nikolay Chervov of the Soviet General Staff.

In other words, modernization means rearmament, General Chervov said. In fact, this involves plans for replacing the missiles to be eliminated under the INF Treaty with other nuclear weapons.

What type of weapons?

Recently American Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, himself spoke about this in a report for the congress. NATO's plans provide for the emergence of another modification of the Lance missile with longer range and greater accuracy. The United States Sixth Fleet, based on the Mediterranean, will receive already next spring its first consignment of the 300 cruise missiles capable of reaching Soviet territory.

There are plans to deploy in West Germany and Britain new planes armed with such cruise missiles, which will be capable of striking targets intended for the Pershing-2's and cruise missiles to be eliminated under the INF Treaty. In short, Gen Chervov went on to say, as a result of implementing the plans for modernization, Europe might come in for bigger arsenals of nuclear weapons after the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles than it has now.

Formally, the weapon systems envisaged by the modernization plans are not covered by the INF Treaty. In fact, however, their goal is to bypass the treaty. That is why the Soviet Union resolutely objects to modernization, the real aim of which is to rearm Europe, General Chervov pointed out.

British Visit to Shikhany Continues

LD0207174388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Text] Shikhany, Saratov Oblast, 2 Jul (TASS)—TASS correspondent Vladimir Usachenkov reports:

Technological equipment and devices in the mobile complex for the destruction of chemical weapons have been shown to a group of British experts, headed by Ambassador Tess Solesby, at the Soviet military site in Shikhany. The visit by the experts, who arrived in Shikhany on Thursday, is being conducted in response to the trip by a group of Soviet specialists to the Porton Down chemical warfare research center in Britain in May this year.

The technological equipment and devices shown to the British delegation is parallel to that which will be used at the chemical weapons destruction enterprise in Khapayevsk (Volga region). Their construction is among the steps being taken by the Soviet Union aimed at helping in the signing as quickly as possible of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, work on which is being conducted in Geneva.

The USSR has ceased production of chemical weapons and unilaterally announced the extent of its supplies. Testimony to the USSR's willingness to make every effort to liquidate chemical weapons was the visit to Shikhany last October by representatives from 45 countries. During the present visit most attention is being focussed on technical questions connected with the preparation of a Geneva convention.

Lieutenant General Kuntsevich, deputy chief of chemical warfare troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, replied to numerous questions put by representatives of the British delegation.

"We meet with the British delegation with the desire to discuss all the reports," he told a TASS correspondent.

The British specialists today acquainted themselves in detail with the characteristics of the chemical weapons of the USSR Armed Forces.

Lajoie's U.S. Inspection Team Arrives in Moscow
LD0207194988 Moscow TASS in English
1935 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 2 TASS—The arrival of U.S. inspectors in Moscow to monitor compliance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was shown by Soviet television today.

A U.S. Air Force plane landed at Sheremetyevo Airport, bringing 29 inspectors led by Brigadier General Roland Lajoie. They will go to various regions of the USSR.

The general told a Soviet television correspondent that inspection would take two weeks, following which the group would be replaced by another one. He said that he would name the Soviet side the facilities selected for inspection some time later. After that, according to the arrangement, the group is to be sent to the Soviet facility within nine hours.

General Chervov on 'Reasonable Sufficiency'
AU0507110488 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
2 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov: "On the Military Doctrines of East and West; In the Interest of Strategic Stability"]

[Text] In the West, they continue to distort the essence of Soviet military doctrine. They ascribe an aggressive character to it. They assert that the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces has not been substantiated by facts thus far.

And what is the reality?

Let us recall, above all, the fact that the main thesis of our military doctrine is to prevent war. In this way the thesis on preventing war is, for the first time, an integral part of our military doctrine. Naturally, the Warsaw Pact's military activity has envisaged the struggle against war before. This has become the primary task now.

Why? Above all, because a nuclear war in a nuclear century would have catastrophic consequences for both sides. War can no longer be a instrument for achieving political objectives nowadays.

We would be glad if the NATO countries would also declare, just as we have done, that the objective of all their intentions and activity is not to permit war—be it nuclear or conventional war.

The most important characteristic of the Warsaw Pact doctrine is its defensive nature. This is demonstrated, first, by the fact that we have never linked our future with a military solution of international problems.

And second, the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are waiting for the United States and NATO to assume the same commitment.

We do not regard any nation as our enemy. We are prepared to build relations with all countries on the foundation of peaceful coexistence and of mutually taking interests and security into account.

When resolving defensive tasks, we proceed from the principle of retaliatory actions. All our defensive measures are aimed against the threat of war that the U.S. and NATO armed forces pose.

In the buildup of our military forces we adhere to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. What do we understand by this term? This is a state of the country's defense-capability and of its armed forces that ensures the reliable defense of the state (of an alliance of states) against aggression with the minimum of armed forces.

Defensive sufficiency presupposes:

—the mutual commitment that countries will not be the first to launch a war;

—maintaining an equilibrium in the combat structure and in the potential of the USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons;

—reducing armed forces and conventional weapons to the level at which neither of the sides, while ensuring a reliable defense, is able to launch offensive actions;

—harmonizing the structures of armed forces, groupings, and deployment with defensive tasks;

—strict monitoring of the reduction of armed forces and weapons, as well as the monitoring of the two countries' military actions.

Unilateral implementation of defensive sufficiency is practically impossible. Sufficiency is determined by the nature of the military threat. Therefore, the implementation of the principle of sufficiency is a mutual, bilateral process.

In our view, the U.S. and NATO effort to strengthen their security was not coordinated with other countries, but it is to their detriment, and we can see how they are ensuring their military superiority by continuing feverish arms buildup.

I will present some facts: The plans to "compensate" for the Pershing-2's and cruise missiles that have been eliminated (increasing the number of the F-111 aircraft, of cruise missiles to 1,400, enhancing the French and British nuclear potential); the non-assumption of the commitment that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; the holding of extensive military exercises near the socialist countries' borders, which can be distinguished only with difficulty from the real deployment of troops for waging war.

The NATO concept of "nuclear intimidation" also has nothing in common with defense. No one has yet proved, and cannot prove, that if there were not any nuclear weapons, World War III would be inevitable.

Even though up to now World War III has not broken out, today no one can guarantee that this will not happen in the future and nuclear weapons will not be used, all the more so since the United States and NATO do not exclude the possibility of being the first to use them. Can we reconcile ourselves to any, even the tiniest, degree of probability of mankind's self-destruction?

The ongoing changes in the world elicit the need to expand the mutual understanding and cooperation between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO regarding military activity. In their everyday military activity, the Warsaw Pact countries definitely wish to abide by the doctrine and principle of defensive sufficiency. This is our contribution to the strengthening of international security.

CSCE Meeting Entering 'Decisive Stage'

LD0207132288 Moscow TASS in English
1231 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, Jul 2 TASS—TASS political news analyst Vladimir Matyash writes:

The Vienna meeting of the states, parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has entered the decisive stage.

Speaking at a plenary meeting on Friday, the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev said that the Soviet delegation fully and entirely subscribes to the call that efforts be exerted to see to it that the work of the Vienna forum should be crowned with substantial and well-balanced results, possibly as soon as by the end of July this year. This would make it possible to get down to realisation of a vast programme, elaborated over 18 months, the programme of interaction of 35 states in the military-political, trade-economic, ecological and humanitarian areas, which can raise all-European cooperation to a qualitatively new level. Increasingly more realistic becomes a possibility for elaborating the mandate of future negotiations on reduction of troops and conventional armaments in Europe and for their opening as early as this year.

The future of the all-European process will be determined not only by what text of the final document is adopted in Vienna, but also by the subsequent concrete measures that the participants in the meeting will be able to agree upon. The tree planted in Helsinki in 1973 should gain in strength and grow, sending new shoots forth.

In this connection the USSR declares for the early resumption of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and on disarmament in Europe. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this event, since it is bound to develop the tangible results,

attained at the Stockholm conference, to make a new step towards consolidation of confidence and security, lessening of the danger of military confrontation in the continent.

The Soviet Union favours convocation of a conference on economic cooperation in Europe. The time has come to directly attend to organizational matters of the conference. The USSR actively supports also the proposal of Bulgaria and a number of other countries that an all-European conference on questions of the environment be held.

The Soviet Union also attaches great significance to convocation of a conference of the Mediterranean countries to consider ways and means of further compliance with the obligations, adopted by the participating states within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to promote consolidation of security and development of cooperation in that region, including the area of protection of ecological systems.

It is to be recalled that at the very beginning of the Vienna meeting Foreign Minister of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze tabled the proposal that a representative all-European conference for the development of humanitarian cooperation be held in Moscow. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which was held in Moscow these days, made a new major step forward in carrying out the course of democratization of our society, humanization of international relations, the course providing for man, his interests and rights be the centre of all deeds in every country and the whole world.

The Soviet Union expects from the participants in the Vienna meeting concrete considerations on their readiness to complete the Vienna forum successfully and in a balanced way in the near future so that it should bring genuine peace to the all-European home.

70 Soviet Inspectors Arrive in San Francisco

LD0307081888 Moscow TASS in English
0806 GMT 3 Jul 88

[Text] San Francisco, Jul 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin:

A 70-member group of Soviet inspectors has arrived at the Travis Air Force Base near San Francisco, California. Under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, they will carry out on-site inspections to verify compliance with the treaty's provisions.

"The INF Treaty signifies a new stage in Soviet-U.S. relations," Vyacheslav Lebedev, head of the Soviet group, said upon arrival at the base. "It envisions the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons and makes

the life of the peoples of our country and entire mankind safer. The treaty creates an atmosphere of trust between the USA and the Soviet Union. To guarantee mutual trust is our common task."

This is a historic moment for the two great powers, Colonel Tom Smalls, spokesman for the U.S. base, emphasized when greeting the Soviet specialists. He said that 22 inspectors would go to Magna, Utah, the site of a secret facility manufacturing Pershing-2 missiles. The remaining 48 specialists will be divided into groups to carry out inspections, at their own discretion, at all or some of the five facilities in the west of the United States, where the missiles to be destroyed under the INF Treaty are located. This is an Army depot in Pueblo, Colorado, Air Force bases at Fort Huachuca and Davis Monthan, Arizona, munitions factory No 19 of the General Dynamics Corporation in San Diego, California, and the Dugway Test Range in Utah. The duration of inspection is limited to 24 hours. However, on agreement between the sides, the inspections may be extended by another eight hours if there is a need.

At the same time a group of American inspectors led by General Roland Lajoie, the head of the On-Site Inspection Agency of the U.S. Defense Department, left for the Soviet Union.

On the whole, the Pentagon said, the Soviet and American teams of inspectors will carry out "baseline inspection" during 60 days until September 1, to verify the location, number and class of missiles to be destroyed under the INF Treaty. The Soviet team will check 26 facilities in the USA and Western Europe. The American specialists will hold inspections at 133 sites on the territory of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. In future each side will allow inspectors to visit elimination sites and conduct the necessary number of inspections to ensure that all weapons covered by the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty are destroyed completely.

Dismantling of INF Missile Base Reported

*PM0507141588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jul 88 Morning Edition p 3*

[Own Correspondent Yu. Balakirev article under the general heading "Obeying the Letter of the Treaty": "In the Soviet Union..."]

[Text] Maritime Kray—At the missile operating base near the Far Eastern station of Novosysoyevka, the OTR-22 combat missiles (SS-12 in U.S. terminology) are being dismantled and shipped to the destruction sites. This is being done under the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Officer V. Korshikov spread out a large plan, almost the size of the wall, which showed the location of the base's facilities. He calmly gave their coordinates: 44 degrees,

11 minutes, 59 seconds north, 133 degrees, 26 minutes, 05 seconds east. Until recently this information was classified a top state secret. But now the missile operating base in the Sikhote-Alin mountains is well known to our treaty partners. It is ready to receive the U.S. inspectors who will not only be given a copy of the plan but will also be able to view any facility capable of containing delivery systems, warheads, or missile stages.

We were walking along the concrete road warmed by the July sun toward the gray hangars. Through the wide open doors a special vehicle towed another missile canister and drove to the reloading area. Other khaki-colored containers stood waiting their turn. If the Americans want to check the dimensions or the number of stages, the lids will be removed. At my request, the soldiers adeptly removed the forward element of the missile where the warhead is to be attached. It is destined never to be brought into a state of combat readiness.

In the evening a missilemen's rally was held at the Novosysoyevka railroad station. They have kept a reliable watch in the remote Far East and are now fittingly carrying out the state's commitment. A brass band struck up as the first trainload of missile launchers departed. They will be taken uncovered right across the country to the site where they are due to be scrapped. In the space of 2 days in July, 14 missile launchers, 4 transporters, and 20 combat missiles—half the stipulated quantity—have been removed from the base. The U.S. side knows where the destruction sites are, and the movement of the transport can be verified from space. All the stations confirm the passage of each train carrying this awesome weaponry. Information is being sent continually to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Moscow.

The next transport is now being put together. One after another the missile canisters weighing many tonnes are towed to the loading site at the base, and self-propelled cranes lift them in slings and transfer them to the platform of the powerful truck tractor. In the cabin of the crane, Talgat Mulayev, a Kazakh with gleaming white teeth, was performing the maneuver. I asked him: What are your thoughts as you send this ultramodern weaponry to be scrapped?

"My father had to fight—I think about him: What would he have said?" was his reply.

The father of warrant officer Viktor Boyko, chief of the combat missile guidance detachment, also fought and lived here, in the Maritime Kray, for a short time after the war—until his wounds took their toll.... Viktor's life has been bound up with the Army and with these missile subunits where he has experienced a lot. He has become used to his missile launchers the way a cavalryman gets used to his horse. But he understands and approves the supreme goals which dictated that a whole class of weapons should be destroyed. I asked: How do you picture your future after the base has been cleared of missiles? He answered:

"I am a top flight warrant officer, I could be commander of a maintenance platoon or a technician...."

The base command is prepared to show everything stipulated in the top-level accord.

We went to the hangars where the equipment unconnected with the missile system elements is stored. There they kept the trucks stored under canopies, the track layers, and the pit machines [kotlovannaya mashina]. Any equipment large enough to contain a missile warhead or delivery vehicle may be examined.

The base's territory is ringed on the horizon by the green mountains of Sikhote-Alin. Along the road which passes through the dense deciduous forest, the truck tractors are taking the missiles to the railroad. A train is leaving with 20 combat missiles. On 6 July it is planned to load 17 dummy missiles. In so doing, the terms of the Soviet-U.S. treaty will have been fulfilled in the Far East in a very short space of time. Only the words on the board near the entrance to the base will remain unchanged: "We are against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for the maintenance and consolidation of world peace."

Further on Missile Dispatch

PM0507141988 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 5 Jul 88 p 4

[V. Fridyev dispatch: "Missiles Scrapped"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Novosyoyevka, Maritime Kray—The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles began to be implemented on 1 July. Our correspondent reports from the Novosyoyevka Missile Operating Base in Maritime Kray:

A telegram left for Moscow. There it was duplicated and sent off to comparable centers in Washington. It was announced that a train left Novosyoyevka station on 1 July at 2155 loaded with 14 launchers and 4 OTR-22 (SS-12 in U.S. terminology) missile transporter vehicles. Destination: Belorussia's Stankovo station. Another train also set off in the night carrying 20 missile delivery systems. It was going to Kazakhstan to Saryuzek station. The terrible equipment will be destroyed in these areas verified by U.S. inspectors.

The emerald swath of the summer taiga bubbles up among the spurs of the Sikhote-Alin. Suddenly beyond a bend in the road—a number of dilapidated houses, a high concrete wall, and an iron gate bearing red stars—the Novosyoyevka Operating Base. U.S. inspectors are waiting there now.

"We are ready for the meeting," Colonel V. Korshikov, the chief of the inspectors' escort group, said. "Admittedly the Americans will not find the missiles here: They have begun to be taken to the station."

"Throughout June," Major A. Kostitsyn, battery commander and also a member of the inspectors' escort group, said, "we prepared the equipment for dispatch. For it has to cross the entire country. We missilemen have complex feelings. Pride for our country, which has for the first time in history found the strength and the boldness to agree to abandon an entire class of arms. And concern—our service and life are changing. It is now my dream to enter an academy. I am a professional soldier, and I believe that I can still prove useful to the motherland in that capacity. However, there is also a civilian specialism—engineer-mechanic. My greatest dream is for my children to live in peace."

U.S. Report Examines Upgrading NATO Forces LD0407125988 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT 4 Jul 88

["United States Looks for Ways To Upgrade Arms in Europe"—TASS headline]

[Text] Washington, July 4, TASS—The U.S. Congressional Budget Office has circulated a report which examines several possible approaches to the question of upgrading NATO's armed forces in the light of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty in December 1987. The authors of the document look for ways to make up for arms that are subject to elimination under the INF Treaty through a build-up of conventional arms in Europe.

In particular, the report suggests as a 'quick version' spending 5,000 million dollars to build a 'barrier' along the border of the Federal Republic of Germany. The barrier is to consist of tank traps and other types of obstacles. They may have a positive effect on the balance forces, particularly on the first days of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The authors of the study also examine the possibility of implementing a long-term programme for the modernization of NATO forces: To phase in a larger amount of up-to-date types of weapons or considerably to increase the amount of weapons which are already in service. According to the budget office estimates, such programmes would cost 48,000 million and 41,000 million dollars respectively.

There is yet another version—which, according to the authors of the report, may yield results by the middle of the 1990s—envisages the development and purchase of new types of arms to have a capability to deliver a strike immediately against the second echelon of Warsaw Treaty forces.

The report has it that if such version is practicable at all (it would cost approximately 50,000 million dollars and would be implemented only by the year 2008), it would be the most costly arms modernization programme.

'Mandate' Talks Session Held in Vienna

LD0407084588 Moscow TASS in English
0838 GMT 4 Jul 88

[Text] Vienna, Jul 4 TASS—Another meeting within consultations between representatives of Warsaw Treaty and NATO states on drafting a mandate for future talks on cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was held here today.

SS-12 Missiles Dismantled in Novosysoyevka

LD0407091388 Moscow World Service in English
0700 GMT 4 Jul 88

[Excerpt] At a Soviet base near the station of Novosysoyevka in the Far East, the missiles which the Americans call the SS-12 are being dismantled and sent to the sites where they will be destroyed. This is done under the Soviet-American Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

News Conference on British Visit to Shikhany

LD0407121888 Moscow TASS in English
1127 GMT 4 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 4 TASS—The visit by a group of British experts of the Soviet military facility in Shikhany, Saratov region, in return to the stay of the Soviet delegation at the military center for chemical research at Porton Down, Britain, last May is of major importance to working out a convention on banning and destroying chemical weapons, said Colonel-General Vladimir Pikalov, head of the Chemical Troops of the USSR Defence Ministry. He addressed a press conference here today devoted to the results of the British delegation's visit to the Soviet military facility.

"On June 30, the British delegation toured a chemical troops training center near Moscow and on July 1-3 gained familiarization with the organisation and main directions in the operation of the Shikhany military facility," the colonel-general said.

"Soviet specialists presented over 19 reports on the history and modern state of chemical weapons, methods of protection against them, indication of poisonous substances and other issues. They were attended by the show of real specimens of laboratory equipment and chemical troops technology. During the discussion representatives of the British delegation put over 300 questions, to which exhaustive answers were given."

Yuriy Nazarkin, a representative of the USSR at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, expressed the view that the British experts' fly by helicopter over the Shikhany facility and their inspection of ten points chosen by them could serve as a prototype of a challenge

inspection. Such inspections should become a component of the mechanism to verify a convention on banning chemical weapons, which is being worked out in Geneva.

Tessa Solesby, British chief negotiator at the disarmament talks in Geneva, thanked the Soviet side for hospitality and good organisation of the visit and expressed confidence that it would serve to build up trust between the USSR and Britain.

She noted that the British delegation was afforded an opportunity to inspect a large number of laboratories, test ranges and demonstration sites and everywhere photography, filming and sound recording was allowed. Tessa Solesby expressed, however, discontent that the British delegation was denied permission to inspect a facility near Shikhany.

Commenting on this statement, Colonel-General Vladimir Pikalov noted that the visit of the mentioned facility—a chemical plant which is under the authority of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry—was not envisaged by the programme. He stressed that during the stay at Porton Down the USSR delegation abided strictly by the programme and did not ask to make any changes in it.

Soviet Inspectors Visit U.S. Bases in FRG

LD0507215588 Moscow TASS in English
2048 GMT 5 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn July 5 TASS—Two groups of Soviet military inspectors today visited U.S. military bases in Mutlangen and Wueschheim in the south of the FRG and conducted on-site inspection in accordance with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Pershing-2 missiles are deployed in Mutlangen. Cruise missiles are deployed in Wueschheim. They are to be removed from the West German territory and destroyed as stipulated by the treaty on INF forces.

INF Inspection Team Continues Tasks in U.S.

LD0507220488 Moscow TASS in English
2046 GMT 5 Jul 88

[Text] San Francisco, July 5, TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin:

Soviet inspectors have completed the first series of on-site inspections to verify the U.S. side's compliance with the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty.

They visited, in groups, five military facilities in the west of the United States, which are, or were, the homes of missiles and their components that are to be destroyed under the treaty.

The Soviet experts inspected the Pueblo Army depot in Colorado, the Fort Huachuca Army base and the Davis-Monthan Air Forces base in Arizona, General Dynamics Plant 19 in San Diego, California, and the Dugway Range in Utah.

They were allowed to spend 32 hours at each site.

Representatives of the U.S. Department of Defence said those were "baseline inspections" during which the Soviet inspectors verified the location, number and class of the declared missiles and their components stationed there.

Today, 48 Soviet inspectors are leaving San Francisco for home.

The other 22 Soviet inspectors will stay at Magna, Utah, where a plant producing components for Pershing-2 missiles is located.

American officials said U.S. inspectors had carried out the first series of similar inspections in the Soviet Union.

Baseline inspections will last till September 1.

Soviet experts will visit a total of 26 facilities in the U.S. and Western Europe.

American experts will inspect 133 sites in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

After the first series of inspections, verifying compliance with the INF Treaty, is over, inspectors on both sides will visit or stay at various facilities and missile destruction sites until all the declared weapons are eliminated.

Shevardnadze Article on Deterrence Cited
LD0507203288 Moscow TASS in English
1736 GMT 5 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—The existence and preservation of such means of total destruction against which there is no protection are unacceptable for the USSR from the viewpoint of national security, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze writes in the latest issue of the journal *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*.

Just as any other country, we would like to live in the most favorable international environment, the minister emphasized. This equally suits our own interests and the common interests, above all the interests of our allies and friends to whom we have political, juridical and moral obligations. The Soviet Union's main concern is the ensurance of peace, the maximum elimination of the risk of being involved in an armed conflict, and the maintenance of one's armed forces and military expenditures at the optimal level. The Soviet Union will not

put in jeopardy its own security and the security of its friends. No one should have any doubts about that, Eduard Shevardnadze emphasized.

If nuclear weapons were really a means of deterring war, they would have deterred also the race of conventional armaments. In reality it was quite the opposite way. Realising that nuclear war should not be fought and cannot be won, the states were building up their conventional armaments proceeding from the view that a "conventional war" is quite permissible even with nuclear deterrence. The arms race that was on all these 40 odd years is not a theoretical but material confirmation of the fact that the nuclear weapon has not fulfilled and does not fulfill the functions of deterrence.

Security in a nuclear weapons free world can be ensured by means of agreements on arms reduction, by bringing the structure and deployment of armed forces in accordance with the requirements of a defensive doctrine and non-offensive strategy, strict and permanent control over the observance of commitments, the widening system of confidence-building measures in the military area, the openness of military activity, by institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations Organization.

It is precisely all this and not nuclear weapons that are real means of deterrence, a real guarantee of the security of our country and of universal security, a real barrier to an outbreak of war, the USSR foreign minister emphasized.

UK Delegation's CW Facility Tour 'Useful'
PM0707140588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jul 88 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA special correspondent A. Serbin dispatch: "Shikhany Once Again. British Experts' Visit to Soviet Military-Chemical Facilities"]

[Text] Shikhany-Moscow—...It is now as hot on the banks of the Volga, where Shikhany is located, as it is around Moscow, and so the British guests had to work in both places, in the literal sense of the words, by the sweat of their brows.

The group of British experts which has just visited our country came here to return a visit by our specialists to the British chemical warfare research center at Porton Down. This exchange has taken place within the framework of broadening confidence-building measures designed to help the speediest conclusion of a convention on the complete and universal banning and destruction of chemical weapons now being elaborated at the international conference in Geneva.

Shikhany is a place with which the world is already familiar from last year's demonstration to the participants in the Geneva talks of standard samples of chemical munitions at the disposal of the USSR Armed Forces and of our national technology for destroying chemical

weapons. Prior to their trip to Shikhany, the British inspected the USSR chemical troops' training area near Moscow, where junior commanders and chemical defense specialists are trained. Soviet specialists were shown similar facilities at Porton Down.

Last year when we opened the gates of the Shikhany military facility, which is designed to resolve comprehensive problems linked with our chemical troops' technical equipment, objective observers described this as an unprecedented step in confidence-building between countries.

At Shikhany the British were granted access to the facility's laboratories and were acquainted with the technology for destroying chemical weapons, with special processing systems, and with the equipment used by the subunit tasked with eliminating AES accidents (this subunit was involved in combating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident). They were shown a plan of the facility and inspected Shikhany from helicopters; they were allowed to inspect 10 points in which they showed particular interest.

"The British experts were given 17 lectures on different questions associated with the facility, and we answered more than 300 questions that they asked."

It would be no exaggeration to say that both at Shikhany and in the Moscow area, the guests showed tremendous interest in what they were shown. Suffice it to say that it was after midnight when they completed their first day's work at Shikhany. They were extremely well equipped to materialize this interest. Apparently not a single word from our specialists providing explanations went unrecorded on their dictaphones, and their camera shutters clicked and their portable video recorders operated continuously.

I can foresee the cautious reader's question: "Aren't we going too far with our openness?" I think that this question must be answered as follows: We are holding serious talks and firmly intend to secure the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons, and we are demonstrating this by our behavior.

Incidentally, as Soviet specialists noted, the British visit to our facilities, unlike our visit to Porton Down, was more reminiscent of the so-called inspection [proverka] on demand—a verification measure provided for in the convention now in preparation.

But how are things going at the talks themselves? At one time, our side expressed the hope that a chemical weapons convention could be signed last year. I asked this question of Yu. K. Nazarkin, the Soviet delegation head at the chemical weapons talks, who is now in Shikhany.

"The talks are continuing," he replied. "I must say that there are still difficulties at these talks. We are resolving the technical difficulties in the elaboration of the convention, in particular, those linked with verification of its implementation. But there are political difficulties. At present we cannot perceive any changes in the U.S. stance. At the same time, I want to point out that two factors should influence the progress of the Geneva talks. First—the results of the Soviet-U.S. Moscow summit. The joint Soviet-U.S. statement describes the banning of chemical weapons and the conclusion of an effective convention on this as a 'question of unmitigated urgency.' The results of the Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, where practically all its participants—their degree of sincerity is another matter—advocated the banning of chemical weapons, should also affect the talks."

It must be said that the British side expressed its viewpoint on the question of concluding a convention. Miss T. Solesby, leader of the British delegation at the Geneva disarmament conference and head of the group of British experts at Shikhany, insisted that everyone has the political will to conclude a chemical weapons convention and that it is only a matter of great technical difficulties. At the same time, it is clear that it is the political will that certain Western partners are lacking.

Demonstrating such will, our country has announced the cessation of chemical weapons production. Late last year, the Soviet Union officially declared its chemical weapons stocks. As for the United States, it has, on the contrary, resumed manufacture of these weapons, an extremely dangerous form of them, moreover: binary chemical weapons.

"What is the importance of the current U.S. production of binary weapons?" I asked Lieutenant General A.D. Kuntsevich, academician, Hero of Socialist Labor, who is a leading USSR Defense Ministry and USSR Academy of Sciences expert.

"It is an extension of U.S. policy in the chemical weapons sphere, which proceeds on the premise that its potential must be high and it must resolve military tasks," he replied. "The production of binary chemical weapons is impeding the conclusion of a convention."

...The British experts' visit is over. The guests thanked us for the splendid way in which it was organized and stated that they would sum up its final results in London. It can be affirmed without fear of error that the visit was useful. Colonel General V.K. Pikalov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops, said that the exchange of visits to Shikhany and Porton Down will be beneficial at the Geneva talks.

Mayorskiy Comments on 20th Anniversary of Non-Proliferation Pact

*LD0607102888 Moscow TASS in English
0933 GMT 6 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 6 TASS—The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

was evidence of the measure of responsibility and maturity with which the international community as a whole is capable of settling the fundamental issues of the present. A statement to this effect has been made today by Boris Mayorskiy, deputy head of the Department for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Outer Space of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He was addressing a press conference in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It is precisely the awareness of the inseparability of our own security from that of all the other states, of our own benefit from the common benefit, Boris Mayorskiy continued, that has created the necessary political and moral-psychological prerequisites for the appearance of the treaty and development of the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In these terms the non-proliferation treaty can serve as an example and model for the other multilateral processes involved in the tasks of limiting and totally scrapping various types of weapons.

The Soviet Union is invariably true both to the spirit and letter of its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A convincing evidence of that is the stage-by-stage programme put forward by the USSR for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the programme for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world. This is also convincingly seen from the history of our participation in international talks, bilateral and multilateral ones, on various disarmament issues.

The treaty has been a substantive contribution to building up confidence between states and has become an active catalyst and stimulating factor for diverse international contacts in the political field.

This year will see the start of preparations for the next review conference scheduled for 1990. Yet of special significance will be the conference that will follow it and which, according to the terms of the treaty, is to be convened 25 years after it came into force i.e., in 1995 and at which the participant states will have to decide by a majority vote the question of prolonging the treaty or turning it into one without a time-limit. The Soviet Union favours that by that time the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should become a universal one in composition of signatories to it and its further destiny will be decided by the whole of the international community.

As far as the term of the treaty is concerned, it, in our view, should be determined by only one factor, the term of existence of nuclear weapons themselves. In other words, we favour that the treaty should remain in force as long as at least one unit of nuclear weapons remains on earth. Herein lies its historical mission, Boris Mayorskiy emphasised.

Inspection Team Arrives in San Francisco
PM0607143788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jul 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Unnamed IZVESTIYA correspondent Washington dispatch on undated telephone interview with Soviet INF inspection group leader Anatoliy Yevgenyevich Samarin in Salt Lake City, Utah: "Inspectors Set to Work"]

[Text] Washington—As already reported, in accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the first inspection groups of Soviet specialists have arrived in the United States. One of them has been based in Salt Lake City, Utah. Its leader, Anatoliy Yevgenyevich Samarin, talks by telephone with your correspondent.

"The Soviet inspectors arrived on an IL-62 aircraft at Travis Air Force Base near San Francisco. This is one of the two U.S. arrival points for Soviet inspection groups (the second point is the city of Washington). The procedure, as laid down by the joint accords, for inspection at Customs of our baggage and the control technology which we had brought with us took quite a long time. Our group did not give cause for any questions on the U.S. side.

"Five groups of inspectors—10 people in each group—are to proceed to the facilities to collate initial data included in the memorandum and the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Ours is the largest group. It consists of 22 [this and previous figure as published] people. We have a rather different task which I will discuss below.

"On Saturday, a U.S. C-141 aircraft took us to Salt Lake City, the administrative center of the state of Utah. Here we were met with great ceremony. A representative of the state governor came to the airport. There were many journalists. Judging by their reports, the inspectors' arrival was a very major event in Utah's life.

"We were given temporary accommodations in a cottage halfway between Salt Lake City and the town of Magna. There is a kind of leisure zone here. Later a permanent residential complex will be built for Soviet inspectors. An on-site inspection administration set up in the Pentagon is dealing with accommodating and escorting us. It is also setting up inspection groups to be sent to the USSR.

"After a short rest, there was a familiarization tour to the monitoring zone. This was the Hercules Plant, which is close to Magna. It used to produce equipment which is being eliminated according to the INF Treaty. Our task is to verify that output banned by the treaty is not shipped from the plant. Special control points are being organized for this at the exit to the plant.

"We shall be in Magna 2-3 months. Then a new group will fly in. At the U.S. side's request, we start practical work on 5 July, the day after the U.S. Independence Day national holiday. Meanwhile, we are resolving everyday questions which, thanks to the foresight of the U.S. side, have been reduced to a minimum.

"The warm and, at the same time, businesslike reception that we have been given here gives us reason to hope that on the basis of mutually agreed procedures, both sides will be able to fulfill the obligations resulting from the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles."

INF Treaty Inspectors Arrive in FRG
PM0707115188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jul 88 First Edition p 5

[Unnamed own correspondent dispatch: "Inspectors Arrive"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 Jul—Two groups of Soviet inspection and verification personnel arrived in the FRG yesterday in accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. At the welcoming ceremony, a representative of the U.S. command stated that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is a "historic event." A representative of the FRG Defense Ministry noted in his welcome that the FRG unequivocally supports the treaty and has therefore agreed to verification on its territory.

Over the course of 2 weeks, the groups of Soviet inspectors will visit six U.S. military bases where nuclear Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, stockpiles, and other services connected with these types of weapon are sited.

The withdrawal of U.S. missiles from FRG territory should begin, as is known, 90 days after the treaty comes into force and last 3 years.

'Repercussions' Program Discusses Foreign Policy
LD0907081388 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1555 GMT 7 Jul 88

["Repercussions" program hosted by Political Observer Boris Kalyagin, with TASS General Director Sergey Andreyevich Losev; Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Directorate for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament; and IZVESTIYA Political Observer Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin—live]

[Excerpts] [Kalyagin] Hello, esteemed viewers. We meet again in our "Repercussions" studio in Ostankino to reply to the questions that concern you. We originally planned to spend today discussing problems connected with the continuation of the Soviet-U.S. summit-level dialogue. Even our GOVORIT I POKAZYVAYET MOSKVA published this. But life, as the saying goes, has

made us adapt our plans. The 19th all-union party conference was a landmark not just in the life of our country; it also has great international significance. Its results are influencing world developments and our country's relations with the outside world. That is what we would like to talk about today.

[Karpov] 'There were many different reactions to the party conference from both the right and left. But if you try to determine what line predominates, I think that it was the positive reactions. That is, the party conference has not been greeted merely with interest. It has been greeted as a positive new phenomenon in both the internal life of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. As for the sphere closest to me, disarmament issues, I would say the following: It introduced an additional element of confidence to the Soviet Union's proposals. Whereas previously our radical proposals for the destruction of nuclear weapons and a sharp reduction in conventional arms were sometimes interpreted as propaganda moves, now a larger and larger number of people are beginning to see these proposals as serious and as a reflection of the real essence of our system, the new socialism that we intend to create.

[Kalyagin] Viktor Pavlovich, here's a question for you. Yakov Moiseyevich Guryevich, a scientific worker from Moscow, is interested to know why the Vienna talks on reducing troops and arms in Europe are proceeding so slowly, or hardly progressing at all. What is the actual difference between our stance and that of the West?

[Karpov] If you are referring to the talks on reducing troops and arms in central Europe...

[Kalyagin] In central Europe, that's evidently what he is referring to.

[Karpov] ...Yes, the talks that have been going on since 1973. Well, from the very start those talks were doomed to fail, because the main method selected for conducting them was to argue about troop numbers in central Europe, and without on-site checks. This dragged out the debate for 13 years. In effect there was no progress; the sides were constantly marking time on their old stances with no desire and no opportunity to break the deadlock. But we think that we have now formulated the issue differently, that an exchange of data on NATO and Warsaw Pact troops and arms in Europe should be subjected to checks at the very beginning of the talks. There is a chance of achieving a new approach, an approach which will not lead to an impasse but will make it possible to check the initial data, establish how closely it corresponds to what has been stated, and embark on specific decisions to remove the asymmetries and imbalances which actually exist between NATO and the Warsaw Pact armed forces in Europe. We can then move on to the deep cuts we are proposing—500,000 on the NATO and Warsaw Pact sides—and continue that movement until the NATO and Warsaw Pact troops are no longer in a position to wage offensive operations.

They will then become nothing more than a means of defense. We see this as the main task, the main aim, and our program for troops and arms reduction in Europe plots movement toward it.

[Bovin] That is, we want to jump over Vienna, if you like. Do I understand it correctly?

[Karpov] Yes, I think so: Over the problem that has been in Vienna since 1973, and to begin in a different way with a broader approach in an all-European context, while naturally devoting prime attention to the central European area, where the confrontation between the two military blocs is most concentrated. This is also where additional measures, parallel measures, are needed, along with troop and arms reductions on an all-European scale, in order to ease the tension along the dividing line between the two military alliances.

[Kalyagin] Aleksandr Yevgenyevich: During one of "Studio Nine's" itinerant sessions, you were constantly stating that you didn't believe in the possibility of reaching agreement with the present U.S. Administration. Is that the case?

[Bovin] Of course, and more than once. More than once.

[Kalyagin] Yes, well your statement continues to disturb many viewers. They have asked questions about this in the past, and now Medvedenko, a history teacher from Kirovograd, writes about it, asking the following question: What do you now think of your statement, and how do you see the further prospects for relations between our countries, given the results of the 19th party conference?

[Bovin] A senior colleague of mine always used to say to me: Sasha, you have to be more clever today than you were yesterday. I think he was right. Incidentally, I am reminded of an interesting episode that happened when I was in West Berlin. The association of accredited journalists there invited me to dinner, well, a sort of a dinner, at which I was to answer questions. The day before, a West Berlin newspaper published an article asking why Bovin was being given a dinner, saying that it was a waste of time since in any case he would only say the same as his government, which was of no interest. Anyway, the meeting began, and I asked if they had all read the article. They said yes they had, and I said that it was wrong because, as you know, my government never makes a mistake, whereas I quite often make mistakes. Therefore, my point of view by no means always coincides with that of my government. True, it now turns out that the government also makes mistakes, but I still do so much more frequently. I really did think that Reagan would be incapable of jumping over his anticommunism, over that evil empire, to reach an agreement. Admittedly, as our viewers and readers may recall, I added the rider that this was a rare case in which I very much

wanted to be mistaken. Well, I was in luck: My wish came true, I was mistaken, Reagan came to Moscow, Gorbachev went to Washington, and everything was fine.

[Kalyagin] Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Zotov, a petroleum engineer from Moscow, asks the following: What do you see as the point of the meetings between our defense ministers, between U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci and Yazov? After all, years of talks have failed to produce results. Do you believe that these meetings will be of any use? I am directing the question to you, Viktor Pavlovich, but I think that in light of his previous remarks Aleksandr Yevgenyevich could also answer it.

[Karpov] Well, I can state that the first meeting between Comrade Yazov and U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci in Berne did not, of course, solve all the problems which had not been solved before. It would have been naive to assume that it could solve them. But there was a discussion of some fundamental things concerning military doctrines and the possibility of an exchange of visits between the U.S. and Soviet Armed Forces—I mean, of course, representatives of those Armed Forces—such as mutual calls by ships, trips by the leaders of the Soviet General Staff, by Comrade Akhromeyev, who is in Washington at the moment, and visits by U.S. chiefs of staff of the branches of the Armed Forces, etc. From a position in which the U.S. and Soviet Armed Forces gazed at one another from afar with tremendous suspicion, there is at last an opportunity for the leaders of those Armed Forces, for the ministers, to take a human look at each other close up, to see whether somebody perhaps has horns and, so to speak, to see if it is possible to reduce the tension and suspicion which exist. This is what we see as the point behind cultivating contacts between the leaders of the Soviet and U.S. military departments.

[Bovin] I would like to add that we at the Peace Committee have another approach. We made the following suggestions to the Americans: Let a hundred of your ordinary soldiers and a hundred of ours get together and discuss the problems that soldiers have, what Army service is like there and here. By the way, our Defense Ministry agreed to this, but the Americans seem to have been prevaricating. So, there we have another idea for contacts between the military, but on a different level.

[Kalyagin] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Rozhnov, a journalist from the village of (Stanovoye) in Lipetsk Oblast, asks several questions on a military theme. I'd first like to congratulate Comrade Rozhnov on getting through to us by telephone from a village in Lipetsk Oblast, which is no small feat in itself! There's one question here which I think we have already answered: Why is there so little information in the central newspapers on the problem of reducing conventional weapons in central Europe. We have just dealt with that. Here is another question from him: Are there any Soviet warships in the Persian Gulf?

[Karpov] There are several of our minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. They are ensuring the passage of our merchant ships.

[Losev] I think there are about four of them.

[Karpov] Five, or four—they are constantly being replaced.

[Bovin] There's an escort vessel, I believe, and a couple of mine sweepers, and...

[Losev] This is in comparison to 30 or 40 U.S. ships. There are about 30 at the moment, but usually they have kept 40 there.

[Bovin] I think the Kuwaitis have chartered three tankers from us, and we're escorting these tankers.

[Kalyagin] Nikolay Dmitriyevich Yevseyev, a pensioner from Alma-Ata, asks the following general question. What influence did the 19th party conference exert on the general disarmament negotiations? What could you say about that?

[Bovin] There hasn't been time yet...

[Karpov, interrupting] It really is too early to say what influence it exerted, but I have already said that there is more confidence in our proposals, more attention to our proposals, and consequently we can count on wider support for our proposals in different political circles. I think that in the long term this will be the effect of the party conference.

[Kalyagin] I think that we can all agree with that. Vladimir Gennadiyevich Fedosov, an engineer from the town of (?Kolbin), asks whether in the near future we shall be able to compare the data on the armed forces of the Western countries, which are fairly widely known, with data on our own armed forces.

[Karpov] I think that this opportunity will come, since, as you will know, our proposal for a three-stage reduction of troops and armaments in Europe provides for an exchange of data between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on troops and armaments on the European Continent. I think that within this context the balance which exists, in Europe at any rate, will be visible, and people will be able to reach their own conclusions and make their own assessments about this balance.

[Kalyagin] Nikolay Ivanovich Grachev, an engineer from Sverdlovsk, has asked the question. He says he wants to know what the new political thinking consists of. Isn't it just a case of making countless concessions to the West? We constantly agree to their demands, and receive nothing in return. And he goes on to set out his view that we made concessions in signing the Euromissile treaty. Many people in the West talk about the Warsaw Pact countries' superiority in conventional

weapons, and we have already started to agree to that, and somehow you can't hear our spokesmen being so persistent in talking about the multiple superiority of the Americans. And so on and so forth. I think that a fundamental reply must be given to this question.

[Karpov] I think it must. I think first of all that this question contains its own answer. Why is it that all agreements that are concluded with the United States or the Western powers are viewed by us from the point of view of who made concessions to whom? Why do we have this approach?

[Bovin] We are the victims of our own propaganda.

[Karpov] I think that is true. We have already spoken about it. We are frequently influenced by the propaganda that we set in motion ourselves. We really have reduced and will reduce more intermediate-range missiles in Europe than the United States. But who forced us to site so many missiles in Europe? For the whole of Britain we need 5 nuclear warheads of an average yield of 150-200 kilotonnes, but we have 900 missiles. Who needed these missiles? We counted them. Why were they sited? The Americans sited fewer, so they will have to eliminate fewer. As far as conventional troops and armaments in Europe are concerned...

[Bovin, interrupting] It was no concession.

[Karpov] It was no concession, but if we agreed to eliminate these missiles, we have to eliminate more because we sited more. As far as troops and armaments in Europe are concerned, we also have to examine realistically who has how many stationed and where. And there are imbalances. In central Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries have more troops and armaments; NATO has more troops and armaments on the southern flank. Such is the correlation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. You have to examine these things. We could agree to reduce troops in central Europe to a greater degree, with the NATO countries reducing more in southern Europe. We see this as an opportunity for an accord to lower the level of military confrontation. But why should we have this compulsory view that if we make concessions in central Europe, and we get concessions in southern Europe, that would be a bad thing?

[Bovin] The viewer started from a broader question. What's this got to do with the new political thinking?

[Karpov] It's common sense.

[Bovin] It's simply a sense of realism. If I have 10 pistols and you have 5, and we decide to throw them all away, I will be throwing away twice as many as you. This is normal, and I don't think there is even a whiff of a concession here. By the way, there are certain things where our former standpoints weren't realistic enough. We are now changing them, and from the outside it seems like we are backing down. We are simply returning

to a common sense standpoint. Everything is natural and normal here. But I want to say again how our former propaganda is now backfiring on us, if you like.

[Losev] Regarding the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the person who asked the question has evidently forgotten one thing: The U.S. missiles were of strategic significance in regard to us. At the same time, we could not reach the United States with our missiles.

[Kalyagin] The time factor was also involved.

[Losev] So the fact that we are eliminating more missiles than the Americans is compensated in this other aspect: They have to eliminate missiles with a very short flight time, which in practical terms means that the problem of defense is made very much more difficult. Missiles of strategic significance are those that can hit targets on our territory.

And this viewer continues in the same spirit: Why does the USSR not supply arms to the insurgents in El Salvador and the African National Congress, on the same basis that the United States supplies arms to the dushmans and contras? This is a serious question, which should not just be shrugged off. This is because the basis, the heart of the Reagan doctrine is the export of counterrevolution. Isn't that so? And this happens above all through the supply of arms to these gangs, which are destabilizing the situation in sovereign states. The author of the theory was the late Casey, whose advice was followed by President Reagan. By the way, as far as Central America and Afghanistan are concerned, the former policy is being continued. Casey said that you needed to supply only a small amount of weapons to these gangs in order to destabilize the situation in some small developing country.

As far as our policy is concerned, it is generally known, isn't it? We do not export revolution. But that does not mean that we do not render aid, including the supply of arms, to national liberation movements. The writer is deeply wrong on this. It suffices to ask the representatives of national liberation movements directly—and the writer can do that now, because they visit Moscow regularly—to obtain a completely different answer from the one implied in his question.

But I must say that we do not, of course, supply the Salvadorans, the Salvadoran insurgents with weapons. We do not try to crawl into the Americans' backyard. But one would like them to stop this habit of creeping up to our very borders and destabilizing the situation in neighboring countries. It isn't 1929, of course, which was the time when we were relatively weak and such operations as the one on the East China Railway were undertaken. I link this with the situation which is being brought about by the quite impudent and shameless policy of Pakistan, which continues to contravene the Geneva agreements. But we're not so defenseless.

[Bovin] This is a broader question. We should not compete with the Americans over who is going to send in more weapons. We should display some wisdom here in the context of the new political thinking and try to work out some sort of mechanism for managing these crisis situations and preventing them from growing into some sort of wider conflict. That is what we should concern ourselves with, I repeat, and we are attempting to do so, instead of competing over who can supply more weapons somewhere. The latter path is not the best way to strengthen security. It was no coincidence that the conference report said that in the past we overstressed the significance of military-political methods at the expense of purely political methods for strengthening our security. We are now attempting, somehow, to reach new goals in our policy. This is very important, I believe.

[Kalyagin] We have already touched on the situation in Afghanistan, and there are quite a few questions on this. Most of them, for some reason, are addressed to Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin. Evidently he is regarded as a symbol of journalistic conscience. At any rate, people are demanding an unequivocal reply to the question of whether sending our troops into Afghanistan was a mistake or our internationalist duty. They ask us to assess the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Several people ask this: Barabanov from Moscow, Ivan Alekseyevich Sergeev from Moscow.

[Bovin] Let's just think about this together. It's a very complex problem. If I attempt to assess the intentions which prompted us to do this, I must conclude that the intentions were the most noble ones. It was our internationalist duty. We decided to do this, to help our friends in a very difficult and tense situation, when the infiltration of this counterrevolution from abroad had been stepped up, and the Americans were active there. And we decided to help our friends, I repeat, to go in and stabilize the situation, and then to pull out. As far as I can imagine, that must have been the motivation of the people who made the decision. But we can now see—and one is always much wiser with hindsight—that not all circumstances were evidently duly considered. First, we didn't consider sufficiently the situation inside Afghanistan. We came up against the fact that resistance came not from individual people. The resistance was of a broader nature. This is something that came to light later. We saw ourselves getting bogged down there, and we couldn't do what we wanted. We got bogged down, and paid quite a high price. The war, as is known, is not popular in the Soviet Union, among the people. And I think that our new political leadership demonstrated a sense of realism when, having assessed the whole situation self-critically, it made the only possible decision in the circumstances: the decision to pull out of the war. Although, by the way, there are also drawbacks to that decision.

[Kalyagin] By the way, in this regard people also ask what measures our government can take if the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan are not observed.

[Bovin] You know, this is a very difficult question. I get the impression that we have no realistic measures that we can adopt. What? Are we to remain there, and keep troops there, and slow down the troop pull-out? I can't really imagine such measures. But evidently there are political measures. We shall be negotiating with the Americans, with them and with third countries. We shall be shaping world public opinion over this problem. We shall attempt somehow to influence the situation through political means, but not military. I think we should approach it from that point of view.

[Kalyagin] What is the view in the ministry?

[Karpov] I think that the main thing of course is that the policy of national reconciliation should be affirmed in Afghanistan itself.

[Bovin] That would be ideal of course. It would be ideal.

[Karpov] And we must work to promote this policy, to promote its triumph. I think that the combination—the pullout of our troops and the stepping up of the political struggle to ensure noninterference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan—provides a way out of the situation.

[Kalyagin] Our time is almost up, but here is one last question, connected with recent events: the Americans' downing of an Iranian aircraft, using two missiles. Comrade Gritsinyn from Moscow compares this with our downing of a South Korean aircraft in the Far East, and he asks what the common factors and the differences are in these two events. Let's reply very briefly.

[Losev] Well, you see, in our first commentaries we did not touch on this aspect. It was broached by the Americans. They asked for the comparison themselves, as the saying goes. And President Reagan personally (?threw it into play), so to speak. We have had to return to the subject as well. Since then, very many quite thorough and detailed works have come out. There was a Japanese booklet, from which it was clear that it had been a CIA intelligence operation. In other words, the responsibility for what has just happened in the Persian Gulf, and the other operation and the tragic consequences, is borne by the Americans.

[Kalyagin] Also, it was over our territory.

[Losev] They are now back-tracking from the version of events initially put out by the Pentagon. They asserted that the aircraft was descending, and was all but adopting a kamikaze tactic to ram the cruiser, which was stuffed full of electronics. But it turns out that it was gaining height. They asserted that it had left the air corridor used by civilian aircraft. Today they admitted that nothing of the sort had occurred. It deviated slightly from the center line in the air corridor, and had started to turn toward the center line. That was when they downed it.

[Kalyagin] One can agree with Jesse Jackson, one of the candidates for the presidency, who said it was not a technical error but an error of policy.

CW Chief Deplores UK Approach to Exchange
PM0807103388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Jul 88 Second Edition p 5

[Undated letter from Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General V. Pikalov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Chemical Troops: "Two Approaches. On the British Delegation's Visit"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA has already announced that during the period 29 June through 4 July, a British delegation was in the Soviet Union to familiarize itself with the Soviet military facility at Shikhany.

In connection with the British delegation's claims regarding the program for its stay at the Shikhany facility made at the 4 July news conference in Moscow, the editorial office has received the following letter from the USSR Ministry of Defense.

This was a return visit by the group of British specialists. This May a Soviet delegation was familiarized with Britain's chemical warfare defense center at Porton Down.

The mutual exchange of delegations to military-chemical facilities was coordinated in the course of the Soviet-British consultations within the framework of the talks on the banning of chemical weapons. The main idea and dimension of these measures consisted in confidence-building and in promoting the speediest elaboration of a convention on a chemical weapons ban.

We prepared the program for the British delegation's stay in the Soviet Union precisely so that the exchange of visits should make a real contribution to the chemical disarmament process. That is why the program also made provision above all for those questions which are of interest from the viewpoint of the convention now being elaborated, such as the destruction of chemical weapons, verification of compliance with the ban on chemical weapons, the physical-chemical and medical-biological methods for such verification, and so on.

The British delegation of 13 people included an ambassador (the head of the delegation at the disarmament conference), the director of the Porton Down facility, his leading staffers, and also representatives of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense.

The British delegation was received on 30 June by Army General V. M. Shabanov, USSR deputy defense minister, and V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister. On the same day, the delegation visited the chemical

troops' training area in the Moscow district, where it was familiarized with the system for training chemical defense troops junior commanders.

It must be pointed out that on the first day of the delegation's stay in the USSR, two quite different approaches to the exchange of visits emerged. Whereas the Soviet delegation which had gone to Britain familiarized itself with the program and made no attempt to make any changes or adjustments, this cannot be said of the British delegation. The leadership of the British delegation issued practically an ultimatum demanding the right to visit another facility apart from Shikhany, also located in Saratov Oblast. The Soviet side explained that the aforementioned site does not form part of the chemical troops or part of the USSR Ministry of Defense as a whole, but rather comes under the jurisdiction of an industrial ministry. However, it proved impossible to convince our guests of this and, despite the fact that the delegation was given a complete and comprehensive viewing of the Shikhany military facility, at the news conference on the results of the visit, held on 4 July at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center, the British delegation marked down our refusal to authorize a visit to this industrial enterprise as "inadequate openness" [otkrytost].

The British delegation was at the Shikhany military facility from 30 June through 3 July. In that time, it was given 19 reports on the history of chemical weapons, military chemistry, toxicology, detection and identification, and the problems of destroying chemical weapons, including explanations on questions of protecting personnel and the environment when destroying the weapons or eliminating the consequences of possible accidents at facilities destroying chemical weapons stocks. The reports were accompanied by a demonstration of the relevant samples which could be used when fulfilling the terms of the future convention. Exhaustive answers were given to all the questions that occurred to the British representatives. And there were more than 300 such questions.

The British delegation flew round the entire territory of the Shikhany military facility in helicopters and chose 10 points for additional visits and familiarization. The helicopters made two passes and covered 142 km (twice the perimeter of the site) at a height of 200m. However, despite this, the British delegation nevertheless claimed unobjectively at the Moscow news conference that the helicopters had allegedly not flown over some part of the range. British delegation representatives visited all 10 places that they had chosen (by way of comparison—the Soviet delegation only chose one point to visit after its flight over Porton Down), including the range command post, several laboratory buildings, firing ranges, and even...the boiler house.

However, I must say bluntly that there was no mention of the problems impeding the speediest conclusion of a convention on a chemical weapons ban. The British

delegation was completely engrossed in gathering informational data. The British representatives did their utmost to evade discussion of the problems facing them at the talks.

On leaving Shikhany, 32 minutes before takeoff, the British delegation asked to be familiarized with yet another—11th—point on the site. This request was granted.

By and large, it must be noted that the British delegation's visit to the Shikhany military facility was strict in character, as if it were an on-site inspection [proverka] on demand rather than an act of goodwill on our part.

One more element. Evidently, there are forces in the West which are interested in compromising our openness and casting doubts on the sincerity of the USSR's intentions in the sphere of eliminating chemical arms.

It is appropriate to mention here that the Soviet Union unilaterally stopped production of chemical weapons, has begun the construction of a specialized enterprise to destroy stocks of such weapons, was the first to declare how many such weapons it possessed, (which no other country, notably the United States, has yet done), stated that all Soviet chemical weapons are on the USSR's territory and have never been handed to anyone, showed participants in the Geneva talks a depot storing sample chemical munitions, and has submitted a whole series of constructive proposals at the talks being held within the framework of the disarmament conference aimed at achieving accords most speedily.

That is why doubts about our adherence to the cause of total universal chemical disarmament are at the very least not borne out by facts and aim to justify the militarist course of the United States and its NATO allies of escalating the chemical arms race.

We view the process of confidence-building and cooperation among the states taking part in the talks as one of the requisite conditions for the conclusion of an effective international convention on banning chemical weapons.

By and large, it must be noted that the Soviet-British exchange of visits to the Porton Down and Shikhany military-chemical facilities has made a definite contribution to the process of strengthening the atmosphere of trust, and we welcome it unconditionally.

However, to be honest, I have contradictory feelings: above all, because I expected great things and hoped that this exchange of visits would facilitate understanding of the problems which still need to be resolved.

I would not like such exchanges of visits only to serve as an excuse for asking countless questions with no direct bearing on the convention and thus dragging out and sidetracking the talks.

Perhaps it is advisable to make more extensive use of such forms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation as symposiums, seminars, and conferences on specific technical questions which crop up in the course of the work of the disarmament conference. Moreover, the main criterion when judging the usefulness of such measures should be their real contribution to effectively resolving problems on which there is still disagreement.

U.S. INF Inspection Team Arrives in Moscow
LD0707183788 Moscow TASS in English
1818 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, July 7, TASS—By TASS special correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev:

The U.S. Air Force transport aircraft, C-141, which landed today at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-1 airport, did not cause much surprise among its employees. Only a handful of passengers looked with curiosity at the huge jet with unfamiliar identification marks. One more group of American inspectors came on this flight to conduct checks on Soviet territory in line with the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty.

It has been the ninth team to arrive in Moscow since July 1, when the process of mutual inspections started. Sixteen facilities have been checked so far over that period, with the 17th, the destruction site Lesnaya in Rovno region, the Western Ukraine, being inspected now.

This is the second trip to the USSR for the chief of the team, which arrived today, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Kelly. In early July he took part in an inspection trip to the missile operating base Rechitsa in Gomel region, Belorussia. "It is clear to us that the Soviet side is interested in facilitating our inspections," he said in perfect Russian. "Excellent conditions were created for our work and we are quite satisfied. The American and Soviet sides strive to do everything possible to bring the INF Treaty to a success. In addition to official contacts, we have established good personal relations. Your officers had produced a positive impression on me—they are capable commanding officers who have good knowledge of the provisions of the treaty. They are also very hospitable. I think this is the national trait of the Soviet people."

Lawrence Kelly said further that the on-site checks that had been conducted showed that verification measures were working. "This makes one confident that we can advance in arms control issues."

The C-141 military transport is preparing for the flight to Frankfurt am Main, from where American inspection teams arrive in Moscow. A group of inspectors who finished work at two Soviet missile operating bases near Glukhov, the Ukraine, are boarding the plane. Its head Terry Cornil said that the inspections conducted by the team at both bases were a success. The team could see everything stipulated by the treaty.

U.S. Carries Out Nuclear Test in Nevada
LD0707193388 Moscow TASS in English
1906 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] New York, July 7, TASS—The United States carried out yet another nuclear explosion at the Nevada test site. The Associated Press news agency reported that the test which had been conducted for military purposes had caused an earth jolt of 5.6 points on the Richter scale. Earth tremors had been felt in Las Vegas which is at a distance of more than 160 kilometers from the epicentre of the explosion.

The AP report did not give data about the explosion's yield. However, expert opinion is that the explosion was one of the most powerful detonations over the entire period of the existence of the proving ground in Nevada.

A spokesman for the U.S. Department of Energy has said that the test which is this year's eighth one went off normally and was not accompanied with a release of radiation into the atmosphere.

Nonproliferation Pact, Nuclear Test Limits Noted
PM0707123588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
7 Jul 88 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report under the rubric "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center": "For a World Without Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] A news conference held 6 July at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center was devoted to the 20th anniversary of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the results of the latest round of full Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting and ultimately stopping nuclear tests.

B. G. Mayorskiy, acting chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Department on Questions of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Space, described the conclusion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as evidence of the responsibility and maturity with which the international community as a whole can tackle the resolution of fundamental problems of the day. He stressed that its term of operation must be determined by one factor alone: the length of time that nuclear weapons themselves exist.

I. M. Palenykh, leader of the USSR delegation at the full Soviet-U.S. talks on the limitation and ultimate cessation of nuclear tests, noted that the second round of talks took place in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere, providing effective conditions for seeking and working out mutually acceptable solutions.

While preparing a joint verification experiment at the sides' testing grounds with a view to elaborating improved measures for verifying the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, the

sides focused their attention on the elaboration of concrete accords governing the substance of future verification measures under this treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Protocols to both treaties must be finally coordinated in the shortest possible time, so that immediately after this the sides can switch at the talks to examining more radical steps for limiting the yields and numbers of nuclear tests, I.M. Palenykh stressed.

Soltan Comments on Chemical Weapons Ban
LD0700072088 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] The 7th of July marks the start of the summer session of the disarmament conference, where 40 countries are represented. Our commentator Yuriy Soltan believes that acute debates will develop, primarily on the issue of banning chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles. He elaborates, and this is what he writes:

A draft convention on this has largely been coordinated, but I don't undertake to predict when it will be completed, even though a green light seems to have been opened for a successful conclusion of this work. All participants in the conference view the convention as essential. Many delegates to the recent United Nations General Assembly session on disarmament also gave top priority to the endeavors to ban chemical weapons. The Soviet and American leaders described this problem at their summit meeting in Moscow as of everlasting importance. The Soviet Union initiated an exchange in teams of specialists, who inspected military chemical facilities in the USSR, the United States, and Britain. Why then does the signing of the convention that many expected to take place last year still remain undecided?

There are two approaches to the endeavors to resolve this problem. Disputes on the convention (?all) focus on verification, including on-site inspections as well as inspections at both state sector and private facilities that might be engaged in producing combat chemicals. As for the United States, it wants to leave the commercial plants which largely account for the manufacture of chemical weapons out of verification procedures. Moreover, the Soviet Union has officially announced the quantity of combat chemicals it has at its disposal, 50,000 tonnes. It also declared that Soviet chemical weapons are stored only on Soviet soil and that they have never been granted to anyone. No other country, neither the United States nor its NATO allies, has released such data.

Judging by different sources, the United States has 150,000 tonnes of deadly chemicals, that is, more than 3 million units of chemical ammunition, and 1 in 10 American chemical shells, bombs, and mines is stored in Europe. Warships cruising the waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans also have American chemical weapons on board. Besides, last year, the Soviet Union stopped the production of all types of chemical arms and began to build a facility for liquidating their stockpiles. At about the same time, the United States launched the production of artillery shells for another dangerous type of nerve gases, binary.

Comparing the two approaches to the efforts to resolve the major disarmament problem, you will be able to determine beyond any doubt who uses the mechanism of hinderance at the conference. It must be added that what matters is not only technical difficulties but also the unwillingness of some countries to take a political decision with a view to eliminating those weapons of mass destruction once and for all.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SPD's Bahr Calls For Bonn Disarmament Meeting

AU2306140888 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jun 88 p 6

[Excerpt] Berlin, 22 June—SPD Presidium member Bahr has asked the FRG Government to convene a "European conference" on disarmament problems and nuclear-free corridors in the FRG. At the end of the 3-day International Meeting on Nuclear-Free Zones in East Berlin, Bahr called it deplorable that Bonn does not take further disarmament steps. The meeting proposed by GDR state and party leader Honecker has confirmed his opinion that "nuclear-free corridors are the right way."

The FDP delegation was praised for its participation in the disarmament meeting by the GDR media. Although the Free Democrats do not think much of nuclear-free zones, the youth journal JUNGE WELT wrote on Wednesday [22 June] that it is important "that not only women and men who are of the same or similar opinion participate in the large-scale equal dialogue in the palace." On Wednesday the SED official organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused Ronneberger, deputy chairman of the FDP Bundestag Group of "polemics." This was how the paper reacted to Ronneberger's speech at the East Berlin meeting in which he opposed nuclear-free zones on Monday [20 June].

On Wednesday Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU-CSU Bundestag Group, called the East Berlin conference "a propaganda event characterized by outdated thinking." The exclusion of a Swedish participant and other events have clearly demonstrated that the managers of the conference were only interested in presenting an audience believing in nuclear-free zones.

Glasnost and perestroika (openness and restructuring) have remained foreign words in East Berlin, Ruehe said. The assaults on Western correspondents near the Wall rather increase the impression that one is trying to prevent glasnost and perestroika in East Berlin. Hardly 2 weeks ago, the Potsdam conference suggested that a real and open dialogue on confidence-building could be possible. However, the latest events have again placed this impression in question.

Scholz Urges U.S. Support for Disarmament Effort

WA2906173288 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 June 88 p 4

[Article by fy. "Take the Soviet Union at its Word; Washington Supports Bonn Concept/France as 'Impediment'"]

[Text] Bonn will be able to count on Washington's support in its efforts to effect a NATO mandate for conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the

Urals as quickly as possible. This is perhaps the most significant result brought back by new West German Defense Minister Scholz from his recent official visit to Washington. Scholz met with his host, Secretary of Defense Carlucci, with Vice President Bush, Senators Nunn, McCain and Levin, as well as with Assistant Secretary of State Whitehead. He encountered agreement with his view that conventional disarmament must follow in priority the agreement now being sought on a "Start" accord on the reduction of intercontinental nuclear missiles and that the West should not limit itself simply to reacting to Soviet proposals.

"The Soviet Union has admitted its own conventional superiority and has also indicated its approval of the principle of asymmetrical force reduction. The West must make an active effort to take advantage of the opportunities that this offers," was the conclusion Scholz drew in Washington from current Soviet policy. He agreed with his partners in the talks that the Soviets ought to be taken at their word. Moreover, Scholz stated, NATO would have to come to a consensus on a joint set of demands to be submitted to the Soviet Union.

Scholz regarded the course of his visit as "very positive" because it had resulted in agreement on the assessment of all important issues discussed with Carlucci and the other participants. At center stage was the question of how quickly a mandate for the Conference on Conventional Disarmament between the Atlantic and the Urals could be achieved. Scholz found support from Carlucci for the German disarmament proposals—Bonn had made known its own concepts as early as March—as well as the German recommendation that Europe not be treated as a whole, but that separate consideration would have to be given to the problems of North Europe, Central Europe and South Europe during the Vienna negotiations. Until now, the United States have preferred an overall view during the preliminary planning. The efforts at reaching a common understanding will now be continued and intensified at a higher working level. The talks with Carlucci were seen by the Germans as a first step in this direction.

As could be heard during the visit, there is the hope in the West German Government that now, following the recent elections in France, there could be a review of previous French positions regarding the conventional disarmament conference. So far, the French posture, as perceived by the Germans, has been an impediment. In the efforts to achieve a mandate for the CCD in Vienna, only the preamble and a number of principles and guidelines have been agreed upon. Such details as whether air forces will be included in the first phase of negotiations, as the Soviets have wanted, or to what extent nuclear-capable weapons—so-called dual-capable weapons—will be negotiated or limited to nuclear-capable artillery or, beyond this, or to what extent aircraft will be included, again as the Soviets have proposed, have not been settled.

It became clear in Washington that the demand upon Moscow to follow up its words on conventional armaments with actions would have to be matched by NATO's own obligation to itself to eliminate its own shortcomings and to set in motion specific negotiations through the Alliance's commitment to a negotiation mandate. Scholz does not deny that the working out of a mandate for disarmament negotiations, now the nub of the task imposed upon NATO, can only be achieved when it becomes clear to the Alliance what the contours of its overall disarmament and security concept will be and how this overall concept is to be integrated into its East-West policy. A speeding up in reaching consensus among the 16 sovereign NATO countries is necessary. Scholz, however, did not want to let himself be committed to a schedule within which the NATO consensus should come to pass, this being the prerequisite to taking the Soviet Union at its word. It would have to take place "soon," it was reported.

During the talks in Washington, it was pointed out to the German defense minister that there was a large gap between the disarmament rhetoric of the Soviet leadership and its actual arms policies in important areas. For example, testing was reported to be taking place in the Soviet Union of four short-range missile prototypes. According to experts, these could be regarded as replacements for the SS-21 and the SCUD-B missiles. Furthermore, the Soviets were said to be making significant gains in strengthening the offensive capability of their air force. Soviet expansion of its armored forces was also said to be ongoing. Although the Soviet Union has only recently introduced a modern main battle tank, the T-80, its successor is already in production. The Soviets are also said to have produced some 1000 of these tanks and to have already equipped one division with it in the Soviet Union. It is such moves as these, in contradiction to the disarmament policy officially promulgated by the Soviets, that make it all the more urgent to be able to impress upon the Soviet Union the necessity of a decision. "It is necessary that the trend toward expanding their offensive capability be turned around," stated Scholz.

Not discussed in the delegation talks, according to official sources, was the modernization of Western nuclear short-range missiles, particularly the "Lance" missiles. The need for a decision on this issue will apparently not emerge until after the inauguration of a new administration in Washington next year.

SPD's Bahr Outlines Disarmament, Security Motion

*LD3006150088 Hamburg DPA in German
1349 GMT 30 Jun 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—In the view of the Social Democrats, the West should declare its readiness to halve the number of NATO Armed Forces and reduce offensive weapon systems to an even greater degree. This is the

correct point of departure for negotiations on establishing conventional stability in Europe, said SPD President Member Egon Bahr in Bonn today. He was presenting the SPD's motion for peace and disarmament policy for the party congress at the end of August in Muenster. These proposals could be the starting point for an agreement on equal upper limits with the Eastern armed forces.

According to Bahr, the motion unanimously adopted by the SPD executive underlines the continuity of the Social Democratic peace policy. The concept of joint security developed by the SPD is finding increasing support in East and West. It is important now to give additional impetus to the process of disarmament and to make peace in Europe "unbreakable" by means of steps in the nuclear and conventional spheres.

The SPD sees the threat to development as being above all the "erroneous belief" that more security could be achieved by more weapons. It strongly rejects the modernization of existing and the development of new types of "exotic" weapons which could alter the strategic situation.

The SPD calls for an early start to talks which, parallel to the talks on conventional stability in Europe, are to eliminate nuclear short-range missiles from the Atlantic to the Urals. The aim in this respect is for further zero solutions, both with regard to battlefield weapons as well as short-range and new air-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Tactical nuclear weapons should be eliminated by the time conventional stability is established in Europe. Intermediate steps are also possible in this respect. For example, a continued reduction of nuclear-armed artillery could also be begun unilaterally without the federal republic's security interests being endangered.

In the seven-page motion, the Social Democrats also speak out in favor of a growing role for West Europe, including France, in the Western alliance. The idea of a "European buttress" within NATO is supported. This should not, however, be an obstacle to the continuing process of disarmament but must help to create a stable peace in Europe going beyond the borders of the alliance.

FRANCE

LE FIGARO Interviews FRG's Rupert Scholz
*PM3006100288 Paris LE FIGARO in French
28 Jun 88 p 2*

[Report on Interview with Defense Minister Rupert Scholz by Pierre Bocev and Jean-Paul Picaper in Bonn—date not given]

[Excerpt] This "Scholz doctrine," which is very close to the ideas of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, should be applied to military problems in particular.

For instance, the Kremlin has been talking of its "defensive doctrine" for 2 years, whereas according to Rupert Scholz' analysis, which is shared by all Western experts, the Soviet Army's posture is still offensive.

"The army has already been supplied with 1,000 new tanks. They belong to a new generation called the FST ("future Soviet tank") which complements the armored forces' recently supplied T-80 tanks and ,therefore, amount to early modernization."

Gorbachev would "increase his credibility by halting production of new weapons for the Soviet forces." But, the minister concedes, "the change in thinking is a process" which requires time. Whatever Gorbachev's real intentions, account must be taken of the "weight of the apparatus which suffers from excessive bureaucracy." This is why Mr Scholz thinks he must be given the "benefit of the doubt."

In his view, the same reasoning must be applied to the latest Soviet proposals on conventional disarmament, in other words the nonnuclear forces.

In a speech to the United Nations at the beginning of the month, the head of Soviet diplomacy suggested conventional disarmament in three phases. First, the removal of "asymmetries," in other words the quantity of weapons which one of the two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—has in excess over the other. It would be followed by a reduction of 500,000 men in each camp.

Finally, the very structure of the armed forces on both sides would be changed to remove their offensive capability: They would become truly "defensive."

With this plan, the Kremlin has undoubtedly scored a point with Western public opinion, the German minister thinks. Hence the importance of "not allowing the Soviets to take the initiative." Otherwise, the West will only have a "reactive attitude" to the USSR's many suggestions, whereas the West ought to be "active."

The German minister wishes to remove the Soviet forces' capability to invade Western Europe. "To achieve that, the asymmetries which favor the Eastern bloc will have to be eliminated by an agreement."

The establishment of a joint Western position, therefore, is of "vital importance." In Rupert Scholz' view this should take place on two levels. First, within NATO to draw up an "overall concept" of the future of security and disarmament. But also in Franco-German consultations which, he said, are "complementary and necessary."

It is to this that the minister's visit to Paris today will be partly devoted. It is primarily a "visit aimed at making acquaintance and there is no specific agenda" for the talks. However, Franco-German relations are a perfect example of "cooperation in the security policy sphere which will be stepped up."

In this connection, the Franco-German defense council, like the joint brigade, is "the expression of possible developments" in this crucial sphere. Of course, Franco-German cooperation is not intended as "competition with NATO." Instead, the aim is to build a "complementary structure" in Europe, notably in the WEU framework but within the Atlantic Alliance.

NETHERLANDS

Lt Gen G.C. Berkhof on Advantages, Problems of INF Treaty

52002444 *The Hague INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR* in Dutch Apr 1988 pp 242-249

[Commentary by Lt Gen G. C. Berkhof, retired: "The Treaty of Washington: A Step Forward or a Leap in the Dark?"]

[Text] On all sides the signing of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range weapon systems in Washington on 8 December of last year has been characterized as a unique and historic event. That it will go down in history is certain. However, only time will tell whether it was a historic blunder, as some French politicians argue, or whether it marks a turning point in East-West relations, as we hear in comments from many politicians from the other Western European countries. One thing that is certain, however, is that there is movement in the arms control process. A new wind is blowing and the stagnation that marked recent years seems to be turning into the opposite. If the agenda that has been proposed is adhered to, we might even go so far as to speak of an arms control race, and a race the initiative for which clearly came from Moscow at that.

Naturally that raises the question as to the Kremlin leaders' motives for this about-face. Inasmuch as altruism is not a guiding principle in relations between states, the calculation of political and military gains and losses must have come out positively on balance for them, too. Perhaps not immediately, but certainly in the long run. In any case, it is important to view every treaty—including this one—on its merits. Arms control does not put an end to conflicting interests. Although these conflicts may assume a different character, the competition is still there, even at the negotiating table.

The Treaty

The treaty signed in Washington comprises four documents:

- the actual treaty on the elimination of existing intermediate-range weapons—known as intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in NATO jargon—and shorter-range nuclear forces or SNF; the treaty also forbids the production, testing, or deployment of new weapons in these categories; it is of unlimited duration but if extraordinary circumstances require, it can be denounced on 6-months' notice; signed separately but also part of the treaty are:
- a protocol on the procedures to be followed in the elimination;
- a protocol on inspection; and
- a memorandum of understanding on the inventory of weapons as of 1 November 1987 and their location.

In addition, there is another treaty which is important but was signed earlier, on 15 September 1987. This provides for the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, permanently-manned staffs in Moscow and Washington. In a certain sense this is an extension of the hot line agreement of 1963. In addition to their primary mission, the prevention of unintended war, the centers are also charged with the exchange of data required by the treaty obligations. The centers will not become involved in any disputes. If such arise, a Special Verification Commission will be convened. What is to be done if that fails to resolve the dispute is not stated in the treaty.

The treaty covers ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, specifically those with a range of more than 1,000 and less than 5,500 km (the INF weapons) and those with a range of 500 to 1,000 km (the SNF weapons). Upon ratification of the treaty, the INF weapons must be eliminated within a period of 3 years. A period of 18 months is provided for the elimination of the SNF weapons. Furthermore, the treaty uses the term "weapon-delivery vehicles" for both ballistic and cruise missiles. This means that not only must the nuclear variants be eliminated but also the chemical and conventional ones. Thus far little attention has been paid to this point.

The memorandum of understanding reveals that the Soviet Union must eliminate a total of 1,836 missile systems, compared to 857 for the United States. Table 1 [not reproduced] shows that previous American estimates of the number of Soviet weapons were inaccurate. In part, this seems to be the result of transfers from the operational to the nonoperational category. Thus, it is surprising that there are still 36 nonoperational missiles at the Votkinsk Mechanical Engineering Factory, even though production of that missile ceased some time ago. It also looks as though the Soviet Union has scrapped SS4's very rapidly. There are more operational launch installations (79) than operational missiles (65), which is not very logical from an organizational standpoint. The discrepancies must also be attributed to the difficulties of satellite reconnaissance. It is possible to determine the location of bases with great certainty but errors can occur in determining the number of weapons, particularly when smaller weapons are involved. On the other hand it

is difficult to hide missile launches. This is because launches are observed not only by various types of satellites but also by the other national technical means: ground-based radar and listening stations.

Verification and Elimination

Compliance with the treaty will be monitored not only through national technical means but also through on-site inspections. The basis for these inspections is the data in the memorandum. It must be reviewed no more than 30 days after ratification, after which 200 inspectors will have 60 days to inspect all the locations named in it. Furthermore, the elimination proceedings may be monitored. Plans for these must be delivered in advance to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. For 13 years after verification, random tests may be held at locations that had been viewed earlier. There are limits on this, however (20 the first 3 years, then decreasing to 15 and 10 at 5-year intervals).

A thorny problem was presented by the monitoring of factories. Both parties disliked the idea of foreign snoopers but since the Votkinsk factory produces missiles with a stage similar but not identical to a stage of one of the missiles being eliminated, something needed to be done about it. It was obvious that the national technical means would be inadequate for verification. The solution chosen was to build a double fence around the factory; between the fences patrols may be carried out in vehicles. Furthermore, American inspectors may monitor the contents of trucks and railroad cars at the main gate. Other gates, which must not be used for freight traffic, will be watched with television cameras. In order to balance the treaty, the United States allowed the Hercules Plant No. 1 in Utah to be monitored in the same way. In the past Pershing missiles were assembled there. Inspectors will remain on site for a maximum of 13 years. If after 3 years, however, it is found that no missiles have been produced during a period of 12 consecutive months, the monitoring will cease.

Which missile caused this problem is unknown. It might, however, be the SS25. This missile caused other headaches as well since it is the subject of negotiations in the START talks. The bases it operates from are suspiciously like those for the SS20. For that reason it was agreed that upon request the SS 25's will have to be brought outside within 6 hours and remain there for 6 hours. The bunker roofs will have to remain open for that period, so that satellites can determine that they are empty. This stipulation will remain in force for 3 years unless other verification possibilities are agreed on in the START negotiations. Each year, six requests may be made, each one to monitor only one operational base.

The treaty uses the word "elimination." This is because the weapons will not only be destroyed but may also be made unusable in other ways. Still, destruction by explosion or by firing the missile stages, is the most-used method. The debris must be also compressed or crushed.

Cruise missiles will be cut lengthwise. They will be further grounded by cutting the fins in half. As for the launch installations, the treaty stipulates how each shall be treated. On the Soviet installations, among other things, the rearmost section will be removed so the vehicles can still be used for civilian purposes.

As mentioned above, there will be still other alternative methods of elimination. One hundred INF weapons may be launched. In doing so, no test equipment may be used, only instruments required for safety purposes. It is also permitted to put a total of 15 weapons on display. The treaty even allows for the possibility of total loss of weapons in an accident. That must be announced immediately, however. The nuclear devices and guidance systems will not be destroyed. These will be removed from the nose cones or reentry vehicles before the latter are destroyed. It was determined that the nuclear warheads of the West German Pershing IA missiles, which are not mentioned in the treaty, will be withdrawn to the United States 15 days before the expiration of the elimination deadline, after which the nose cones will be destroyed.

Elimination and Verification: An Analysis

The elimination of the weapon-delivery vehicles and launch installations will be thoroughly done. However, the warheads and guidance systems will not be destroyed. In the case of nuclear warheads, this could hardly be otherwise. The special nuclear materials needed for them cannot be eliminated or neutralized without danger. Consequently, the arsenal of nuclear warheads remains potentially intact. In some cases the nuclear warheads can be transferred to other weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, the nuclear warheads of ground-launched versions of cruise missiles could be used for nuclear sea-launched variants. The special nuclear materials can in any case be used to produce new nuclear warheads. Inasmuch as only the container (nose cone or reentry vehicle) will be destroyed, it will presumably not be possible in the case of weapons like the SS23 (and possibly also the SS12) to determine whether a weapon originally carried a nuclear, chemical, or conventional warhead.

Iraq's attacks on Iranian cities using missiles supplied by the Soviet Union (presumably of the SS12 type in view of their range) raise the question of whether Moscow must withdraw at least the warheads of those missiles and whether their nose cones must be destroyed like those of the West German Pershing IA's. The text of the treaty reads as follows: "During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles, which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same time frame in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section." Since the text does not specifically refer to nuclear reentry vehicles, conventional variants are not excluded as such. Since, however, this concerns only one party and

Washington has declared that this text refers to the West German Pershing IA missiles, Moscow is not formally obliged to do anything about the Iraqi SS12's. Missiles with a range under 500 km (not yet the subject of negotiations) have, however, been supplied to a large number of countries. This question could pose a thorny problem for those missiles since circumvention certainly cannot be ruled out there.

Monitoring procedures for the elimination of weapon systems, launch installations, and bases are well planned. Certainly, the verification is better arranged than in the earlier SALT agreements. In those, monitoring was possible only through national technical means. These would have been inadequate for the verification of this treaty, as demonstrated by the aforementioned discrepancy between estimates and actual numbers of weapons. Consequently, supplementary on-site inspections are essential.

Nonetheless, the monitoring is not ironclad. That is because inspections are restricted to the objects named in the memorandum of understanding and factories producing cruise missiles are excluded. The United States could, for instance, install the engines originally intended for the ground-launched version on sea-launched variants. The engines are the same after all. The question, however, is whether the Americans would be willing to take that risk. The types appear in the budget at different points so the danger of such manipulation leaking out is certainly a real one.

Despite glasnost, Soviet defense production is considerably less transparent in budgetary and other respects. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has declared that it is producing a missile with a stage similar though not identical to a stage of one of the missiles being eliminated. The Votkinsk Mechanical Engineering Factory, where this missile is assembled, does, however, fall under the monitoring stipulations. To be sure, missile parts can only be inspected on the exterior but inspections elsewhere would still reveal that stages from missiles being eliminated were missing. Naturally the possibility cannot be ruled out that one of the parties has not declared a hanger full of weapons. That then would not be monitored. Still, the operational usefulness of something like that seems small.

The treaty devotes considerable attention to the elimination of training facilities. After a time, the level of training would consequently fall. Furthermore, no test or training launches may be carried out. Those would almost certainly be detected by national technical means.

To sum up, therefore, it must be concluded that despite the fact that both parties can cheat on the stipulations of the treaty, the chance of them actually doing so is not very great.

Still, in cases where a violation is alleged (one detected by satellites for instance) it would have been better to permit the inspection of the installation involved (one not named in the memorandum of understanding) upon request. This might reduce mutual suspicion. Furthermore, it would lay good groundwork for any follow-up negotiations. Of course, it does not solve the problem of what is to happen if a violation is detected and the party involved refuses to rectify the situation. One solution for this might have been to include a stipulation permitting arbitration by third parties and permitting the facts to be made public. If that fails, the injured party should have the right to annul the stipulation violated. This would reduce the chances of the treaty being denounced in its entirety.

Another omission is that the Americans did not require a larger number of inspectors and random inspections. As it is, they are the same for both parties. That seems reasonable but it is not. The Americans must spread themselves over 127 installations, while the Soviet inspectors need monitor only 34.

The INF/SNF Treaty: An Analysis

It is said that the treaty on the elimination of INF and SNF weapons is a good treaty because the verification procedures are worked out so well. Of course that is nonsense. Good monitoring of treaty compliance is of importance because otherwise suspicions may arise which it was the very purpose of the treaty to reduce. That is important but has nothing to do with the essence of the treaty—increased security for both parties. A treaty that is bad in this respect is not improved by good monitoring procedures; it remains what it is, a bad treaty.

Now, the answer to the question of whether this is a good or a bad treaty depends of course on where one stands. For Moscow the INF treaty has certainly accomplished a long-felt desire, that of removing the most modern American forward based systems. The Soviet Union has always viewed this type of weapon as a strategic weapon. For the Soviets, any American weapon capable of reaching the Soviet Union is a strategic weapon; the category therefore is not limited to those with a range of 5,500 km and over. In the SALT/START negotiations the Americans have always refused to accept this definition because that would mean that Soviet weapons aimed against Western Europe would not fall under the treaty. That has not happened but the result of the INF treaty is still that weapons threatening the Soviet Union are being eliminated in exchange for the elimination of weapons that do not form a threat to the territory of the United States. That is why the INF treaty is a step forward for Moscow; the Soviets view it as a good treaty because it provides "equal security" for both parties in the area of nuclear armaments.

For the administration in Washington the elimination of the cruise and Pershing II missiles means that in case of a conflict in Western Europe, they will not be confronted early on with the problem of using weapons that present a great danger of escalation. For the remaining American weapons in the INF class, approximately 160 F-111 bombers operating from bases in the United Kingdom, the question of nuclear use comes up less rapidly. Furthermore, the aircraft must defy the formidable Warsaw Pact air defense system, which means that the threat (and thus the deterrence) from them is of a different order than that from the INF weapons now being eliminated.

There is an additional point. Since the mid-1970's the limited nuclear options laid down for American ICBM's have been supposed to serve in part to deter attacks with nuclear weapons on targets in Western Europe. The vulnerability of these weapons has robbed these options of a great deal of their credibility. This vulnerability will not diminish if the number of nuclear warheads for intercontinental missiles is halved in the START negotiations. Rather the opposite will happen. In a certain sense this and the elimination of INF weapons are erecting a fire wall which creates a qualitative difference between the deterrence of an attack on Western Europe on the one hand, and one on the United States on the other.

For that matter, this is also the tenor of the recently published report "Discriminate Deterrence" written by a group of security experts (including Clark, Brzezinski, and Kissinger) and representatives of the American armed forces. (Footnote 1) The report, which the group worked on for a year and a half, makes the following comments on nuclear deterrence:

"To help defend our allies and to defend our interests abroad, we cannot rely on threats expected to provoke our own annihilation if carried out. In peacetime, a strategy based on such threats would undermine support for national defense. In a crisis, reliance on such threats could fail catastrophically for lack of public support. We must have military effective responses that can limit destruction if we are not to invite destruction of what we are defending."

What the authors have in mind here is explained elsewhere:

"The Alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider and more devastating war—but through the risk of further escalation would still be there—but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading Soviet forces. The nuclear weapons would be used discriminately in, for example, attacks on Soviet command centers or troop concentrations."

The report also points out that in the future it will be possible to use very long-range conventional weapons of great accuracy to attack targets deep in the Soviet Union. The Americans are far ahead in this area. The result then is that:

"Current technology makes it possible to attack fixed targets at any range with accuracies within one to three meters. These accuracies and modern munitions give us a high probability of destroying a wide variety of point and area targets with one or a few shots without using nuclear warheads. They make practical attacks on heavily defended military targets deep in enemy territory.... Bridges, surface-to-air missile sites, intelligence facilities, rail lines, electric generating plants, petroleum refineries—all are suddenly much more vulnerable in the age of smart munitions."

The authors of the report argue therefore that the United States will need tens of thousands of weapons, with mass production bringing costs down to an acceptable level. The irony, however, is that the report will need to be revised thoroughly on this point. As mentioned above, because both ballistic and cruise missiles are defined as weapon-delivery vehicles, the deployment of nonnuclear weapons is forbidden. The introduction of cheap conventional ground-launched cruise missiles is therefore out of the question. Since SALT II has used the same definition for air-launched variants, it is unlikely that START will do otherwise. If that is indeed the case, then it will represent another barrier to the conventional option. As will be explained elsewhere, there is still uncertainty about sea-launched cruise missiles but even if they are not banned, it is certainly unlikely that "some tens of thousands" could be deployed.

Thus it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that with the INF treaty, the Soviet Union not only was able to reduce the nuclear threat against its territory but also managed (to a large extent) to block a potential conventional threat against it. For Washington the net results are less favorable. On the one hand, the advantage in accurate conventional weapons has been lost but on the other hand, better conditions have been created for a policy of "tailor-made deterrence."

In regard to INF weapons, the American negotiators were able to work on the basis of NATO's two-track decision, the 1979 decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles and at the same time to demonstrate a willingness to discuss a reduction in these weapons and in SS20 missiles. For SNF weapons the situation was different. For them, there was no Western offer on the table and the American negotiators were obviously taken by surprise by their Soviet counterparts. In addition, consultations with the allies probably played a marginal role here, as demonstrated by the squabbling over the West German Pershing IA missiles. What moved Gorbachev to make this proposal is not clear at present. In contrast to the SS20 missiles, the SS12's and SS23's can

carry not just nuclear but also chemical and conventional warheads. The nonnuclear versions therefore had a role to play in the strategic/operational air offensive: successive attacks by spetsnaz sabotage teams, nonnuclear ballistic and cruise missiles, and aircraft.

Now the missile component is being removed so its mission—to eliminate important targets in the rear—will have to be taken over by other weapon systems. These could be air-launched cruise or other missiles, possibly variants that do not fall under START ceilings or have a range of less than 500 km. As a result, the demands placed on NATO's air defense system in the future will need to be reviewed. Before the treaty was signed, it was generally assumed that in terms of long-term air defense a limited defense against ballistic missiles of the SS12 and SS23 types would be needed. That sort of extended air defense now must assume a different character.

On the other hand, it is important to Moscow that the West German Pershing IA's will not be modernized. It was planned for those missiles to be replaced by the Pershing IB, a Pershing II missile but with one less stage. Its range would thus be about 800 km, not enough to hit the Soviet Union but quite sufficient to pass over the territory of the GDR and threaten major targets on Soviet supply routes.

The Pershing option gave the FRG a special status within the alliance. The country was closely involved in target analysis (as a result it could ensure that the population of the GDR was spared) and would also have an important voice in deliberations about any possible use of nuclear weapons. This is because the guidelines for that stipulate that special weight shall be given to the views of countries closely involved.

The Soviet military argued therefore that in case of conflict the FRG would urge the United States to use the Pershings before conventional defense failed. There will certainly be greater reluctance to use weapons with a shorter range because they will hit either the FRG's own territory or that of the other Germany, the GDR.

Also of importance to Moscow is the fact that the INF treaty thwarts plans to introduce modern conventional missiles in this class, as part of the follow-on forces attack (FOFA), for instance. Thus the Americans no longer have the option of modernizing the engines of their 170 Pershing IA's and equipping the missile with a new guidance system and a conventional warhead. This conventional Pershing missile would have been particularly suitable for attacking airfields.

A great deal has been made of the fact that the Soviet Union will eliminate more weapons than the United States. This is a first, to be sure, but the fact remains that it is unwise to concentrate exclusively on the weapons being eliminated. It is, after all, the weapons that remain that will determine the new military relationship after

the implementation of the treaty, and for that reason they are certainly at least as important. In the class of INF weapons the relationship is now approximately 2.5 to 1. After the elimination of weapons this relationship will become more unfavorable, 4.5 to 1. This is because the Soviet Union has more long-range bombers and they do not fall under the provisions of the treaty. (Footnote 2) In many respects the situation is more unfavorable than in 1979, if only because of a lack of possibilities by which to correct the unfavorable relationship. With regard to SNF weapons, on the other hand, the relationship will grow more stable, since after the elimination approximately the same number of dual capable weapon systems will remain on each side. (Footnote 3)

Also of importance, of course, are the weapons under negotiation in the START talks. Here the target is a 50 percent reduction in nuclear warheads on missiles. For Western Europe the result will not be unimportant. If the Soviets are left with many variable-range missiles (such as the SS19, SS25, and possibly the SS24), then there will still be a major nuclear threat to Western Europe.

There is also the question of what will be done about sea-launched cruise missiles. Up to now the Americans have wanted to keep these outside the START process because in their opinion verification is impossible. According to AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY of 14 December 1987, however, the Soviet Union has indicated that it is able to detect nuclear cruise missiles with satellites, even underwater. It is difficult to judge the implications of this without knowing the technical details but if the report is accurate, then it will certainly affect the stability of relations in the nuclear sector, not least because it might mean that submarines carrying missiles can also be detected. The inclusion of cruise missiles on ships in a future START treaty would also create very great difficulties for the option of subordinating some of these weapons to SACEUR, as has been discussed. It should, however, be possible not to include conventional versions in the treaty, at least if the report is accurate, and that cannot be determined at the present stage.

The other weapons left by the treaty and still not the subject of negotiations are nuclear weapons with a range of less than 500 km. If we limit ourselves to cruise and other missiles, then the Soviet Union has a great superiority in this class. Nonetheless, Moscow seems willing to negotiate. Such an offer would create tensions within the alliance. The SNF treaty divides the alliance into zones of unequal security; that is psychologically true at any rate. The expression "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans" may not be correct from a military point of view but it would be difficult to convince the West German people of that. Many West German politicians are therefore very interested in negotiating on these weapons. To be sure, it was agreed at the NATO summit of 2 and 3 March in Brussels to give priority to negotiations on chemical and conventional weapons but Chancellor Kohl will still come under heavy pressure domestically if Gorbachev presents a third zero option.

Difficulties could also arise for the 1983 Montebello agreement to modernize shorter-range nuclear weapons. Now Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher were able to agree on a statement that these weapons will be kept "up to date" but it remains to be seen whether the ministers of defense will be able to remain so vague at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in April. That is when the plan prepared by the NATO supreme commander for the proper "mix" of weapon systems and nuclear warheads will come up for discussion. It will also be necessary to determine the schedule for replacing weapons like the Lance. If, as Chancellor Kohl has stated, they are to be replaced between 1993 and 1995, then the decision really has to be made very soon. Given the time that elapses between the decision to deploy and the deployment (4 to 6 years), it can only be postponed until 1990 at latest. With a well-timed third zero option, Gorbachev could throw a real monkeywrench into the works; this certainly will not have escaped his attention.

Now in assessing the military situation, one certainly must not look only at numbers of weapons; the strategy planned for their use is important as well. The Warsaw Pact's military strategy provides for an offensive against NATO's forward defensive line using armored units and for simultaneous operations against targets in the rear. Through speed and surprise, the Warsaw Pact will attempt to gain a decision before NATO uses nuclear weapons. According to the Soviet military, such a plan will have a greater chance of success if there is great hesitation about using nuclear weapons. This can be achieved by making American nuclear weapons more vulnerable, by "negotiating them away," or by a combination of the two. The INF treaty fits in particularly well with this plan.

On the other hand, NATO's strategy, which explicitly provides for the first use of nuclear weapons, is not made any more credible thereby. The strategy further lays down that the nature and extent of the response is not fixed in advance. The uncertainty this creates is considered an important element in the doctrine of deterrence because it makes it impossible to calculate gains and losses in advance. Part of this effect has now been lost; this is partially due, by the way, to the American policy of "tailor-made deterrence." This is not a happy development, not least because there is little agreement as to what should be done now with the remaining nuclear weapons.

It is objected that Gorbachev and his associates are far more interested in making resources available to strengthen the economy. In this view, it is not so important to judge the treaties on their military merits, but rather to get a "political process" going which will lead to further rapprochement. (Footnote 4) Greater economic interdependence and a better exchange of technology, it is said, can bring the Kremlin to put less emphasis on the military element of systemic competition. After all, a debate has started in Moscow too, about an "adjusted" or "sufficient" defense.

The last point is certainly true. It is also correct that the military apparatus by and large stands behind Gorbachev's arms control initiatives. The "more is better" philosophy is obsolete, at least as far as nuclear weapons go. Whether that is also true of conventional weapons is highly uncertain, however. Thanks to low pay, a high degree of standardization, and its less technologically oriented design style, the Soviet Union can compete comfortably in this area. In addition, this type of weapon is the only Soviet industrial product that is successful on the world market. Consequently it would harm the economy if production shrank drastically.

Furthermore, the debate over an "adjusted" defense is mainly about weapons that will revolutionize the art of war and about how they should be incorporated into Soviet strategy. This involves not only military applications for electronics, where it is admitted that the United States is ahead, but also weapons based on the application of new physical principles, such as laser and microwave weapons, which the Soviet Union is primarily concentrating on. Microwave weapons are capable of disrupting electronic equipment and can, even at low energy levels, disorient or kill humans. Presumably in connection with these, experiments are being carried out with new patterns of organization such as integrated army corps, operational maneuver groups, and independent brigades. These can move more quickly and can be mobilized or brought up to wartime strength within a shorter time. Without a good understanding of these developments, negotiations on a reduction in conventional armaments—like negotiations on the remaining nuclear weapons in Western Europe—are little more than a leap in the dark.

To sum up, when the INF/SNF treaty is ratified, a class of weapons will be eliminated. Whether that will increase the security of Western Europe is questionable. A great deal will depend on the follow-up negotiations and it is impossible to predict with any certainty what they will bring. This is not only because Gorbachev's agenda is uncertain but also because there is real doubt as to whether NATO can reach agreement to bring all its differing interests under a single umbrella. Weapons will be eliminated but that certainly will not end Western Europe's security problems.

Footnotes

1. "Discriminate Deterrence," report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Washington, January 1988. See also G. C. Berkhof, "Afschrikking naar Maat?" [Tailor-Made Deterrence?], in ATLANTISCH PERSPEKTIEF, 1988/1, pp 8-14.

2. USSR: 502 Tu-16's, 165 Tu-22's, 290 Tu-26/22M's, and 795 Su-24's; United States: 56 FB-111's, 160 F-111's, and 220 A-6E's. "The Military Balance 1987-1988," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1987

3. USSR: 1,845 dual capable aircraft and 100 ALCM's. Other Warsaw Pact countries: 233 dual capable aircraft. United States: 1,421 dual capable aircraft. NATO less the United States: 1,096 dual capable aircraft. Source: idem.

4. This is in accord with the opinion of Foreign Minister Genscher, NRC HANDELSBLAD, 2 February 1987.

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TURKEY

Former Navy Commander Opposes Nuclear-Powered Submarines

52002445 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
29 Apr 88 pp 2, 13

[Text] The United States wants to transfer to Turkey nuclear-powered attack submarines which it will retire from service soon. While the Turkish General Staff and the Turkish Naval Forces remain cool to this proposal, they want Turkey to be given conventional submarines.

The United States put the first nuclear-powered submarines of the "Skate" class into service in 1958. The Americans built four vessels of this class: the Skate, the Swordfish, the Sargo and the Seadragon.

In trying to transfer these submarines to Italy and Turkey, the United States consulted with the general staffs of the two countries. Italy responded with a definitive "no" to this proposal while the Turkish General Staff and the Turkish Naval Forces command gave it a cool response and asked that the "priorities in line with Turkey's national strategies" be taken into account in the modernization of the Turkish navy.

Admiral Zahit Atakan, a former commander of the Turkish Naval Forces and the submarine fleet, expressed his opposition to the proposal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the Turkish navy and said:

"With its current means the Turkish Naval Forces cannot maintain nuclear-powered submarines. We have no facilities or personnel for these submarines. It is very expensive to maintain them. Moreover, the seas within the Turkish navy's area of operations are not suitable for such submarines. The acquisition of these submarines would be a bad decision. What Turkey needs is conventional submarines."

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